본고는 1990년대 한국영화를 장르의 변전과 감성의 재편이라는 차원에서 고찰한 것이다. 1990년대는 영화산업구조와 미디어 환경의 획기적 변화에 따라 장르의 변전과 재편이 일어나며 한국영화사의 패러다임이 바뀌는 시기다. 본고에서는 이러한 전환이 1987년 민주화와 1998년 IMF로 상징되는 세계자본주의화에 의한 감성의 변화와 연관된다고 보고 영화 텍스트에 나타난 현상을 분석하며 그 이면의 계기와 맥락을 밝혀보고자 했다. 이 연구가 기존의 논의와 다르게 1990년대 한국영화사에 접근한 지점은 다음 세 가지다. 첫째, 1990년대에 왜 하필이면 로맨틱코미디 장르가 부상했는지, 로맨틱코미디는 어떤 단계를 거쳐 성립된 것인지에 대해서는 아직 심도 있는 논의가 이루어지지 못하였으므로 우선적으로 이 부분에 착목했다. 둘째, 1987년부터 1999년까지를 전환기로 보고 이 시기에 나타난 장르와 감성의 주류를 읽어내기 위해 최고 흥행작들을 분석 대상으로 삼았다. 그러한 영화들은 장르 판도와 대중의 취향을 상징적으로 보여주는 텍스트이기 때문이다. 셋째, 멜로드라마와 로맨틱코미디에 대한 분리된 고찰에서 벗어나 두 장르를 아우르는 감성구조를 살펴 봄으로써 1990년대 한국영화에 보다 거시적이고 역동적으로 접근하고자 했다. 역사는 면면한 흐름으로 이어지는 것인 만큼 그것은 이전 시대와의 단절이 아니므로 연속선상에서 변곡점과 계기에 유의할 때 변화의 역학과 구조가 적시될 수 있기 때문이다. 이러한 접근을 통해 도출된 결론은 다음과 같다. 1980년대까지 한국 영화의 주류 장르는 멜로드라마였고, 이는 구조적 정합성에 어긋나는 모순과 과잉의 요소들이 파토스에 의해 상쇄되거나 봉합되는 오랜 관습을 유지해왔다. 여기에서 구조적 정합성이란 합당한 규약이나 거래가 지켜지지 않는다는 것이다. 1990년대에 장르가 재편되는 과정은 구조적 정합성을 희생하는 관습에 거리를 확보하는 가운데 진행된다. 그 방향은 합리적 이성주의와 자본의 논리에 의한 통어가 강화되어 가는 것이다. 그것은 웃음을 통해 대상에 대해 거리를 두면서 발언의 수위를 높이고 임계를 확장하는 코미디로 시작하여 감성을 취향의 항목으로 기호화하고 상호 합의와 실리적 거래의 논리를 통해 구축해가는 로맨스로 전개된다. 이를 통해 1990년대 한국영화는 무조건적 가족주의에 긴박된 파토스의 서사로부터 멀어져가는 쪽으로 발전되어 간다. 이는 1980년대 후반 이후 한국사회가 근대 합리주의의 쌍생아로서의 민주주의와 자본주의의 상향된 궤도에 진입하는 것과 동궤를 이루는 것이다.
The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.