• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.36 no.4
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• pp.53-80
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• 2017

The purpose of this study is to examine the determinants of the number of bank relationships in Korea. Firm-specific determinants considered here include leverage, size, age, return on asset, investment grade, tangibility, liquidity, R&D expenditure. We estimate the effects of these variables, and compare the results with those from previous studies performed for other economies. Concerning the effects of business cycle, we find that the business cycle is an important factor in determining the number of bank relationships. The number of bank relationships varies over the business cycle, and we notice a counter-cyclical behavior, which means the number decreases during economic expansions and increases during contractions. This result can be interpreted as a result of firms' diversification of borrowings into multiple banks in order to reduce the liquidity risk during the recession. In the subsets, however, the number of bank relationships for large firms is stable regardless of the business cycle. Unlisted firms, non-chaebol, and low credit quality firms which have relatively limited access to alternative sources of financing show counter-cyclical behavior. Finally, such phenomena is not observed in the non-competitive credit market, while they show a counter-cyclical behavior in the competitive credit market.

• The Journal of Small Business Innovation
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.1-16
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• 2016

Korean government had used public 'credit guarantee schemes' (CGS) as a counter-cyclical measure. However, it is still controversial about the effectiveness of policy financing on the SMEs. Criticism on policy financing involves the argument that supporting enterprises hampers competition and innovation of SMEs by increasing their dependence on the government and delays the exit of marginal firms. In this paper, we investigate how to effectively build up the rationale of running public CGSs. At the same time, we propose the ways to coexist of public credit guarantee and market-based private finance system for SMEs. First, CGS, as a counter-cyclical function, must coexist with the private financial system by compensating the market failure caused by pro-cyclical behavior of the private financial market. Second, CGS has the comparative advantages, compared to both the interest rate policy of the central bank and fiscal policy of the government. The credit guarantee is the symptomatic treatment that could revitalize the economy shortly by providing liquidity. Also, knowing that CGS is provided based on the leverage ratio defined by outstanding guarantee divided by capital fund, public 'credit guarantee' (CG) has an advantage that is free from the risk of government deficit. Third, the reason for existence of the CGS should be founded in supporting services for SMEs, available only in a public sector that is difficult to expect from private banks. In this regard, it is desirable to strengthen the publicness of credit guarantee over the support for start-ups, growing companies, the improvement of productivity, increase of exports, a long-term investment in facilities, the employment-creating businesses, and innovative enterprises.