• 국제지역연구
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• 제12권2호
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• pp.327-349
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• 2008

이 논문은 황혼선거와 대통령 소속정당의 선거이득 사이에 어떠한 상관관계가 있는가를 분석하고 그 이론적 함의를 규명한다. 이 논문은 2007년 한국에서 개헌과 관련한 논쟁이 한창일 때 선거주기에 따라 이득을 보는 정당이 발생할 수 있다는 문제의식이 형성되어 일단 다양한 선거주기 가운데 황혼선거와 집권당의 선거이득 사이에 어떠한 관계가 발생하는지 학술적인 호기심을 가지고 체계적으로 분석한다. 이러한 목적을 달성하기 위하여 먼저 이 논문은 관련된 주제에 대한 선행연구의 이론적인 성과를 고찰한다. 그 다음으로 이 논문은 러시아와 콜롬비아의 황혼선거를 사례로 분석해본다. 마지막으로 이 논문은 연구의 결과와 의의를 요약한다.

• 분석과 대안
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• 제1권2호
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• pp.2-12
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• 2017

Research on democratic transitions has relatively ignored the question of why some countries experience a regressive form of political pacts, while others do not. This paper develops a simple game-theoretic model to explain the phenomenon of collusive pacts in the process of democratization. Trasformismo is a term that refers to a system of political exchange based on informal clientelistic politics. The existing studies of the politics of trasformismo have emphasized the timing of industrialization and the tradition of strong state as conditions of the politics of trasformismo. However, not every late industrializers and not every strong states experienced some variants of collusive political pacts in their trajectories of democratization. In this paper, I contend that the politics of trasformismo is rather a generalizable pattern of political elites' behavior under particular circumstances. By developing a simple game theoretic model, this paper suggests the conditions under which political actors are likely to collude to a regressive form of political pacts. The model shows that the likelihood of collusion to a regressive form of political pacts is a function of a set of parameters. First, a higher level of incumbency advantage in electoral competition is likely to be associated with a higher probability of collusive political pacts. Second, a higher degree of the monopoly of political representation of political parties without a close link with a variety of societal forces is likely to induce collusive behavior among politicians. Third, the ruling party leader's expectations about the likelihood of a safe extrication are related to collusive political pacts. This paper then engages in a case study of the 1990 three-party merger in South Korea. The 1990 Korean case is interesting in that the ruling party created a new party after having merged with two opposition parties. This case can be considered a result of political maneuver in a context of democratization. The case study suggests the empirical relevance of the game-theoretic model. As the game of trasformismo and the case study of the 1990 three-party merger in South Korea have shown, the collusive political pact was neither determined by a certain stage of economic development nor by a particular cultural systems. Rather, it was a product of the art of trasformismo based on party leaders' rational calculations of the expected likelihood of taking governing power.