• Journal of the Korea Society for Simulation
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.19-27
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• 2022

This study compares and analyzes wholesale(or price-only) contract, revenue-sharing contract, quantity-flexibility contract, and channel-rebate contract in a decentralized supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer. By setting the parameters of each coordination contract based on the previous results, we conduct simulations using @RISK for several combinations of these parameters. Under the supply chain coordination, we evaluate the probability of successfully signing a contract and the participant in favor of each contract. As a result, the quantity-flexibility contracts is most advantageous for the retailer and the channel-rebate contracts is most advantageous for the supplier. It revealed that revenue-sharing contracts can be used more flexibly because they can be selected in the widest range to redistribute profits between supplier and retailer.

• The Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business
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• v.14 no.9
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• pp.21-30
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• 2023

Purpose: Focusing on the role of the special contract to collaborate the supply chain operations, this study investigates how the revenue sharing contract affects the performance of Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI). Research design, data, and methodology: The optimization model is formulated to represent two stage supply chain system where the supplier and retailer manage the operations to maximize their own profits. Three supply chain models including the traditional system, VMI, and VMI with revenue sharing contract are compared in the numerical examples. Results: According to the numerical analysis, the entire supply chain system has greater profit under VMI than the traditional system, while VMI alone sacrifices the supplier's profit. With the proper sets of revenue share ratio and wholesale price discount rate, VMI with revenue sharing contract results in the increased profit for both supplier and retailer compared with VMI alone as well as the traditional system. Conclusions: The numerical examples imply that VMI, when it is combined with the revenue sharing contract, can be the effective collaboration program that satisfies every supply chain member. To make VMI with revenue sharing contract to be fair to all supply chain members, they need to agree on the appropriate contract content.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.18 no.5
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• pp.99-109
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• 2020

Purpose: This study aims to develop and empirically analyze a research model in order to comprehend the relationship among the service quality of market-wholesaler system, re-transaction intention, and recommendation intention of forwarder. Further, we suggest new six factors reflecting the service quality of market-wholesaler system and highlight market expansion of forwarder as a mechanism in the relationship. Research design, data and methodology: The authors developed the new scales measuring the service quality of market-wholesaler system (i.e. trade price, price fluctuation, payment receipt, settlement period, trade information, and customer service) and conducted a cross-sectional survey for 439 forwarders in a wholesale market. And then we performed a series of path analyses to test hypotheses. The hypotheses are as follows. [H1] The service quality of market-wholesaler system will positively affect forwarders' market expansion, [H2] Forwarders' market expansion will positively affect their re-transaction intention, [H3] Forwarders' market expansion will positively affect their recommendation intention, [H4] Forwarders' re-transaction intention will positively affect their recommendation intention. Results: The results showed that all the six factors for the service quality of market-wholesaler system were positively related to market expansion of forwarders. There was a differential effectiveness in the six factors of the service quality. More specifically, the positive effect of customer service factor was the strongest on market expansion of forwarders. And the respective effects of trade price, price fluctuation, settlement period, trade information factors were followed in order. The positive effect of payment receipt factor was the weakest on market expansion of forwarders. Also, market expansion of forwarders was positively related to their re-transaction intention and recommendation intention. Furthermore, market expansion of forwarders was indirectly related to recommendation intention through re-transaction intention as well. Conclusions: The research findings provide important theoretical and practical implications. This study is the first to attempt to test the perception of forwarders for the service quality of market-wholesaler system by developing and using the new scales. Also, there has been a sharp controversy about the effectiveness of market-wholesaler system. The findings support that market-wholesaler system would be activated by empirically verifying the effectiveness of the service quality on the various outcomes.

• Journal of Korean Society of Forest Science
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• v.83 no.2
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• pp.133-147
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• 1994

Wastepaper recycling has significant implications not only in providing scarce raw material input for the paper industry but in environmental concerns such as reducing solid waste disposal, energy conservation and preservation of forest resources. The objectives of this study was (1) to develop an econometric model of demand for and supply of wastepaper, (2) to forecast wastepaper consumption and price to the year 2000 applying the econometric models estimated and (3) to estimate the elasticity of variables which are included in the wastepaper supply and demand equations. In this study wastepaper was classified into three groups, old newsprint, old corrugated and mixed For each group such as demand and supply equation were estimated. The demand equations were estimated as a function of paper and paper product consumption and wholesale price index and supply equations as a function of wastepaper price, one year lagged paper and paperproduct consumption and transportation price. Applying the econometric models to forcasting results in the future consumption and supply of wastepaper projected as 11.645 million MT and 7.396 million MT in 2000, respectively. The rate of wastepaper self-supply is forcasted about 63.5% in 2000. Especially, the rate of old neswprint self-supply is predicted about 16% which means about 2.2 million MT of old newsprint should be imported from foreign countries. Lastly, some policy measures to promote wastepaper recycling rate based upon economic and physical characteristics of wastepaper and market structure are suggested.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.4 no.1_2
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• pp.19-57
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• 1973

Laver io one of the most necessary and seasonal items in Korean food from oldtimes. Laver is lagely eaten in dried form, and its supply depends entirely upon culture weeds. The history of laver culture in Korea about sixty or seventy years is older than in Japan. Significance of laver culture is divided into two aspects, one is food supply in the nation, and the other is export to other countries. Houses engaged in laver culture are about foully thousands, and laver production in 1972 is estimated as 1, 3 bitten sheets. (1 sheet is a dried laver of 20 cm sq, in the shape of paper) Especcially meaning of layer production is the concentration of labour input, and systematic management of labour. From around 1920, the method of laver culture was introduced by Japanese Imperialism for mono culture in shallow seas, and mass products of laver is provided to Japan market, DOMESTIC MARKET Fundamental consume function calculates at below, $D_{(68_71)}$=16354 $Y^{0.471}$ $P^{-1.0662}$ where D is total layer demand, Y income variable, P price variable. It means income elasticity is 476. in the whole country, and price elasticity is 1, 07. But generally income elasticity is higher in urban area than in rural area, as shown at 1, 3 in Seoul city. Expence of laver in house expenditure is mutually correlated with another expence, See Table 12 about the relative function. See Table 14 and 16 about the relation between the gathering and the changes of price in auction, wholesale and retail price support system is for two effects, one of which is constraint of the upper price, the other is rise of the lower price. Before the system control, the equation in three year average calculated as below, $Y_{b}$ ＝18, 907.7455＋15435.9364 t (r=0.89) where the origin t＝0 is the November and the units are month. Post the system control, $Y_{p}$ =30, 047.9636+1, 631.1721t (r＝0.97) therefore, this system has an effect only on the rise of lower price, Average annual margins of laver products at four market levels according to the consumer spent is below. EXPORTING MARKET Japanese demand function of laver products is, Log D=5, 289+1, 108 Log Y-1, 395 Log P (r=0.987) where D is Japanese laver demand, Y income variable, P price variable. according to which income elasticity is 1. 1 and price elasticity is 1.4. Laver production in 1970 tile highest record till then, is estimated as six billion sheets. But the recent improvement of laver culture techniques, the production of seeds and freezing storage of seeds has been stabilized. Futher new culture farms have been developed by means of break- water fences or by floating culture method. These improvements have been backed up with increased demand of laver products. Import quantity and price of Korean laver products are restrained by three organizations, that is producer, distributor and consumer. This relationship calculated by regression equation shows that import is influenced only producer organization, at the sacrifice of consumer profit. For increase to export of laver products, we urgently require to open foreign trade of laver products for Japanese consumer, .and Japan has political responsibility to solve Korean laver structure. But with long run timeseries, as regards Japanese production and import quantity, importing function shows increasing trend as below, 250 million sheets ＜3, 947.1674+0.005 $L_{g}$ ＞) 600 million sheets where $L_{q}$ is relative production quantity of laver in Japan. (unit; 100 thousand sheets) Our Export effort should be put on the highly processed products whithin the restraind quote.ote.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Gas
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.26-34
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• 2010

KOGAS, established in 1983 by law to ensure stable gas supply to the public, is responsible for the wholesale distribution to 30 city gas companies that deal with the retail distribution of natural gas in their geographic areas. The gas imported by KOGAS is measured by checking the level difference of LNG shipped in tankers before and after unloading. The analysis of gas composition is essential because the imported gas price is determined by its calorific value. The turbine meter is widely used for measuring the gas sold to city gas companies. Unlike the metering system for power plants, there is no gas chromatograph since the custody transfer of gas to the city gas companies is not billed by calorific value, but by volume basis. The gas quantity that a city gas company has bought from KOGAS is not equal to the quantity that the company sold to its customers. There have been some discrepancies between the wholesale gas meter readouts and retail ones due to some inherent errors of meters and some operational issues of the meters. This paper investigates the controversies regarding the real quantity of gas between distributors and consumers. It will discus and suggest desirable policies, both technically and economically, in order to solve the discrepancies of gas measurement.

• Journal of Cadastre & Land InformatiX
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• v.44 no.2
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• pp.177-192
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• 2014

The factors that affect on the ratio of monthly rent to total rents in commercial real estate lease contract was empirically investigated. The theoretical basis for the research was location theory, retail trade-area analysis, bid rent, agglomeration theory, and demand externality theory. The data used in this study included information on goodwills per 3.3 square meters, deposit money per 3.3 square meters, retail rents per 3.3 square meters, and passing pedestrians' characteristics in 96 retail trade areas in South korea. As the results, using the hedonic price functions and multi-regression analysis, the independent variables does affect the ratio of monthly rent to total rents in the each retail trade area were goodwills per 3.3 square meters, deposit money per 3.3 square meters, retail rents per 3.3 square meters, and the number of Small Wholesale Retail Trade Firms at the level of nation. also, the results show goodwills per 3.3 square meters and the number of Small Wholesale Retail Trade Firms are important factors in determining the ratio of monthly rent to total rents in commercial real estate lease contract in seoul. In summary, not only the economic conditions in the retail trade area but also the passing pedestrian count should be considered to determine the ratio of monthly rent to total rents in commercial real estate lease contract.

• Journal of Global Scholars of Marketing Science
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.37-46
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• 2009

The Census Bureau of the Department of Commerce announced in May 2008 that U.S. retail e-commerce sales for 2006 reached $ 107 billion, up from $ 87 billion in 2005 - an increase of 22 percent. From 2001 to 2006, retail e-sales increased at an average annual growth rate of 25.4 percent. The explosive growth of E-Commerce has caused profound changes in marketing channel relationships and structures in many industries. Despite the great potential implications for both academicians and practitioners, there still exists a great deal of uncertainty about the impact of the Internet channel introduction on distribution channel management. The purpose of this study is to investigate how the ownership of the new Internet channel affects the existing channel members and consumers. To explore the above research questions, this study conducts well-controlled mathematical experiments to isolate the impact of the Internet channel by comparing before and after the Internet channel entry. The model consists of a monopolist manufacturer selling its product through a channel system including one independent physical store before the entry of an Internet store. The addition of the Internet store to this channel system results in a mixed channel comprised of two different types of channels. The new Internet store can be launched by the independent physical store such as Bestbuy. In this case, the physical retailer coordinates the two types of stores to maximize the joint profits from the two stores. The Internet store also can be introduced by an independent Internet retailer such as Amazon. In this case, a retail level competition occurs between the two types of stores. Although the manufacturer sells only one product, consumers view each product-outlet pair as a unique offering. Thus, the introduction of the Internet channel provides two product offerings for consumers. The channel structures analyzed in this study are illustrated in Fig.1. It is assumed that the manufacturer plays as a Stackelberg leader maximizing its own profits with the foresight of the independent retailer's optimal responses as typically assumed in previous analytical channel studies. As a Stackelberg follower, the independent physical retailer or independent Internet retailer maximizes its own profits, conditional on the manufacturer's wholesale price. The price competition between two the independent retailers is assumed to be a Bertrand Nash game. For simplicity, the marginal cost is set at zero, as typically assumed in this type of study. In order to explore the research questions above, this study develops a game theoretic model that possesses the following three key characteristics. First, the model explicitly captures the fact that an Internet channel and a physical store exist in two independent dimensions (one in physical space and the other in cyber space). This enables this model to demonstrate that the effect of adding an Internet store is different from that of adding another physical store. Second, the model reflects the fact that consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences for using a physical store and for using an Internet channel. Third, the model captures the vertical strategic interactions between an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer, making it possible to analyze the channel structure issues discussed in this paper. Although numerous previous models capture this vertical dimension of marketing channels, none simultaneously incorporates the three characteristics reflected in this model. The analysis results are summarized in Table 1. When the new Internet channel is introduced by the existing physical retailer and the retailer coordinates both types of stores to maximize the joint profits from the both stores, retail prices increase due to a combination of the coordination of the retail prices and the wider market coverage. The quantity sold does not significantly increase despite the wider market coverage, because the excessively high retail prices alleviate the market coverage effect to a degree. Interestingly, the coordinated total retail profits are lower than the combined retail profits of two competing independent retailers. This implies that when a physical retailer opens an Internet channel, the retailers could be better off managing the two channels separately rather than coordinating them, unless they have the foresight of the manufacturer's pricing behavior. It is also found that the introduction of an Internet channel affects the power balance of the channel. The retail competition is strong when an independent Internet store joins a channel with an independent physical retailer. This implies that each retailer in this structure has weak channel power. Due to intense retail competition, the manufacturer uses its channel power to increase its wholesale price to extract more profits from the total channel profit. However, the retailers cannot increase retail prices accordingly because of the intense retail level competition, leading to lower channel power. In this case, consumer welfare increases due to the wider market coverage and lower retail prices caused by the retail competition. The model employed for this study is not designed to capture all the characteristics of the Internet channel. The theoretical model in this study can also be applied for any stores that are not geographically constrained such as TV home shopping or catalog sales via mail. The reasons the model in this study is names as "Internet" are as follows: first, the most representative example of the stores that are not geographically constrained is the Internet. Second, catalog sales usually determine the target markets using the pre-specified mailing lists. In this aspect, the model used in this study is closer to the Internet than catalog sales. However, it would be a desirable future research direction to mathematically and theoretically distinguish the core differences among the stores that are not geographically constrained. The model is simplified by a set of assumptions to obtain mathematical traceability. First, this study assumes the price is the only strategic tool for competition. In the real world, however, various marketing variables can be used for competition. Therefore, a more realistic model can be designed if a model incorporates other various marketing variables such as service levels or operation costs. Second, this study assumes the market with one monopoly manufacturer. Therefore, the results from this study should be carefully interpreted considering this limitation. Future research could extend this limitation by introducing manufacturer level competition. Finally, some of the results are drawn from the assumption that the monopoly manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader. Although this is a standard assumption among game theoretic studies of this kind, we could gain deeper understanding and generalize our findings beyond this assumption if the model is analyzed by different game rules.

• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.29-53
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• 2012

As so many marketers get to use diverse sales promotion methods, manufacturer and retailer in a channel often use them too. In this context, diverse issues on sales promotion management arise. One of them is the issue of unplanned buying. Consumers' unplanned buying is clearly better off for the retailer but not for manufacturer. This asymmetric influence of unplanned buying should be dealt with prudently because of its possibility of provocation of channel conflict. However, there have been scarce studies on the sales promotion management strategy considering the unplanned buying and its asymmetric effect on retailer and manufacturer. In this paper, we try to find a better way for a manufacturer in a channel to promote performance through the retailer's sales promotion efforts when there is potential of unplanned buying effect. We investigate via game-theoretic modeling what is the optimal cost sharing level between the manufacturer and retailer when there is unplanned buying effect. We investigated following issues about the topic as follows: (1) What structure of cost sharing mechanism should the manufacturer and retailer in a channel choose when unplanned buying effect is strong (or weak)? (2) How much payoff could the manufacturer and retailer in a channel get when unplanned buying effect is strong (or weak)? We focus on the impact of unplanned buying effect on the optimal cost sharing mechanism for sales promotions between a manufacturer and a retailer in a same channel. So we consider two players in the game, a manufacturer and a retailer who are interacting in a same distribution channel. The model is of complete information game type. In the model, the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader and the retailer is the follower. Variables in the model are as following table. Manufacturer's objective function in the basic game is as follows: ${\Pi}={\Pi}_1+{\Pi}_2$, where, ${\Pi}_1=w_1(1+L-p_1)-{\psi}^2$, ${\Pi}_2=w_2(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. And retailer's is as follows: ${\pi}={\pi}_1+{\pi}_2$, where, ${\pi}_1=(p_1-w_1)(1+L-p_1)-L(L-{\psi})+p_u(b+L-p_u)$, ${\pi}_2=(p_2-w_2)(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. The model is of four stages in two periods. Stages of the game are as follows. (Stage 1) Manufacturer sets wholesale price of the first period($w_1$) and cost sharing level of channel sales promotion(${\Psi}$). (Stage 2) Retailer sets retail price of the focal brand($p_1$), the unplanned buying item($p_u$), and sales promotion level(L). (Stage 3) Manufacturer sets wholesale price of the second period($w_2$). (Stage 4) Retailer sets retail price of the second period($p_2$). Since the model is a kind of dynamic games, we try to find a subgame perfect equilibrium to derive some theoretical and managerial implications. In order to obtain the subgame perfect equilibrium, we use the backward induction method. In using backward induction approach, we solve the problems backward from stage 4 to stage 1. By completely knowing follower's optimal reaction to the leader's potential actions, we can fold the game tree backward. Equilibrium of each variable in the basic game is as following table. We conducted more analysis of additional game about diverse cost level of manufacturer. Manufacturer's objective function in the additional game is same with that of the basic game as follows: ${\Pi}={\Pi}_1+{\Pi}_2$, where, ${\Pi}_1=w_1(1+L-p_1)-{\psi}^2$, ${\Pi}_2=w_2(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. But retailer's objective function is different from that of the basic game as follows: ${\pi}={\pi}_1+{\pi}_2$, where, ${\pi}_1=(p_1-w_1)(1+L-p_1)-L(L-{\psi})+(p_u-c)(b+L-p_u)$, ${\pi}_2=(p_2-w_2)(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. Equilibrium of each variable in this additional game is as following table. Major findings of the current study are as follows: (1) As the unplanned buying effect gets stronger, manufacturer and retailer had better increase the cost for sales promotion. (2) As the unplanned buying effect gets stronger, manufacturer had better decrease the cost sharing portion of total cost for sales promotion. (3) Manufacturer's profit is increasing function of the unplanned buying effect. (4) All results of (1),(2),(3) are alleviated by the increase of retailer's procurement cost to acquire unplanned buying items. The authors discuss the implications of those results for the marketers in manufacturers or retailers. The current study firstly suggests some managerial implications for the manufacturer how to share the sales promotion cost with the retailer in a channel to the high or low level of the consumers' unplanned buying potential.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.33-54
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• 2000

This study intends to examine the distribution channel of the most popular ten species caught in Korean coastal and off-shore fisheries with the aid of interviewing fish brokers and cooperative staffs in fish landing markets. This paper finds and emphasizes the following three suggestions, in order to improve the present scheme of fish distribution system. Firstly, annual catch of 10 kinds of fishes is successively decreasing in quantity from 1994 to 1998. Moreover annual catch shows larger variations than fish price and cooperative sales quantity. Except sea eel and sole, cooperative sales accommodates more than 90% of the fish landed, accounting for the small variation in cooperative sales, which invalidates the effectiveness of the free distribution system adopted by the government. Secondly, diversified distribution channels are exposed according to the nature of the fish, the method to harvest, and the quantity caught. Large retailers such as discount stores, super chains and home shopping institutions are actively involving themselves in direct purchase in fish landing markets. Through the analysis of distribution routes, the general distribution channel of fresh fish has been found such as producers longrightarrow fish brokers in landing markets longrightarrow fish brokers in central wholesale markets longrightarrow wholesalers longrightarrow retailers longrightarrow consumers. In order to reduce distribution margin through the analysis of distribution function and distribution margin, this paper presents a new distribution channel such as producers longrightarrow fish brokers in landing markets longrightarrow wholesalers longrightarrow retailers longrightarrow consumers. Thirdly, to improve the fish landing markets, this paper suggests the M&A of uneconomical fish landing markets or renovating toward wholesalers, introduction of processing services and improvement of processing facilities, subsidizing fish brokers in landing markets, revitalization of marketing divisions in cooperatives and improvement in fish auction system.