• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.23 no.4
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• pp.719-746
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• 2014

This study attempts to estimate the value of the water quality improvement by deriving the equilibrium price of the water pollutant emission permit for the imaginary water pollutant emission trading market. It is reasonable to say that there is already an implicit social agreement for the unit value of water pollutant, when the government set the Total Water Pollutant Loading System for the major river basin as a part of the Comprehensive Measures for Water Management, particularly for the Nakdong River Basin. Therefore, we can derive the unit value of water pollutant emission, which is already implied in the pollution allowance for each city or county by the Total Water Pollutant Loading System. Once estimated, it will be useful to the economic assessment of the water quality related projects. An imaginary water pollutant emission trading system for the Nakdong River Basin, where Total Water Pollutant Loading System is already effective, is constructed for the estimation of the equilibrium price of water pollutant permit. By estimating marginal abatement cost curve or each city or county, we can compute the equilibrium price of the permit and then it is regarded as the economic value of the water pollutant. The marginal net benefit function results from the relationship between the emission and the benefit, and then the equilibrium price of permit comes from constructing the excess demand function of the permit by using the total allowable permit of the local government entity. The equilibrium price of the permit would be estimated to be $1,409.3won/kg{\cdot}BOD$. This is within reasonable boundary compared for the permit price compared to foreign example. This permit price would be applied to calculate for the economic value of the water quality pollutants, and also be expected to use directly for the B/C analysis of the business involved with water quality change.

• Journal of Korean Society for Atmospheric Environment
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• v.21 no.6
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• pp.561-571
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• 2005

To introduce an emissions trading system for GHG that currently have no reduction requirements, the following should be considered as priorities: eliciting the participation of the industrial sector and linking GHG emission trading systems to the emissions trading system (implemented from July 2007) that has become part of national policy with the enactment of the Special Act. Two directions can serve as viable alternatives in that regard. One is a baseline-and-credit method based on incentive auctioning. This has the advantage of inducing participation through economic incentives without a reductions commitment. The downside of this method is that it requires vast investments, as well as the fact that reaching an agreement between participants and the government to decide an objective baseline is difficult. On the other hand, the cap-and-trade method set forth in the Special Act is attractive in that it can be integrated with the air pollutant emissions trading system, but it would be difficult to elicit the participation of the industrial sector in the absence of GHG emission reduction requirements. In the current situation, it would be preferable for the government to induce the participation of the industrial sector by devising a wide variety of incentives because taking part in the emissions trading system before reducing GHG emissions offers large incentives through learning by doing. The timing of GHG reduction commitments and emissions trading system implementation may be uncertain but their Implementation will be unavoidable. Thus the government needs to facilitate preparations for emissions trading of GHG in the future and continuously review its operation in integration with the air pollutant emissions trading system to maximize adaptation and teaming by doing effect in the industrial sector.