• Korean Journal of Heritage: History & Science
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• v.37
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• pp.371-405
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• 2004

International circulation of cultural assets involves numerous countries thereby making an approach based on international law essential to resolving this problem. Since the end of the $2^{nd}$ World War, as the value of cultural assets evolved from material value to moral and ethical values, with emphasis on establishing national identities, newly independent nations and former colonial states took issue with ownership of cultural assets which led to the need for international cooperation and statutory provisions for the return of cultural assets. UNESCO's 1954 "Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict" as preparatory measures for the protection of cultural assets, the 1970 "Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property" to regulate transfer of cultural assets, and the 1995 "Unidroit Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects" which required the return of illegally acquired cultural property are examples of international agreements established on illegal transfers of cultural assets. In addition, the UN agency UNESCO established the Division of Cultural Heritage to oversee cultural assets related matters, and the UN since its 1973 resolution 3187, has continued to demonstrate interest in protection of cultural assets. The resolution 3187 affirms the return of cultural assets to the country of origin, advises on preventing illegal transfers of works of art and cultural assets, advises cataloguing cultural assets within the respective countries and, conclusively, recommends becoming a member of UNESCO, composing a forum for international cooperation. Differences in defining cultural assets pose a limitation on international agreements. While the 1954 Convention states that cultural assets are not limited to movable property and includes immovable property, the 1970 Convention's objective of 'Prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property' effectively limits the subject to tangible movable cultural property. The 1995 Convention also has tangible movable cultural property as its subject. On this point, the two conventions demonstrate distinction from the 1954 Convention and the 1972 Convention that focuses on immovable cultural property and natural property. The disparity in defining cultural property is due to the object and purpose of the convention and does not reflect an inherent divergence. In the case of Korea, beginning with the 1866 French invasion, 36 years of Japanese colonial rule, military rule and period of economic development caused outflow of numerous cultural assets to foreign countries. Of course, it is neither possible nor necessary to have all of these cultural properties returned, but among those that have significant value in establishing cultural and historical identity or those that have been taken symbolically as a demonstration of occupational rule can cause issues in their return. In these cases, the 1954 Convention and the ratification of the first legislation must be actively considered. In the return of cultural property, if the illicit acquisition is the core issue, it is a simple matter of following the international accords, while if it rises to the level of diplomatic discussions, it will become a political issue. In that case, the country requesting the return must convince the counterpart country. Realizing a response to the earnest need for preventing illicit trading of cultural assets will require extensive national and civic societal efforts in the East Asian area to overcome its current deficiencies. The most effective way to prevent illicit trading of cultural property is rapid circulation of information between Interpol member countries, which will require development of an internet based communication system as well as more effective deployment of legislation to prevent trading of illicitly acquired cultural property, subscription to international conventions and cataloguing collections.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• v.13 no.4
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• pp.55-76
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• 2012

Most people prefer to choose zero-cost products they may get without paying any money. The 'zero-cost effect' can be explained with a 'zero-cost model' where consumers attach special values to zero-cost products in a different way from general economic models (Shampanier, Mazar and Ariely 2007). If 2 different products at the regular prices of ￦200 and ￦400 simultaneously offer ￦200 discounts, the prices will be changed to ￦0 and ￦200, respectively. In spite of the same price gap of the two products after the ￦200 discounts, people are much more likely to select the free alternative than the same product at the price of ￦200. Although prior studies have focused on the 'zero-cost effect' in isolation of other factors, this study investigates the moderating effects of a self-regulatory resource and a construal level on the selection of free products. Self-regulatory resources induce people to control or regulate their behavior. However, since self-regulatory resources are limited, they are to be easily depleted when exerted (Muraven, Tice, and Baumeister 1998). Without the resources, consumers tend to become less sensitive to price changes and to spend money more extravagantly (Vohs and Faber 2007). Under this condition, they are also likely to invest less effort on their information processing and to make more intuitive decisions (Pocheptsova, Amir, Dhar, and Baumeister 2009). Therefore, context effects such as price changes and zero cost effects are less likely in the circumstances of resource depletion. In addition, construal levels have profound effects on the ways of information processing (Trope and Liberman 2003, 2010). In a high construal level, people tend to attune their minds to core features and desirability aspects, whereas, in a low construal level, they are more likely to process information based on secondary features and feasibility aspects (Khan, Zhu, and Kalra 2010). A perceived value of a product is more related to desirability whereas a zero cost or a price level is more associated with feasibility. Thus, context effects or reliance on feasibility (for instance, the zero cost effect) will be diminished in a high level construal while those effects may remain in a low level construal. When people make decisions, these 2 factors can influence the magnitude of the 'zero-cost effect'. This study ran two experiments to investigate the effects of self-regulatory resources and construal levels on the selection of a free product. Kisses and Ferrero-Rocher, which were adopted in the prior study (Shampanier et al. 2007) were also used as alternatives in Experiments 1 and 2. We designed Experiment 1 in order to test whether self-regulatory resource depletion will moderate the zero-cost effect. The level of self-regulatory resources was manipulated with two different tasks, a Sudoku task in the depletion condition and a task of drawing diagrams in the non-depletion condition. Upon completion of the manipulation task, subjects were randomly assigned to one of a decision set with a zero-cost option (i.e., Kisses ￦0, and Ferrero-Rocher ￦200) or a set without a zero-cost option (i.e., Kisses ￦200, and Ferrero-Rocher ￦400). A pair of alternatives in the two decision sets have the same price gap of ￦200 between a low-priced Kisses and a high-priced Ferrero-Rocher. Subjects in the no-depletion condition selected Kisses more often (71.88%) over Ferrero-Rocher when Kisses was free than when it was priced at ￦200 (34.88%). However, the zero-cost effect disappeared when people do not have self-regulatory resources. Experiment 2 was conducted to investigate whether constual levels influence the magnitude of the 'zero-cost effect'. To manipulate construal levels, 4 different 'why (in the high construal level condition)' or 'how (in the low construal level condition)' questions about health management were asked. They were presented with 4 boxes connected with downward arrows. In a box at the top, there was one question, 'Why do I maintain good physical health?' or 'How do I maintain good physical health?' Subjects inserted a response to the question of why or how they would maintain good physical health. Similar tasks were repeated for the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th responses. After the manipulation task, subjects were randomly assigned either to a decision set with a zero-cost option, or to a set without it, as in Experiment 1. When a low construal level is primed with 'how', subjects chose free Kisses (60.66%) more often over Ferrero-Rocher than they chose ￦200 Kisses (42.19%) over ￦400 FerreroRocher. On contrast, the zero-cost effect could not be observed any longer when a high construal level is primed with 'why'.