• Journal of Digestive Cancer Reports
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.1-50
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• 2020

Although surgery was the standard treatment for early gastrointestinal cancers, endoscopic resection is now a standard treatment for early gastrointestinal cancers without regional lymph node metastasis. High-definition white light endoscopy, chromoendoscopy, and image-enhanced endoscopy such as narrow band imaging are performed to assess the edge and depth of early gastrointestinal cancers for delineation of resection boundaries and prediction of the possibility of lymph node metastasis before the decision of endoscopic resection. Endoscopic mucosal resection and/or endoscopic submucosal dissection can be performed to remove early gastrointestinal cancers completely by en bloc fashion. Histopathological evaluation should be carefully made to investigate the presence of risk factors for lymph node metastasis such as depth of cancer invasion and lymphovascular invasion. Additional treatment such as radical surgery with regional lymphadenectomy should be considered if the endoscopically resected specimen shows risk factors for lymph node metastasis. This is the first Korean clinical practice guideline for endoscopic resection of early gastrointestinal cancer. This guideline was developed by using mainly de novo methods and encompasses endoscopic management of superficial esophageal squamous cell carcinoma, early gastric cancer, and early colorectal cancer. This guideline will be revised as new data on early gastrointestinal cancer are collected.

• Proceedings of the Korea Technology Innovation Society Conference
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• 2015.05a
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• pp.545-570
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• 2015

Korea is among the ten countries with the largest R&D budget and the highest R&D investment-to-GDP ratio, yet the subject of security and protection of R&D results remains relatively unexplored in the country. Countries have implemented in their legal systems measures to properly protect cutting-edge industrial technologies that would adversely affect national security and economy if leaked to other countries. While Korea has a generally stable legal framework as provided in the Regulation on the National R&D Program Management (the "Regulation") and the Act on Industrial Technology Protection, many difficulties follow in practice when determining details on security management and obligations and setting standards in carrying out national R&D projects. This paper proposes to modify and improve security level classification standards in the Regulation. The Regulation provides a dual security level decision-making system for R&D projects: the security level can be determined either by researcher or by the central agency in charge of the project. Unification of such a dual system can avoid unnecessary confusions. To prevent a leakage, it is crucial that research projects be carried out in compliance with their assigned security levels and standards and results be effectively managed. The paper examines from a practitioner's perspective relevant legal provisions on leakage of confidential R&D projects, infringement, injunction, punishment, attempt and conspiracy, dual liability, duty of report to the National Intelligence Service (the "NIS") of security management process and other security issues arising from national R&D projects, and manual drafting in case of a breach. The paper recommends to train security and technological experts such as industrial security experts to properly amend laws on security level classification standards and relevant technological contents. A quarterly policy development committee must also be set up by the NIS in cooperation with relevant organizations. The committee shall provide a project management manual that provides step-by-step guidance for organizations that carry out national R&D projects as a preventive measure against possible leakage. In the short term, the NIS National Industrial Security Center's duties should be expanded to incorporate national R&D projects' security. In the long term, a security task force must be set up to protect, support and manage the projects whose responsibilities should include research, policy development, PR and training of security-related issues. Through these means, a social consensus must be reached on the need for protecting national R&D projects. The most efficient way to implement these measures is to facilitate security training programs and meetings that provide opportunities for communication among industrial security experts and researchers. Furthermore, the Regulation's security provisions must be examined and improved.