• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.18 no.6
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• pp.47-55
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• 2020

Purpose: The issue of access to credit for private enterprises has been given an increased amount of attention given their crucial role in fueling economic growth. Vietnamese small and medium-sized businesses, however, face many obstacles in accessing financing for profitable investment opportunities, with up to 70% unable to access or obtain bank loans. This paper aims to address the factors affecting the credit accessibility of Vietnamese enterprises, and provide further insights of this issue under the new context of Basel II. Research design, data and methodology: We adopt a pooled sections approach to construct a sample of 155 firm observations before and after the implementation of Basel II accord in Vietnam and employing binary logistic regression and interaction terms for data analysis. Results: We find that firm characteristics (export participation, female ownership) and proxies for bank-borrower relationship (deposit, overdraft facility) have significant and positive effects on firm's access to credit. Notably, the sign of interaction coefficient shows that the implementation of Basel II tends to benefit small-sized firms in terms of credit accessibility. Conclusions: The finding further emphasizes the important role of relationship lending in Vietnam's credit market, which is even more critical for small firms when Basel II is universally applied as the new banking standards in the coming years.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.9 no.7
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• pp.81-91
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• 2022

The aim of this paper was to analyze the determinants of the extent of individual credit rationing at Can Tho Military Commercial Joint Stock Bank (MB). The data was collected from 150 customers according to the systematic random sampling method listed in the bank. This study employed quantitative analysis methods, and Tobit regression model, to test the proposed hypotheses. The results showed that the average loan amount of an individual customer was 1,181.3 million VND, the average credit limit was 48.6%, and the average interest rate was 10.9% per year. Most of the individual customers borrowed money to buy properties. In addition, the analysis results also indicated that individual borrowers still faced some difficulties in accessing bank credit, such as cumbersome procedures, long waiting times, insufficient collateral assets, and loan documents. The results of the Tobit model pointed out that there were five factors affecting the degree of credit rationing to individual customers at the bank, including (1) Collateral, (2) Income, (3) Credit history, (4) Loan purpose, (5) Relationship between borrower and bank. Based on the empirical findings, the possible solutions for the bank and individual borrowers to improve credit efficiency for individual customers at commercial banks are obtained.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.58
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• pp.179-213
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• 2013

While a performance type guarantee is required as a security for non-performance risk by a seller, a payment guarantee is used as a security for non-payment risk by a buyer(or a borrower in a loan agreement). A payment guarantee is a type of independent bank guarantee, bank guarantee, bond, demand guarantee, or standby letter of credit. A guarantor accepts a credit risk of a principal which is normally a buyer in a contract for sale of goods. A payment guarantee is independent of the underlying relationship between the applicant and the beneficiary. The guarantor is only empowered to examine the beneficiary's demand and determine the payment on its face to the terms of the guarantee. A payment guarantee is thus different from a suretyship. The principle of independence carries a significant advantages for a guarantor as well as for a beneficiary. While a documentary credit requires B/L, commercial invoice, packing list, inspection certificate, etc., a typical payment guarantee does not require any evidence for a seller's performance of the underlying contract other than written demand. In this respect payment guarnatee can be a more secured facility than a documentary credit. A payment guarantee normally comes into force from the issuing date and shall remain in effect until all sums guaranteed shall be paid in full by a buyer(or a borrower) or by a guarantor. Although a guarantor shall pay a demand made in accordance with the terms and conditions of the payment guarantee, a payment demand may be denied when it is determined to be abusive or unfair.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.177-188
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• 2013

This study examines how managerial ownership structure affects the borrower's choice of private versus public debt using 2,608 firm-year data for 2006-2008. This paper investigates the relationship between managerial ownership structure and debt choice. Managerial ownership is measured using number of stocks and unexercised stock-options and debt is classified public and private debt. The results find that there is a positive association between managerial ownership and the private debt dependence and also find that when firms finance additional funds, higher managerial ownership leads managers to choose private debt not public debt. Since private debt can be classified into bank debt and non bank debt, this paper examines the relationship between managerial ownership and a choice of bank debt. The results indicate that managers with higher ownership are more likely to use bank debt over public debt and non bank debt. By examining the relation between managerial ownership and a debt choice, this paper has following contributions. First, this study shows that managerial ownership affects the choice of the source of financing using three different proxies of managerial ownership. Second, this study classified private debt into bank debt and non-bank debt and provide the evidence of preference toward private debt especially bank debt among other financing sources. Finally, there are extensive studies related to capital structure and managerial ownership, but there is little empirical research on the debt choice and managerial ownership. Thus, this paper adds to literature by exploring the effects of managerial ownership on a debt choice.