• 의료법학
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• 제10권1호
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• pp.117-168
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• 2009

Generally, criminal law protect the human life after he/she has born. Before the birth, the life of fetus are protected by prohibition of abortion, not of murder. Also, the fetus is not considered as an object of infliction of injury. A popular opinion and case law say that the fetus becomes a person at the point of an outset labor pains. Recently, some theories allege that traditional opinions is not sufficient in the case of induced delivery, so it should be decided by norm, not by a simple fact, whether a unborn child is a fetus or a person, and that the fetus should be considered as an object of infliction of injury. These theories can be meaningful because these could protect human life more comprehensively. In the other side, however, these could harm the legal stability and bring the excessive punishment. Abortion of negligence is not punishable in criminal law, and there is little possibility of the fetus injury without the injury of the pregnant woman. And the Contergan Case, if it happened again, must be dealt with as crime about environment or public health more severely. These new approaches are in conflict with the principle of "nulla poena sine lege" and other fundamental rules of the criminal law, and should lead to the excessive punishment and criminal provisions. Accordingly, the decision of Supreme Court of Korea about the beginning point of human being should be maintained.