• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
• /
• 2000.11a
• /
• pp.3-5
• /
• 2000

It has been the paradigm of game theory that more than two utilities compete and determine the price and amount of dispatch. In order for this theory to be available on real power system, it is necessary to consider the transmission costs as well as the generation costs. In addition Independent System Operator(ISO) should be able to mitigate the congestion, recover the transmission costs and provide information for long-term capacity investment by devising reasonable pricing schemes for the transmission services. Generators also have to take the transmission costs into account when building the bidding strategies. This paper proposes an approach to analyzing the profit maximizing game considering the transmission cost in a competitive electricity market.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
• /
• 2002.11b
• /
• pp.111-113
• /
• 2002

본 논문에서는 경쟁적 전력시장에서 송전 계약에 관한 비용을 모선에서 한계비용 만감도를 이용해서 분할하는 방법을 제시하였다. 구조개편된 전력사장에서는 단순하면서도 분명한 전력 요금 시스템이 요구된다. Zonal pricing은 이런 면에서 좋은 pricing 시스템이 요구된다. 하지만, zone을 효과적으로 나누는 것은 상당히 어렵다. 기존의 방법에서는 오직 부하만을 고려하여 분류를 하였지만, 에너지 시장에서의 전력의 매매행위를 고려할 때, 시스템 내부의 모든 사업자에 대한 고려가 필요하다. 그래서, 본 논문에서는 한계비용 민감도를 이용해서 모든 에너지 시장 참여자를 고려하여, 네트워크를 분할하였다. 모든 노드에서의 민감도의 패턴이 분석되었고 동일한 패턴을 가진 노드들을 같은 zone으로 분류하였다. 6-모선 전력시스템을 이용해서 제안한 방법을 설명하였다.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
• /
• 2000.07a
• /
• pp.373-375
• /
• 2000

By DC load flow approximation, we analyzed marginal cost that is the important factor of price signal for network congestion management and expressed as a function of load. In network congestion, a large scale electric network is partitioned into subnetwork to provide a effetive price signal through zonal pricing. We propose a new network partition technique using marginal cost sensitivity with a variety of load consumption.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
• /
• 2005.07a
• /
• pp.855-857
• /
• 2005

Transmission congestion is one of the Key factor to local market power in competitive electricity markets. Financial transmission rights provide the financial protection to their holders by paying back the congestion cost. However, the market participants who have market power can exacerbate their market power. This paper analyzes the effect of exercising local market power with the rights on the market price. The proposed methodology was demonstrated with the Optimal Power Flow(OPF). Case study is fulfilled by GAMS simulation. The simulation are condusted in case of Nodal Pricing.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
• /
• 2004.11b
• /
• pp.101-103
• /
• 2004

Transmission congestion is one of the Key factors to local market power in competitive electricity markets. Withholding is a one of the methods exercise the market power. This paper presents an alternative methodology in market power under transmission congestion and withholding. The proposed methodology was demonstrated with the Optimal Power Flow(OPF). Case study is fulfilled by GAMS simulation.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
• /
• v.10 no.2
• /
• pp.1-14
• /
• 1985

This problem of product selection and princing are considered in congested and uncongested markets. In a congested market, such as a computer service market, product quality (the level of congestion) is partly a function of the amount of usage, which in turn depands on user choice. In an uncongested market, product qualities are set solely by providers. A model of quality and capacity variation is developed using a state equation description to represent user optimizing behavior. The model is used to study the problem of scarce resources among competing user demands through quality-dependent pricing.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
• /
• 2005.07a
• /
• pp.861-863
• /
• 2005

LMP based congestion management method is suggested as an effective tool, because network congestion can be handled by energy price. It is now being widely used in the North American Electricity Markets. Among them, FGR(Flow-gate rights) is considered to be appropriate for our system, as power flow through the congested line is unidirectional and congestion occurs in the known place. In the CBP market, hedging through transmission right is not necessary even though location pricing system is adopted, because there are no risks in the energy price. Rut, transmission rights should be adopted in the advanced market. Key issue when implementing FGR is how to decide transmission right issuance quantify. This paper deals with a method to decide transmission right issuance quantity by using power. Transfer Distribution Factor(PTDF).

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
• /
• v.25 no.1 s.94
• /
• pp.7-21
• /
• 2007

The purpose of this study is to examine the transportation, equity and efficiency impacts of cordon pricing schemes in the Seoul Capital Region of Korea. Autos would be required to pay a toll of 2.000 Won each time they enter cordons around the CBD or the subcenters during morning peak periods. The imposition of the toll would produce a substantial decrease in traffic volumes within the cordons as well as throughout the Capital Region. The lower the income level of commuters is, the more the share of auto decreases and that of transit increases. For equity impacts, the welfare of commuters would increase or decrease according to the cordon pricing schemes but would produce progressive impacts irrespective of the schemes. However, the commuters who have the highest value of time would experience welfare gains and it would result in regressive impacts. The schemes would result in a substantial net social welfare gain for the efficiency impacts. When the toll is charged at the CBD cordon only, the net social welfare would increase more.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
• /
• v.3 no.1
• /
• pp.31-46
• /
• 1978

Consider a time interval during which the demand for trips is fixed (e.g. the rush hour period). The traveller has a choice between various public modes, whose travel times and fares are fixed, and the automobile mode, for which travel time and cost depend on the volume of traffic flow on those roads, which are subject to congestion. We consider the equilibrium in terms of a representative travellerm, who choses for any trip the mode and route with the least combined money and time cost. When several (parallel) model or routes are chosen, then the combined cost of money and time must be equal among these. Our problem is first, to find the optimal flows of cars and of public mode carriers on the various links of their networks and second the optimal fares for trips by the variousmodes. The object is to minimize the total operating costs of the carriers and car plus the total time costs to travellers. The optimal fares are related to, but not identical with the dual variables of the underlying Nonlinear Program. They are equal to these dual variables only in the case, when congestion tolls on trips or on the use of specific roads are collected from automobile users. When such tolls are not collected, they must be passed on as subsidies to travellers using competing modes. The optimal fares of public modes are then reduced by the amounts of these subsidies. Note that subsidies are not a flat payment to public carriers, but are calculated on the basis of tickets sold. Fares and subsidies depend in general on tile period considered. They will be higher during periods of higher demand. When the assumption of fixed trip demand is relaxed, this tare system is no longer best, but only second best since too much traffic will, in general, be generated. The Free Rider Theorem states the following : Suppose road tolls can be charged, so that a best pricing system for public modes is posssible. Then there may exist free rides on some routes and modes, but never on a complete round trip.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
• /
• v.12 no.6
• /
• pp.2196-2207
• /
• 2017

This paper presents a two-stage market auction model in a pool-based electricity market, which explicitly takes into account the system network security. The security network-constrained market auction model considers the use of corrective control to yield economically efficient actions in the post-contingency state, while ensuring a certain security level. Under this framework, the proposed model shows not only for quantifying the correlation between secure system operation and efficient market operation, but also for providing transparent information on the pricing system security for market participants. The two-stage market auction procedure is formulated using Benders decomposition (BD). In the first stage, the market participants bid in the market for maximizing their profit, and the independent system operator (ISO) clears the market based on social welfare maximization. System network constraints incorporating post-contingency control actions are described in the second stage of the market auction procedure. The market solutions, along with the BD, yield nodal spot prices (NSPs) and nodal congestion prices (NCPs) as byproducts of the proposed two-stage market auction model. Two benchmark systems are used to test and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model.