• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.59-89
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• 2009

The objectives of the 1963 Tokyo Convention cover a variety of subjects, with the intention of providing safety in aircraft, protection of life and property on board, and promoting the security of civil aviation. These objectives will be treated as follows: first, the unification of rules on jurisdiction; second, the question of filling the gap in jurisdiction; third, the scheme of maintaining law and order on board aircraft; fourth, the protection of persons acting in accordance with the Convention; fifth, the protection of the interests of disembarked persons; sixth, the question of hijacking of aircraft; and finally some general remarks on the objectives of the Convention. The Tokyo Convention mainly deals with general crimes such as murder, violence, robbery on board aircraft rather than aviation terrorism. The Article 11 of the Convention deals with hijacking in a simple way. As far as aviation terrorism is concerned 1970 Hague Convention and 1971 Montreal Convention cover the hijacking and sabotage respectively. The Problem of national jurisdiction over the offence and the offender was as tangled at the Hague and Montreal Convention, as under the Tokyo Convention. Under the Tokyo Convention the prime base of jurisdiction is the law of the flag (Article 3), but concurrent jurisdiction is also allowed on grounds of: territorial principle, active nationality and passive personality principle, security of the state, breach of flight rules, and exercise of jurisdiction necessary for the performance of obligations under multilateral agreements (Article 4). No Criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law is excluded [Article 3(2)]. However, Article 4 of the Hague Convention(hereafter Hague Article 4) and Article 5 of the Montreal Convention(hereafter Montreal Article 5), dealing with jurisdiction have moved a step further, inasmuch as the opening part of both paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Hague Article 4 and the Montreal Article 5 impose an obligation on all contracting states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over the offence (i.e., to ensure that their law is such that their courts will have jurisdiction to try offender in all the circumstances covered by Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5). The state of registration and the state where the aircraft lands with the hijacker still on board will have the most interest, and would be in the best position to prosecute him; the paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of the Montreal Article 5 deal with it, respectively. However, paragraph 1(b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraph 1(c) of the Montreal Article 5 do not specify if the aircraft is still under the control of the hijacker or if the hijacker has been overpowered by the aircraft commander, or if the offence has at all occurred in the airspace of the state of landing. The language of the paragraph would probably cover all these cases. The weaknesses of Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5 are however, patent. The Jurisdictions of the state of registration, the state of landing, the state of the lessee and the state where the offender is present, are concurrent. No priorities have been fixed despite a proposal to this effect in the Legal Committee and the Diplomatic Conference, and despite the fact that it was pointed out that the difficulty in accepting the Tokyo Convention has been the question of multiple jurisdiction, for the reason that it would be too difficult to determine the priorities. Disputes over the exercise of jurisdiction can be endemic, more so when Article 8(4) of the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention give every state mentioned in Hague Article 4(1) and Montreal Article 5(1) the right to seek extradition of the offender. A solution to the problem should not have been given up only because it was difficult. Hague Article 4(3) and Montreal Article 5(3) provide that they do not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. Thus the provisions of the two Conventions create additional obligations on the state, and do not exclude those already existing under national laws. Although the two Conventions do not require a state to establish jurisdiction over, for example, hijacking or sabotage committed by its own nationals in a foreign aircraft anywhere in the world, they do not preclude any contracting state from doing so. However, it has be noted that any jurisdiction established merely under the national law would not make the offence an extraditable one under Article 8 of the Hague and Montreal Convention. As far as international aviation terrorism is concerned 1988 Montreal Protocol and 1991 Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detention are added. The former deals with airport terrorism and the latter plastic explosives. Compared to the other International Terrorism Conventions, the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions do not have clauses of the passive personality principle. If the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions need to be revised in the future, those clauses containing the passive personality principle have to be inserted for the suppression of the international aviation terrorism more effectively. Article 3 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and Article 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would be models that the revised International Aviation Terrorism Conventions could follow in the future.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• v.24 no.4
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• pp.443-472
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• 2014

To survive in the global competitive environment, enterprise should be able to solve various problems and find the optimal solution effectively. The big-data is being perceived as a tool for solving enterprise problems effectively and improve competitiveness with its' various problem solving and advanced predictive capabilities. Due to its remarkable performance, the implementation of big data systems has been increased through many enterprises around the world. Currently the big-data is called the 'crude oil' of the 21st century and is expected to provide competitive superiority. The reason why the big data is in the limelight is because while the conventional IT technology has been falling behind much in its possibility level, the big data has gone beyond the technological possibility and has the advantage of being utilized to create new values such as business optimization and new business creation through analysis of big data. Since the big data has been introduced too hastily without considering the strategic value deduction and achievement obtained through the big data, however, there are difficulties in the strategic value deduction and data utilization that can be gained through big data. According to the survey result of 1,800 IT professionals from 18 countries world wide, the percentage of the corporation where the big data is being utilized well was only 28%, and many of them responded that they are having difficulties in strategic value deduction and operation through big data. The strategic value should be deducted and environment phases like corporate internal and external related regulations and systems should be considered in order to introduce big data, but these factors were not well being reflected. The cause of the failure turned out to be that the big data was introduced by way of the IT trend and surrounding environment, but it was introduced hastily in the situation where the introduction condition was not well arranged. The strategic value which can be obtained through big data should be clearly comprehended and systematic environment analysis is very important about applicability in order to introduce successful big data, but since the corporations are considering only partial achievements and technological phases that can be obtained through big data, the successful introduction is not being made. Previous study shows that most of big data researches are focused on big data concept, cases, and practical suggestions without empirical study. The purpose of this study is provide the theoretically and practically useful implementation framework and strategies of big data systems with conducting comprehensive literature review, finding influencing factors for successful big data systems implementation, and analysing empirical models. To do this, the elements which can affect the introduction intention of big data were deducted by reviewing the information system's successful factors, strategic value perception factors, considering factors for the information system introduction environment and big data related literature in order to comprehend the effect factors when the corporations introduce big data and structured questionnaire was developed. After that, the questionnaire and the statistical analysis were performed with the people in charge of the big data inside the corporations as objects. According to the statistical analysis, it was shown that the strategic value perception factor and the inside-industry environmental factors affected positively the introduction intention of big data. The theoretical, practical and political implications deducted from the study result is as follows. The frist theoretical implication is that this study has proposed theoretically effect factors which affect the introduction intention of big data by reviewing the strategic value perception and environmental factors and big data related precedent studies and proposed the variables and measurement items which were analyzed empirically and verified. This study has meaning in that it has measured the influence of each variable on the introduction intention by verifying the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables through structural equation model. Second, this study has defined the independent variable(strategic value perception, environment), dependent variable(introduction intention) and regulatory variable(type of business and corporate size) about big data introduction intention and has arranged theoretical base in studying big data related field empirically afterwards by developing measurement items which has obtained credibility and validity. Third, by verifying the strategic value perception factors and the significance about environmental factors proposed in the conventional precedent studies, this study will be able to give aid to the afterwards empirical study about effect factors on big data introduction. The operational implications are as follows. First, this study has arranged the empirical study base about big data field by investigating the cause and effect relationship about the influence of the strategic value perception factor and environmental factor on the introduction intention and proposing the measurement items which has obtained the justice, credibility and validity etc. Second, this study has proposed the study result that the strategic value perception factor affects positively the big data introduction intention and it has meaning in that the importance of the strategic value perception has been presented. Third, the study has proposed that the corporation which introduces big data should consider the big data introduction through precise analysis about industry's internal environment. Fourth, this study has proposed the point that the size and type of business of the corresponding corporation should be considered in introducing the big data by presenting the difference of the effect factors of big data introduction depending on the size and type of business of the corporation. The political implications are as follows. First, variety of utilization of big data is needed. The strategic value that big data has can be accessed in various ways in the product, service field, productivity field, decision making field etc and can be utilized in all the business fields based on that, but the parts that main domestic corporations are considering are limited to some parts of the products and service fields. Accordingly, in introducing big data, reviewing the phase about utilization in detail and design the big data system in a form which can maximize the utilization rate will be necessary. Second, the study is proposing the burden of the cost of the system introduction, difficulty in utilization in the system and lack of credibility in the supply corporations etc in the big data introduction phase by corporations. Since the world IT corporations are predominating the big data market, the big data introduction of domestic corporations can not but to be dependent on the foreign corporations. When considering that fact, that our country does not have global IT corporations even though it is world powerful IT country, the big data can be thought to be the chance to rear world level corporations. Accordingly, the government shall need to rear star corporations through active political support. Third, the corporations' internal and external professional manpower for the big data introduction and operation lacks. Big data is a system where how valuable data can be deducted utilizing data is more important than the system construction itself. For this, talent who are equipped with academic knowledge and experience in various fields like IT, statistics, strategy and management etc and manpower training should be implemented through systematic education for these talents. This study has arranged theoretical base for empirical studies about big data related fields by comprehending the main variables which affect the big data introduction intention and verifying them and is expected to be able to propose useful guidelines for the corporations and policy developers who are considering big data implementationby analyzing empirically that theoretical base.

• Korean Journal of Agricultural Science
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• v.4 no.2
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• pp.344-390
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• 1977

The purpose of this paper was to schedule optimum cutting strategy which could maximize the total yield under certain restrictions on periodic timber removals and harvest areas from an industrial forest, based on a linear programming technique. Sensitivity of the regulation model to variations in restrictions has also been analyzed to get information on the changes of total yield in the planning period. The regulation procedure has been made on the experimental forest of the Agricultural College of Seoul National University. The forest is composed of 219 cutting units, and characterized by younger age group which is very common in Korea. The planning period is devided into 10 cutting periods of five years each, and cutting is permissible only on the stands of age groups 5-9. It is also assumed in the study that the subsequent forests are established immediately after cutting existing forests, non-stocked forest lands are planted in first cutting period, and established forests are fully stocked until next harvest. All feasible cutting regimes have been defined to each unit depending on their age groups. Total yield (Vi, k) of each regime expected in the planning period has been projected using stand yield tables and forest inventory data, and the regime which gives highest Vi, k has been selected as a optimum cutting regime. After calculating periodic yields and cutting areas, and total yield from the optimum regimes selected without any restrictions, the upper and lower limits of periodic yields(Vj-max, Vj-min) and those of periodic cutting areas (Aj-max, Aj-min) have been decided. The optimum regimes under such restrictions have been selected by linear programming. The results of the study may be summarized as follows:- 1. The fluctuations of periodic harvest yields and areas under cutting regimes selected without restrictions were very great, because of irregular composition of age classes and growing stocks of existing stands. About 68.8 percent of total yield is expected in period 10, while none of yield in periods 6 and 7. 2. After inspection of the above solution, restricted optimum cutting regimes were obtained under the restrictions of Amin=150 ha, Amax=400ha, $Vmin=5,000m^3$ and $Vmax=50,000m^3$, using LP regulation model. As a result, about $50,000m^3$ of stable harvest yield per period and a relatively balanced age group distribution is expected from period 5. In this case, the loss in total yield was about 29 percent of that of unrestricted regimes. 3. Thinning schedule could be easily treated by the model presented in the study, and the thinnings made it possible to select optimum regimes which might be effective for smoothing the wood flows, not to speak of increasing total yield in the planning period. 4. It was known that the stronger the restrictions becomes in the optimum solution the earlier the period comes in which balanced harvest yields and age group distribution can be formed. There was also a tendency in this particular case that the periodic yields were strongly affected by constraints, and the fluctuations of harvest areas depended upon the amount of periodic yields. 5. Because the total yield was decreased at the increasing rate with imposing stronger restrictions, the Joss would be very great where strict sustained yield and normal age group distribution are required in the earlier periods. 6. Total yield under the same restrictions in a period was increased by lowering the felling age and extending the range of cutting age groups. Therefore, it seemed to be advantageous for producing maximum timber yield to adopt wider range of cutting age groups with the lower limit at which the smallest utilization size of timber could be produced. 7. The LP regulation model presented in the study seemed to be useful in the Korean situation from the following point of view: (1) The model can provide forest managers with the solution of where, when, and how much to cut in order to best fulfill the owners objective. (2) Planning is visualized as a continuous process where new strateges are automatically evolved as changes in the forest environment are recognized. (3) The cost (measured as decrease in total yield) of imposing restrictions can be easily evaluated. (4) Thinning schedule can be treated without difficulty. (5) The model can be applied to irregular forests. (6) Traditional regulation methods can be rainforced by the model.

• Journal of Korean Society of Forest Science
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.19-48
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• 1974

Land was originally communized by a community in the primitive society of Korea, and in the age of the ancient society SAM KUK-SILLA, KOKURYOE and PAEK JE-it was distributed under the principle of land-nationalization. But by the occupation of the lands which were permitted to transmit from generation to generation as Royal Grant Lands and newly cleared lands, the private occupation had already begun to be formed. Thus the private ownership of land originated by chiefs of the tribes had a trend to be gradually pervaded to the communal members. After the, SILLA Kingdom unified SAM KUK in 668 A.D., JEONG JEON System and KWAN RYO JEON System, which were the distribution systems of farmlands originated from the TANG Dynasty in China, were enforced to established the basis of an absolute monarchy. Even in this age the forest area was jointly controlled and commonly used by village communities because of the abundance of area and stocked volume, and the private ownership of the forest land was prohibited by law under the influence of the TANG Dynasty system. Toward the end of the SILLA Dynasty, however, as its centralism become weak, the tendency of the private occupancy of farmland by influential persons was expanded, and at the same time the occupancy of the forest land by the aristocrats and Buddhist temples began to come out. In the ensuing KORYO Dynasty (519 to 1391 A.D.) JEON SI KWA System under the principle of land-nationalization was strengthened and the privilege of tax collection was transferred to the bureaucrats and the aristocrats as a means of material compensation for them. Taking this opportunity the influential persons began to expand their lands for the tax collection on a large scale. Therefore, about in the middle of 11th century the farmlands and the forest lands were annexed not only around the vicinity of the capital but also in the border area by influential persons. Toward the end of the KORYO Dynasty the royal families, the bureaucrats and the local lords all possessed manors and occupied the forest lands on a large scale as a part of their farmlands. In the KORYO Dynasty, where national economic foundation was based upon the lands, the disorder of the land system threatened the fall of the Dynasty and so the land reform carried out by General YI SEONG-GYE had led to the creation of ensuing YI Dynasty. All systems of the YI Dynasty were substantially adopted from those of the KORYO Dynasty and thereby KWA JEON System was enforced under the principle of land-nationalization, while the occupancy or the forest land was strictly prohibited, except the national or royal uses, by the forbidden item in KYEONG JE YUK JEON SOK JEON, one of codes provided by the successive kings in the YI Dynasty. Thus the basis of the forest land system through the YI Dynasty had been established, while the private forest area possessed by influential persons since the previous KORYO Dynasty was preserved continuously under the influence of their authorities. Therefore, this principle of the prohibition was nothing but a legal fiction for the security of sovereign powers. Consequently the private occupancy of the forest area was gradually enlarged and finally toward the end of YI Dynasty the privately possessed forest lands were to be officially authorized. The forest administration systems in the YI Dynasty are summarized as follows: a) KEUM SAN and BONG SAN. Under the principle of land-nationalization by a powerful centralism KWA JEON System was established at the beginning of the YI Dynasty and its government expropriated all the forests and prohibited strictly the private occupation. In order to maintain the dignity of the royal capital, the forests surounding capital areas were instituted as KEUM SAN (the reserved forests) and the well-stocked natural forest lands were chosen throughout the nation by the government as BONG SAN(national forests for timber production), where the government nominated SAN JIK(forest rangers) and gave them duties to protect and afforest the forests. This forest reservation system exacted statute labors from the people of mountainious districts and yet their commons of the forest were restricted rigidly. This consequently aroused their strong aversion against such forest reservation, therefore those forest lands were radically spoiled by them. To settle this difficult problem successive kings emphasized the preservation of the forests repeatedly, and in KYEONG KUK DAI JOEN, the written constitution of the YI Dynasty, a regulation for the forest preservation was provided but the desired results could not be obtained. Subsequently the split of bureaucrats with incessant feuds among politicians and scholars weakened the centralism and moreover, the foreign invasions since 1592 made the national land devasted and the rural communities impoverished. It happned that many wandering peasants from rural areas moved into the deep forest lands, where they cultivated burnt fields recklessly in the reserved forest resulting in the severe damage of the national forests. And it was inevitable for the government to increase the number of BONG SAN in order to solve the problem of the timber shortage. The increase of its number accelerated illegal and reckless cutting inevitably by the people living mountainuos districts and so the government issued excessive laws and ordinances to reserve the forests. In the middle of the 18th century the severe feuds among the politicians being brought under control, the excessive laws and ordinances were put in good order and the political situation became temporarily stabilized. But in spite of those endeavors evil habitudes of forest devastation, which had been inveterate since the KORYO Dynasty, continued to become greater in degree. After the conclusion of "the Treaty of KANG WHA with Japan" in 1876 western administration system began to be adopted, and thereafter through the promulgation of the Forest Law in 1908 the Imperial Forests were separated from the National Forests and the modern forest ownership system was fixed. b) KANG MU JANG. After the reorganization of the military system, attaching importance to the Royal Guard Corps, the founder of the YI Dynasty, TAI JO (1392 to 1398 A.D.) instituted the royal preserves-KANG MU JANG-to attain the purposes for military training and royal hunting, prohibiting strictly private hunting, felling and clearing by the rural inhabitants. Moreover, the tyrant, YEON SAN (1495 to 1506 A.D.), expanded widely the preserves at random and strengthened its prohibition, so KANG MU JANG had become the focus of the public antipathy. Since the invasion of Japanese in 1592, however, the innovation of military training methods had to be made because of the changes of arms and tactics, and the royal preserves were laid aside consequently and finally they had become the private forests of influential persons since 17th century. c) Forests for official use. All the forests for official use occupied by government officies since the KORYO Dynasty were expropriated by the YI Dynasty in 1392, and afterwards the forests were allotted on a fixed standard area to the government officies in need of firewoods, and as the forest resources became exhausted due to the depredated forest yield, each office gradually enlarged the allotted area. In the 17th century the national land had been almost devastated by the Japanese invasion and therefore each office was in the difficulty with severe deficit in revenue, thereafter waste lands and forest lands were allotted to government offices inorder to promote the land clearing and the increase in the collections of taxes. And an abuse of wide occupation of the forests by them was derived and there appeared a cause of disorder in the forest land system. So a provision prohibiting to allot the forests newly official use was enacted in 1672, nevertheless the government offices were trying to enlarge their occupied area by encroaching the boundary and this abuse continued up to the end of the YI Dynasty. d) Private forests. The government, at the bigninning of the YI Dynasty, expropriated the forests all over the country under the principle of prohibition of private occupancy of forest lands except for the national uses, while it could not expropriate completely all of the forest lands privately occupied and inherited successively by bureaucrats, and even local governors could not control them because of their strong influences. Accordingly the King, TAI JONG (1401 to 1418 A.D.), legislated the prohibition of private forest occupancy in his code, KYEONG JE YUK JEON (1413), and furthermore he repeatedly emphasized to observe the law. But The private occupancy of forest lands was not yet ceased up at the age of the King, SE JO (1455 to 1468 A.D.), so he prescribed the provision in KYEONG KUK DAI JEON (1474), an immutable law as a written constitution in the YI Dynasty: "Anyone who privately occupy the forest land shall be inflicted 80 floggings" and he prohibited the private possession of forest area even by princes and princesses. But, it seemed to be almost impossible for only one provsion in a code to obstruct the historical growing tendecy of private forest occupancy, for example, the King, SEONG JONG (1470 to 1494 A.D.), himself granted the forests to his royal families in defiance of the prohibition and thereafter such precedents were successively expanded, and besides, taking advantage of these facts, the influential persons openly acquired their private forest lands. After tyrannical rule of the King, YEON SAN (1945 to 1506 A.D.), the political disorder due to the splits to bureaucrats with successional feuds and the usurpations of thrones accelerated the private forest occupancy in all parts of the country, thus the forbidden clause on the private forest occupancy in the law had become merely a legal fiction since the establishment of the Dynasty. As above mentioned, after the invasion of Japanese in 1592, the courts of princes (KUNG BANGG) fell into the financial difficulties, and successive kings transferred the right of tax collection from fisherys and saltfarms to each KUNG BANG and at the same time they allotted the forest areas in attempt to promote the clearing. Availing themselves of this opportunity, royal families and bureaucrats intended to occupy the forests on large scale. Besides a privilege of free selection of grave yard, which had been conventionalized from the era of the KORYO Dynasty, created an abuse of occuping too wide area for grave yards in any forest at their random, so the King, TAI JONG, restricted the area of grave yard and homestead of each family. Under the policy of suppresion of Buddhism in the YI Dynasty a privilege of taxexemption for Buddhist temples was deprived and temple forests had to follow the same course as private forests did. In the middle of 18th century the King, YEONG JO (1725 to 1776 A.D.), took an impartial policy for political parties and promoted the spirit of observing laws by putting royal orders and regulations in good order excessively issued before, thus the confused political situation was saved, meanwhile the government officially permittd the private forest ownership which substantially had already been permitted tacitly and at the same time the private afforestation areas around the grave yards was authorized as private forests at least within YONG HO (a boundary of grave yard). Consequently by the enforcement of above mentioned policies the forbidden clause of private forest ownership which had been a basic principle of forest system in the YI Dynasty entireely remained as only a historical document. Under the rule of the King, SUN JO (1801 to 1834 A.D.), the political situation again got into confusion and as the result of the exploitation from farmers by bureaucrats, the extremely impoverished rural communities created successively wandering peasants who cleared burnt fields and deforested recklessly. In this way the devastation of forests come to the peak regardless of being private forests or national forests, moreover, the influential persons extorted private forests or reserved forests and their expansion of grave yards became also excessive. In 1894 a regulation was issued that the extorted private forests shall be returned to the initial propriators and besides taking wide area of the grave yards was prohibited. And after a reform of the administrative structure following western style, a modern forest possession system was prepared in 1908 by the forest law including a regulation of the return system of forest land ownership. At this point a forbidden clause of private occupancy of forest land got abolished which had been kept even in fictitious state since the foundation of the YI Dynasty. e) Common forests. As above mentioned, the forest system in the YI Dynasty was on the ground of public ownership principle but there was a high restriction to the forest profits of farmers according to the progressive private possession of forest area. And the farmers realized the necessity of possessing common forest. They organized village associations, SONGE or KEUM SONGE, to take the ownerless forests remained around the village as the common forest in opposition to influential persons and on the other hand, they prepared the self-punishment system for the common management of their forests. They made a contribution to the forest protection by preserving the common forests in the late YI Dynasty. It is generally known that the absolute monarchy expr opriates the widespread common forests all over the country in the process of chainging from thefeudal society to the capitalistic one. At this turning point in Korea, Japanese colonialists made public that the ratio of national and private forest lands was 8 to 2 in the late YI Dynasty, but this was merely a distorted statistics with the intention of rationalizing of their dispossession of forests from Korean owners, and they took advantage of dead forbidden clause on the private occupancy of forests for their colonization. They were pretending as if all forests had been in ownerless state, but, in truth, almost all the forest lands in the late YI Dynasty except national forests were in the state of private ownership or private occupancy regardless of their lawfulness.