• Asian Journal of Business Environment
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• v.10 no.2
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• pp.5-15
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• 2020

Purpose: This study examines the impact of individual reciprocal preferences on coalition formation. The reciprocal model considers a player's own payoff, the player's perception of others' payoffs, and others' perceptions of the player's payoff. Research design, data and methodology: A reciprocal model is built to illustrate how reciprocity influences individual decisions in a coalition game and its formation. The prediction is examined with experimental evidences from a dictator game and a membership game. Results: The theoretical result suggests that the coalition formation could be unstable due to negative reciprocal kindness. The experimental findings support that negative reciprocal kindness could lead players participating in a coalition, no matter their dominant strategies are. When subjects were essential to make contributions to a coalition, they were more likely to cooperate if they were treated badly. In contrast, when subjects were unnecessary, the reciprocal kindness could enhance cooperative tendencies. Conclusions: This study reveals that the reciprocal behavior could influence individual decisions and reshape the coalition formation. In terms of policy implications, this study has shown that coalition formation could be reshaped by reciprocal prefe rences. Due to the strategic and complicated decision process in an interactive environment, a comprehensive investigation of factors would be required in a climate coalition in practice.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.19 no.7
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• pp.51-59
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• 2021

Purpose: Anger has become one of the dominantly experienced emotions in recent years, particularly under the COVID-19 pandemic. Considering the critical role that anger plays in consumers' lives, the present research examines how feeling angry about money influences consumers' spending and money distribution decisions. Research design and methodology. Three experiments were conducted using different emotion induction methods (i.e., dictator game, autobiographical recall, and scenario). Results. Feeling angry about money decreased pro-social spending (i.e., less money distribution to the others), but it did not affect virtuous or utilitarian spending for the self-unlike past finding on negative feelings that increased utilitarian spending. Furthermore, whereas anger-tainted money decreased pro-social spending of that money, guilt-tainted money increased pro-social spending. However, the effects of guilt versus anger were not completely symmetrical. The antagonistic effect of anger was diffusive across spending on distant and close others, whereas the pro-social effect of guilt was limited to distant others. Conclusions: These findings help policy makers and financial institutions forecast how money will be distributed or circulated when it is likely to be dampened by anger under the pandemic. They also highlight the importance of examining the effects of discrete emotions (e.g., anger vs. guilt) beyond valence.

• Korean Journal of Cognitive Science
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• v.26 no.2
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• pp.241-261
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• 2015

The current study investigated whether in-group bias affects 5- to 6-year-old children's resource-allocation decisions. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to allocate 10 stickers between a friend (an in-group member) and a stranger (an out-group member). Children allocated significantly more stickers to friends than to strangers, suggesting that they made distributive decisions in favor of their in-group members, when they were not the beneficiary of a resource-allocation. In Experiment 2, we examined whether being one of the recipients in the resource-allocation game would affect children's decisions. The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1 except that participants were asked to allocate stickers between themselves and a friend or a stranger. The children showed selfish distributions regardless of recipients. These results indicate that when children become one of the recipients in a resource-allocation, their self-interests override their preference for in-group members.