상정(尙淨)은 18세기 중·후반에 활동한 조각승으로, 지금까지 알려진 수조각승 상정의 조상 활동 6건과 그가 조성한 기년 불상 중 마지막 작품으로 발견된 1767년 거창 송계사 <목조여래좌상>을 토대로 상정 불상의 전체적인 작풍을 설정하였다. 상정이 조성한 불상의 공통점은 귀의 생김새, 상·하반신 옷주름, 오른손이 놓인 위치, 하반신 표현 등에 나타나 있었다. 그 중 하반신 표현은 불상 하단에 표현된 연잎 사이로 하반신 옷주름이 흘러내리는 A유형, 연잎과 대좌 표현 없이 하반신에 'S'자형 옷주름만 형성된 B유형, 불신과 대좌를 일체형으로 조성하여 대좌에 표현된 연잎 사이로 하반신 옷주름이 흘러내리는 C유형 등 세 가지 유형으로 구분되는 양상을 확인할 수 있었다. 상정은 그가 유일하게 조각 수업을 받았던 스승 태원(泰元)의 작풍을 충실히 계승하였을 것으로 판단되었다. 이는 서울 봉은사 <목조석가여래삼존좌상 및 나한상> 조성 불사에서 수조각승 태원 아래에서 상정이 3위 조각승(3/12위)으로 참여한 기록과 봉은사 석가상에서 표현된 'S'자형 하반신 옷주름이 상정이 조성한 모든 불·보살상에 반영된 모습을 통해 확인할 수 있었다. 뿐만 아니라 상현좌 표현, 보발의 형상 또한 18세기 전반 조각승 진열(進悅)에서 태원을 거쳐 상정에게로 이어졌던 것으로 추정되었다. 상정과 태원 두 조각승의 작풍은 불상에서 나타나는 양감과 측면의 두께, 하반신 옷주름의 요철 강도, 오른쪽 가슴의 옷자락 형태, 귀의 세부적인 표현 등에서 차이점이 발견되었다. 이와 같은 과정을 통해 조각가 개인의 양식을 추출하였고, 상정의 작풍을 갖고 있는 불·보살상 10건 14점에 대해 상정 또는 태원(계) 등 원 조각가를 분류하는 작업을 시도하였다.
The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.
I. Introduction Since the 1970's drug abuse among young people has increasingly become a social problem in Korea. In the 1980's, drug abuse, especially glue sniffing, has become the cause of many unfortunated incidents resulting in harm to others as well as the abusers themselves. Taking into consideration of the seriousness of this problem, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross initiated a nation-wide research programme, to understand the present situation and to raise the level of public awareness. The goal of this research was to begin a nation - wide campaign against drug abuse. The research team was composed of the Advisary Committee members and the staff of the Youth Department of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross. The data were collected in February 1988 with the collaboration of the staff and volunteers in the local Chapters. The respondents were allocated nation-wide by the quota sampling method. The questionnaires were distributed to the respondents in three groups :2, 700 to junior and senior high school students, 605 to working youths, and 916 to delinquent youths. A total of 4, 221 questionnaires were collected. II. Characteristics of the Respondents The respondents in each group were selected evenly from rural and urban areas. The general characteristics of the respondents can be described as follow: in case of students, the proportions between male and female respondents, and between senior high school and junior high school students were almost evenly distributed. In case of working youths, the proportion of females (80.5%) was higher than those of the students and the delinquents groups. Delinquent youths were defined as those currently being under custody of the centers for juvenile delinquents. Of this number, 38.8% and 68.2% were junior and senior high school drop-outs respectively. The majority of them (92.6%) were male. As for the family background of the respondents, the proportion of those residing in poverty - stricken areas, and the proportion of those from broken families were higher in case of working youths and delinquent youths than those in case of students. III. Present Patterns of Drug Abuse The following summarizes the presents of drug abuse, as tabulated from the results of the survey. 1. Smoking The percentage of youths who smoke was 36% in the student group, 32% m the working youths group, and 94.4% in the delinquent youths group. 2. Alcohol 50.3% of students, 71.6% of working youths, and 93.3% of delinquent youths has experienced drinking alcohol beverages. 3. Tonic: non - alcoholic, caffeinated beverages popular in Korea and Japan The percentage of those who have used tonic at least once was over 90% in all of the three groups. 4. Sedative About 70% of each group has used sedative with the proportion of working youths use higher than those in other groups. 5. Stimulants Those who have used stimulants comprised around 15% in each group. 6. Tranquilizers Somewhat less than 5% of students and working youths, and 28% of delinquent youths, have used tranquilizers. 7. Hypnotics The users of hypnotics amounted to 0.4% of students, 2.6% of working youths and 7.1% of delinquent youths. 8. Marihuana Those who have used marihuana indicated 0.7% of students, 0.8% of working youths, and 13% of delinquent youths. 9. Glue-sniffing The percentage of glue-sniffing was 3.7%, 5% in the students group and in the youths group respectively, but the proportion was unusually high, at 40.7% in the delinquent youths group. From the results of the survey the present situation of drug abuse in Korea can be summarized as follows: 1. A high percentage of Korean youths have experienced smoking cigarettes and drinking alcoholic beverages. 2. Tonics (non - alcoholic, caffeinated beverages), antipyretic analgesics and stimulants quite regularly used. 3. Tranquilizers, hypnotics, marihuana and glue-sniffing are more widely used among delinquent youths than the other youths. From this fact, there exists a correlation between drug abuse and juvenile delinquency. IV. Time-series Analysis of the First Experience of Drug Abuse and Deviant Behaviour The respoundents were asked when they were first exposed to drugs and when they committed deviant acts. By calculating the average age of each experience, the following pattern was found (See Figure 1). Youths are first exposed to drugs by abuse of tonic(non - alcoholic, caffeinated beverages). At the age of 13, they amoke cigarettes, the use of antipyretic analgesics begins at 14 year old, while at the age of 15, they use tranquilizers, and at 16 hynotics. The period of drug abuse which starts from drinking caffeinated beverages and smoking cigarettes and ends in the use of hypnotics takes about three years. During this period, other delinquent behaviours begin to surface, that is, at the age of 13 when smoking cigarettes begins, the delinquent behaviour pattern starts with truancy. Next, they start taking money from others by using physical force. Prior to the age of 15, they are suspended from school, become hostile to adults, begin running away from home, and start using stimulants and alcohol. Soon they become involved even in glue-sniffing and in the use of marihuana. At the age of 15, they begin to see adult videos and carry weapons. Sexual promiscuity and usage of tranquilizers follows the viewing of adult videos. Consequently, by the time they reach the age of 16, they visit drinking establishments, and are picked up by police for committing delinquent acts. And finally, they come to use hypnotic - type drugs. From the above descriptions, drug abuse can be assumed to have a close correlation with delinquent behaviour. V. Social Factors Related to Drug Abuse As for the Korean youths, glue-sniffing is found to he related to aggressive delinquency, in such cases as run - aways, being picked up by the police, and taking money by force. Smoking cigarettes and drinking alcohol is found to be related to seeing adult videos and visiting drinking establishments. Hypnotics and marihuana were found to be representive of drugs which are related to degenerational delinquency, irrespective of social delinquency. The social factors connected with these drug abuse are as follows: 1. Individual factors Male students were more heavily involved in the usage of drug than females. Youths who do not attend church were more likely to be involved in drugs than those who attend. 2. Family factors The youths who were displeased with their mothers smoking and those who thought their parents did not love each other, or those whose parents had used drugs without prescription, were more likely to he drug users. 3. School factors Those youths who found school life boring, were unsuccessful in their studies, spend most of their time with friends, feel their teachers smoke too much, those who had a positive perception of their teachers smoking were likely to he drug users. To sum up, drug abusers depend on the influence of their parents, teachers and peers. IV. Reasons for Drug Abuse Korean students have mainly used drugs to release stress (42.8%), to stay awake (19.7%), and because of the easy accessibility of drugs( 16.6%). Other reasons are due to their ignorance of the side effects of the drugs (3.6%), natural curiosity (4.2%), and to increase strength(3.O%). From the above facts, the major reasons for drug abuse among Korean youths are to release stress and to stay awake in order to prepare exams. Furthermore, since drugs are readily available, we can conclude that drug abuse is caused by the school system(such as entrance exams) in Korea. VII. Conclusion Drug usage among Korean youths are relatively less common than those of western youths. In some cases, such as, glue-sniffing and use of stimulants, the pattern of drug abuse is found. Moreover, early drug abuse is evident, and it has a close connection with deviant behaviour, resulting in juvenile delinquency. Drug abuse cannot be attributed to any one social factor. Specifically, drug abuse depends on parents, peers, teachers and other members of the community, and also is influenced by social institutions such as the entrance exam system. Every person and organization concerned with youth must participate collectively in restraining drug abuse. Finally, it is suggested that social agencial working for youth welfare should make every effort to tackle this serious problem confronted by the Korean youths today.