• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.5
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• pp.53-75
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• 1993

This article is concerned with the comment on "Some New Problems of International Aviation Security-Considerations Forcused on its Legal Aspects". Ever since 1970, in addition to the problem of failure to accept the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal Conventions, there has been also the problem of parties to them, failing to comply with their obligations under the respective treaties, in the form especially of nominal penalties or the lack of any effort to prosecute after blank refusals to extradite. There have also been cases of prolonged detention of aircraft, passengers and hostages. In this regard, all three conventions contain identical clauses which submit disputes between two or more contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of the respective conventions to arbitration or failing agreement on the organization of the arbitration, to the International Court of Justice. To the extent to which contracting States have not contracted out of this undertaking, as I fear they are expressly allowed to do, this promision can be used by contracting States to ensure compliance. But to date, this avenue does not appear to have been used. From this point of view, it may be worth mentioning that there appears to be an alarming trend towards the view that the defeat of terrorism is such an overriding imperative that all means of doing so become, in international law, automatically lawful. In addition, in as far as aviation security is concerned, as in fact it has long been suggested, what is required is the "application of the strictest security measures by all concerned."In this regard, mention should be made of Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention on Security-Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Intereference. ICAO has, moreover, compiled, for restricted distribution, a Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference, which is highly useful. In this regard, it may well be argued that, unless States members of ICAO notify the ICAO Council of their inability to comply with opecific standards in Annex 17 or any of the related Annexes in accordance with Article 38 of the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, their failure to do so can involve State responsibility and, if damage were to insure, their liability. The same applies to breaches of any other treaty obligation. I hope to demonstrate that although modes of international violence may change, their underlying characteristics remain broadly similar, necessitating not simply the adoption of an adequate body of domestic legislation, firm in its content and fairly administered, but also an international network of communication, of cooperation and of coordination of policies. Afurther legal instrument is now being developed by the Legal Committee of ICAO with respect to unlawful acts at International airports. These instruments, however, are not very effective, because of the absence of universal acceptance and the deficiency I have already pointed out. Therefore, States, airports and international airlines have to concentrate on prevention. If the development of policies is important at the international level, it is equally important in the domestic setting. For example, the recent experiences of France have prompted many changes in the State's legislation and in its policies towards terrorism, with higher penalties for terrorist offences and incentives which encourage accused terrorists to pass informations to the authorities. And our government has to tighten furthermore security measures. Particularly, in the case an unarmed hijacker who boards having no instrument in his possession with which to promote the hoax, a plaintiff-passenger would be hard-pressed to show that the airline was negligent in screening the hijacker prior to boarding. In light of the airline's duty to exercise a high degree of care to provide for the safety of all the passengers on board, an acquiescence to a hijacker's demands on the part of the air carrier could constitute a breach of duty only when it is clearly shown that the carrier's employees knew or plainly should have known that the hijacker was unarmed. The general opinion is that the legal oystem could be sufficient, provided that the political will is there to use and apply it effectively. All agreed that the main responsibility for security has to be borne by the governments. A state that supports aviation terrorism is responsible for violation of International Aviation Law. Generally speaking, terrorism is a violation of international law. It violates the sovereign rights of states, and the human rights of the individuals. We have to contribute more to the creation of a general consensus amongst all states about the need to combat the threat of aviation terrorism. I think that aviation terrorism as becoming an ever more serious issue, has to be solved by internationally agreed and closely co - ordinated measures.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.29-73
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• 2012

Aviation safety is the State and industry's top priority and more scientific approaches for fatigue management should be needed. There are lately various studies and regulation changes for crew fatigue management with ICAO, FAA and EASA. ICAO issued the provisions of fatigue management for flight crew since 1st edition, 1969, of Annex 6 operation of aircraft as a Standards and Recommended practice(SARPs). Unfortunately, there have been few changes and improvement to fatigue management provisions since the time they were first introduced. However the SARPs have been big changed lately. ICAO published guidance materials for development of prescriptive fatigue regulations through amendment 33A of Annex 6 Part 1 as applicable November 19th 2009. And then ICAO introduced additional amendment for using Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS) with $35^{th}$ amendment in 2011. According to the Annex 6, the State of the operator shall establish a) regulations for flight time, flight duty period, duty period and rest period limitations and b) FRMS regulations. The Operator shall implement one of following 3 provisions a) flight time, flight duty period, duty period and rest period limitations within the prescriptive fatigue management regulations established by the State of the Operator; or b) a FRMS; or c) a combination of a) and b). U.S. FAA recently published several kinds of Advisory Circular about flightcrew fatigue. U.S. passed "Airline Safety and FAA Extension Act of 2010" into law on August 1st, 2010. This mandates all commercial air carriers to develop a FAA-acceptable Fatigue Risk Management Plan(FRMP) by October 31st, 2010. Also, on May 16, 2012, the FAA published a final rule(correction) entitled 'Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements; correction to amend its existing prescriptive regulations. The new requirements are required to implement same regulations for domestic, flag and supplemental operations from January 4, 2014. EASA introduced a Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) 2010-14 entitled "Draft opinion of the European Aviation Safety Agency for a Commission Regulation establishing the implementing rules on Flight and Duty Time Limitations and Rest Requirements for Commercial Air Transport with aeroplanes" on December 10, 2010. The purpose of this NPA is to develop and implement fatigue management for commercial air transport operations. Comparing with Korean and foreign regulations regarding fatigue management, the provisions of ICAO, FAA, EASA are more considering various fatigue factors and conditions. Korea regulations should be needed for some development of insufficiency points. In this thesis, I present the results of the comparative study between domestic and foreign regulations in respect of fatigue management crew member. Also, I suggest legal proposals for amendment of Korea Aviation act and Enforcement Regulations concerning fatigue management for crew members. I hope that this paper is helpful to change korea fatigue regulations, to enhance aviation safety, and to reduce the number of accidents relating to fatigue. Fatigue should be managed at all level such as regulators, experts, operators and pilots. Authority should change surveillance mind-set from regulatory auditor to expert adviser. Operators should identify various fatigue factors and consider to crew scheduling them. Crews should strongly manage both individual and duty-oriented fatigue issues.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.29 no.1
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• pp.67-95
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• 2014

Some Contracting States of the Chicago Convention issue FAOC(Foreign Air Operator Certificate) and conduct various safety assessments for the safety of the foreign operators which operate to their state. These FAOC and safety audits on the foreign operators are being expanded to other parts of the world. While this trend is the strengthening measure of aviation safety resulting in the reduction of aircraft accident. FAOC also burdens the other contracting States to the Chicago Convention due to additional requirements and late permission. EASA(European Aviation Safety Agency) is a body governed by European Basic Regulation. EASA was set up in 2003 and conduct specific regulatory and executive tasks in the field of civil aviation safety and environmental protection. EASA's mission is to promote the highest common standards of safety and environmental protection in civil aviation. The task of the EASA has been expanded from airworthiness to air operations and currently includes the rulemaking and standardization of airworthiness, air crew, air operations, TCO, ATM/ANS safety oversight, aerodromes, etc. According to Implementing Rule, Commission Regulation(EU) No 452/2014, EASA has the mandate to issue safety authorizations to commercial air carriers from outside the EU as from 26 May 2014. Third country operators (TCO) flying to any of the 28 EU Member States and/or to 4 EFTA States (Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein, Switzerland) must apply to EASA for a so called TCO authorization. EASA will only take over the safety-related part of foreign operator assessment. Operating permits will continue to be issued by the national authorities. A 30-month transition period ensures smooth implementation without interrupting international air operations of foreign air carriers to the EU/EASA. Operators who are currently flying to Europe can continue to do so, but must submit an application for a TCO authorization before 26 November 2014. After the transition period, which lasts until 26 November 2016, a valid TCO authorization will be a mandatory prerequisite, in the absence of which an operating permit cannot be issued by a Member State. The European TCO authorization regime does not differentiate between scheduled and non-scheduled commercial air transport operations in principle. All TCO with commercial air transport need to apply for a TCO authorization. Operators with a potential need of operating to the EU at some time in the near future are advised to apply for a TCO authorization in due course, even when the date of operations is unknown. For all the issue mentioned above, I have studied the function of EASA and EU Regulation including TCO Implementing Rule newly introduced, and suggested some proposals. I hope that this paper is 1) to help preparation of TCO authorization, 2) to help understanding about the international issue, 3) to help the improvement of korean aviation regulations and government organizations, 4) to help compliance with international standards and to contribute to the promotion of aviation safety, in addition.