• Korean small business review
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• v.33 no.4
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• pp.77-93
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• 2011

Since 2000, the employment rate of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) has dwindled while the creation of new jobs and the emergence of healthy SMEs have been stagnant. The fundamental reason for these symptoms is that the economic structure is disadvantageous to SMEs. In particular, the greater gap between SMEs and large enterprises has resulted in polarization, and the resulting imbalance has become the largest obstacle to improving SMEs' competitiveness. For example, the total productivity has continued to drop, and the average productivity of SMEs is now merely 30% of that of large enterprises, and the average wage of SMEs' employees is only 53% of that of large enterprises. Along with polarization, rapid industrialization has also caused anti-enterprise consensus, the collapse of the middle class, hostility towards establishments, and other aftereffects. The general consensus is that unless these problems are solved, South Korea will not become an advanced country. Especially, South Korea is now facing issues that need urgent measures, such as the decline of its economic growth, the worsening distribution of profits, and the increased external volatility. Recognizing such negative trends, the MB administration proposed a win-win growth policy and recently introduced a new national value called "ecosystemic development." As the terms in such policy agenda are similar, however, the conceptual differences among such terms must first be fully understood. Therefore, in this study, the concepts of win-win growth policy and ecosystemic development, and the need for them, were surveyed, and their differences from and similarities with other policy concepts like win-win cooperation and symbiotic development were examined. Based on the results of the survey and examination, the study introduced a South Korean model of win-win growth, targeting the promotion of a sound balance between large enterprises and SMEs and an innovative ecosystem, and finally, proposing future policy tasks. Win-win growth is not an academic term but a policy term. Thus, it is less advisable to give a theoretical definition of it than to understand its concept based on its objective and method as a policy. The core of the MB administration's win-win growth policy is the creation of a partnership between key economic subjects such as large enterprises and SMEs based on each subject's differentiated capacity, and such economic subjects' joint promotion of growth opportunities. Its objective is to contribute to the establishment of an advanced capitalistic system by securing the sustainability of the South Korean economy. Such win-win growth policy includes three core concepts. The first concept, ecosystem, is that win-win growth should be understood from the viewpoint of an industrial ecosystem and should be pursued by overcoming the issues of specific enterprises. An enterprise is not an independent entity but a social entity, meaning it exists in relationship with the society (Drucker, 2011). The second concept, balance, points to the fact that an effort should be made to establish a systemic and social infrastructure for a healthy balance in the industry. The social system and infrastructure should be established in such a way as to create a balance between short- term needs and long-term sustainability, between freedom and responsibility, and between profitability and social obligations. Finally, the third concept is the behavioral change of economic entities. The win-win growth policy is not merely about simple transactional relationships or determining reasonable prices but more about the need for a behavior change on the part of economic entities, without which the objectives of the policy cannot be achieved. Various advanced countries have developed different win-win growth models based on their respective cultures and economic-development stages. Japan, whose culture is characterized by a relatively high level of group-centered trust, has developed a productivity improvement model based on such culture, whereas the U.S., which has a highly developed system of market capitalism, has developed a system that instigates or promotes market-oriented technological innovation. Unlike Japan or the U.S., Europe, a late starter, has not fully developed a trust-based culture or market capitalism and thus often uses a policy-led model based on which the government leads the improvement of productivity and promotes technological innovation. By modeling successful cases from these advanced countries, South Korea can establish its unique win-win growth system. For this, it needs to determine the method and tasks that suit its circumstances by examining the prerequisites for its success as well as the strengths and weaknesses of each advanced country. This paper proposes a South Korean model of win-win growth, whose objective is to upgrade the country's low-trust-level-based industrial structure, in which large enterprises and SMEs depend only on independent survival strategies, to a high-trust-level-based social ecosystem, in which large enterprises and SMEs develop a cooperative relationship as partners. Based on this objective, the model proposes the establishment of a sound balance of systems and infrastructure between large enterprises and SMEs, and to form a crenovative social ecosystem. The South Korean model of win-win growth consists of three axes: utilization of the South Koreans' potential, which creates community-oriented energy; fusion-style improvement of various control and self-regulated systems for establishing a high-trust-level-oriented social infrastructure; and behavioral change on the part of enterprises in terms of putting an end to their unfair business activities and promoting future-oriented cooperative relationships. This system will establish a dynamic industrial ecosystem that will generate creative energy and will thus contribute to the realization of a sustainable economy in the 21st century. The South Korean model of win-win growth should pursue community-based self-regulation, which promotes the power of efficiency and competition that is fundamentally being pursued by capitalism while at the same time seeking the value of society and community. Already existing in Korea's traditional roots, such objectives have become the bases of the Shinbaram culture, characterized by the South Koreans' spontaneity, creativity, and optimism. In the process of a community's gradual improvement of its rules and procedures, the trust among the community members increases, and the "social capital" that guarantees the successful control of shared resources can be established (Ostrom, 2010). This basic ideal can help reduce the gap between large enterprises and SMEs, alleviating the South Koreans' victim mentality in the face of competition and the open-door policy, and creating crenovative corporate competitiveness. The win-win growth policy emerged for the purpose of addressing the polarization and imbalance structure resulting from the evolution of 21st-century capitalism. It simultaneously pursues efficiency and fairness on one hand and economic and community values on the other, and aims to foster efficient interaction between the market and the government. This policy, however, is also evolving. The win-win growth policy can be considered an extension of the win-win cooperation that the past 'Participatory Government' promoted at the enterprise management level to the level of systems and culture. Also, the ecosystemic development agendum that has recently emerged is a further extension that has been presented as a national ideal of "a new development model that promotes the co-advancement of environmental conservation, growth, economic development, social integration, and national and individual development."

• Korean Journal of Agricultural Science
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• v.10 no.1
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• pp.28-60
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• 1983

This study was carried out to define the effects of external factors including temperature, moisture, oxygen and light quality on the germination of sesame seeds and to investigate the change of major chemical constituents of seeds during germination. The results obtained are summarized as follows: 1. The average germination ratio was from 95.8% to 97.2% when it was tested every $5^{\circ}C$ intervals from $20^{\circ}C$ to $35^{\circ}C$ and no significant difference in germination ratio was found within $20^{\circ}C$ to $35^{\circ}C$. But the germination ratio dropped rapidly to 32.2% when seeds were germinated at $15^{\circ}C$ and the coefficient of variation become greater(77%) 2. The days required for germination ranged from 1.16 to 1. 64 at the temperatures of $35^{\circ}C$ to $25^{\circ}C$ and they were 3.07 and 10.4 at the temperatures of $20^{\circ}C$ and $15^{\circ}C$, respectively. 3. Considering the germination ratio and days needed, $15^{\circ}C$ was assumed to be the minimum temperature for germination practically and this temperature is recommended for testing low temperature tolerance of seed germination of sesame cultivars. 4. The varieties shown the highest low temperature tolerance were Shirogoma and Turkey. The next varieties shown some degree of low temperature germination were Suweon #29, Naebok and IS 58. The varieties with 70 to 80% of germination ratio were Maepo, Suweon #14, Kimpo, Moondeok, and Haenam. Among the 90 varieties tested, the varieties with comparatively high degree of low temperature tolerance were about 10%, and 70% of the low temperature tolerant varieties were domestic varieties. 5. At $12^{\circ}C$ the Shirogoma was the only variety which showed over 50% of germination ratio, 71.4% of the varieties showed less than 20% of germination ratio. When the temperature was raised to $27^{\circ}C$ 18 days after placement at $12^{\circ}C$ all the varieties showed over 90% of germination ratio within 2days. 6. The amounts of water imbibition needed for seed germination were 0.48 to 0.62 times of the seed dry weight at $25^{\circ}C$ and were significantly different among sesame cultivars. About 63% of water required for germination was imbibed in 2 hours after placement of seeds under the germination condition. 7. Under saturated moisture condition the average germination ratio was 0.42%. In the soil of which water potential was -0.4bar 64.8% of the seeds germinated and the most adequate soil water potential for sesame seed germination was about -0.4 to -5.5 bar. The germination ratio decreased as the soil water potential declined below -5.5 bar. 8. Six out of 10 varieties were not influenced by 5% of oxygen in air germination chamber, while varieties such as Yecheon, PI 158073, IS 103 and Euisangcheon showed 64 to 91% of germination under the 5% oxygen content. Under anaerobic condition, cotyledones were not emerged but only hypocotyl was emerged and elongated. The germination ratio of IS 103 decreased significantly under anaerobic condition. 9. When the seeds were dried for 24 hours after 12 hours imbibition of water, the seeds of Cheongsong did not lose their germination ability and 27.5% was germinated but Suweon #9 and Early Russian failed to germinate. However, the germination ratio of IS 103 decreased when the seed were dried 24 hours after 4 hours imbibition of water and the germination ability of IS 103 was maintained even though the seeds were dried for 24 hours after 24 hours imbibition of water. 10. During germination, sugar content of sesame seed increased rapidly and activity of ${\alpha}$-amylase increased gradually while starch content decreased significantly. The rates of increase in sugar content and enzyme activity and decrease in starch content were significantly lower at $15^{\circ}C$ compared with those at $25^{\circ}C$. 11. During germination of sesame seeds, lipid content in the seeds dropped rapidly and the activity of alkaline lipase increased significantly at early stage of germination. The rate of decrease in lipid content and increase in emzyme activity was lower at $15^{\circ}C$ than at $25^{\circ}C$. 12. Four out of 6 varieties were not affected in germination by light wave length. But Suweon #8 was inhibited in germination by 600-650nm. and IS 103 by 600 to 650nm and 500 to 550nm of light wave length. Suweon #8 showed high germination ratio under 650 to 760 nm and 500 to 560nm, and IS 103 under 400 to 470nm and complete darkness. 13. The germination ratios increased significantly in the seeds of which 1000 grain weight is heavier. When the seeds were placed at soil 4cm deep, Cheongsong and Early Russian failed to emerge their cotyledones, but Suweon #9 and IS 103 showed 32.5 and 50% cotyledone emergence, respectively. The extracts from sesame plant and soil where the sesame was cultivated previously did not affect in the-germination of sesame seeds. 14. The covering by black or transparent polyethylene films increased germination ratio compared with uncovered seeds. The covering was effective in shortening the days needed for germination and in improving the early seedling growth, number of capsules per plant and grain yield. Difference was not so seizable between the two polyethylene films but the transparent film appeared somewhat more effective than the black one. 15. Simcheon, Cheongsong. Suweon #9. PI 158073 and IS 103 showed lower rate of water absorbtion by seed during germination and Suweon #8, Suweon #26, Orotall and Euisangcheon showed high increase in seed weight after water absorbtion by seed.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.8
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• pp.49-168
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• 2010

Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.