• The Journal of Korean-Japanese National Studies
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• no.33
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• pp.67-111
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• 2017

This article aims to shed light on the wartime labor mobilization of prisoners on a large scale in/across colonial Korea and beyond during the late wartime period. More specifically, this article reveals the logic and mode of mobilization, and sorts out nationwide mobilization cases in colonial Korea. To this end, this article draws on documents and magazines published by the criminal administration of the Japanese Government-General of Korea, as well as the memoirs of prisoners and prison staff including prison administrators and prison chaplains. With the onset of the wartime system, the labor work in prisons centered on the production of military supplies. In 1943, the labor mobilization began to organize the National Protection Corps and dispatch them to remote workplaces. For example, at the requests of the military, prisoners were selected and sent to Hainan Island, while others were sent to military factories and mining fields in the northern part of the country. The authorities specified and adjusted the criteria for imprisonment based on education, physical strength, and other physical and mental conditions. Unconverted ideological offenders were excluded from the mobilization, and instead put under separate control. In preparation for mobilization, the prisoners trained in military drills, received Japanese language education, and underwent assimilation as imperial subjects through the preaching in prison. In order to induce prisoners to volunteer, a legislation system based on the shortening of the prison terms, including the parole system, was also promoted under the wartime system. As a result, prisoners were forced to work harder and faster even under the lowest of wages, poor food and poor housing conditions, and they also filled vacancies in managerial positions by serving as supervisory assistants. The reward system for them, however, did not function properly towards the end of the war, and the number of escapes and infectious outbreaks, as well as mortality rates rapidly increased under the harsh conditions.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.9 no.6
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• pp.153-163
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• 2011

This study analyzes the military and political factors that influenced the Participatory Government's resolution in Wartime Operational Control (OPCON) Transition. The research on key factors in OPCON transition firstly implemented literature research and then increased feasibility through additional use of AHP. The analysis results showed that there was a negative effect for Korean Peninsular Defense in the 'ROK-US Alliance Asymmetry' area, a positive effect to increase ROK-led Capability of Theater Operation in the 'ROK and U.S. Alliance Interdependence' area and a positive effect for Invocation of ROK Self-Defense Power in the 'Interests of Participatory Government's Liberal Regime' area respectively. After applying AHP, "ROK exercise of Self-defense" in the 'Interests of Participatory Government's Liberal Regime' area received the highest assessment, while the "Increasement of North Korea's Threat" in the 'ROK-US Alliance Asymmetry' area received the lowest assessment. This study is meaningful in that it analyzed the key military and political factors in the Participatory Government's resolution of Wartime OPCON Transition using AHP.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.8
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• pp.169-238
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• 2010

The year 2010 is the 60th anniversary commemorating the Korean War. China intervened in the Korean War with the logics such as "To Resist the U.S.'s Aggression and Aid North Korea," "Save Endangered Home & defend Nation," and "If the Lips Are Gone, the Teeth Will Be Exposed to the Cold or If One of Them Falls, the Other is in Danger." However, China had a deep and long connection with North Korea through 1st Chinese Civil War, war against Japan imperialism, and 2nd Chinese Civil War. China has consulted with Kim Il-sung on his invasion of South Korea at the initial stage of development and played a casting vote role in the execution of the invasion plan. During the Korean War, the PLA supported the North Korea's regime by its action, and made the Korea Peninsula divide into two semi-permanently. Even after the war, China continues to maintain relations with North Korea by helping North Korea build the Kim Il-sung's Kingdom. Currently, whenever any issue related to North Korea rises in the international society, China definitely gets involved in those issues and exercises its power. Conditionally 'either armed aggression or, and wartime' in North Korea, China would follow the "Clause of Military Auto Intervention." In addition, China is very likely to establish refugee camps for North Koreans in the Northeastern-Three-Province and to provide rear bases or guerrilla camps for pro-Chinese sects. Furthermore, voluntarily playing a role as spokesman of North Korean Regime in the international society, China will exercise enormous influence on the reunification of the Korean Peninsula.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Clothing and Textiles
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• v.43 no.2
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• pp.255-273
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• 2019

Perceptions of beauty change and are shared with others in the media of emotional words. In the modern age, a mix of traditional and modern make-up cultures has changed the standards of beauty. Therefore, an analysis using emotional words (an image that consumers have for certain subjects) and an image scale that intuitively shows them can be an important means for understanding changes in the "beauty of the time". This paper considered changes in typical aesthetic characteristics that women pursued through make-up by analyzing emotional words in white make-up powder advertisement texts from the 1920s through the 1930s. Imported modern technologies changed cosmetic manufacturing techniques and advertising methods to create a momentum that changed women's make-up culture from light to heavy make-up or from white to color make-up. Such changes have led to changes in the perception of beauty and were expressed through sensitive vocabularies such as pure, new, fresh, lofty, lively, healthy, and cheery. Such changes reflect social aspects such as women's aspirations for high status, pursuit of security, or women's roles under the wartime regime to show a change from beauty with an attribute of [+cool] to that of [+soft].

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.58-92
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• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.4
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• pp.351-379
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• 2006

Former ministers of national defense and foreign affairs, intellectuals such as former and incumbent professors, and various NGO groups are demanding the South Korean government to stop promoting independence in operational control which is currently held by the United States Armed Forces in Korea commander. Although the Korea should exercise operational control independently in the future, orientation on the direction which should be taken under consideration in promoting this transfer should be assumed. First of all, South Korea must sufficiently examine the criticisms and dissenting opinions, and reflect them in promoting independence in operational control. From now on, the South Korean government should reflect the opinions of experts in operational control, and must promote the transfer with national consensus. Unilateral enforcement of the transfer may cause serious errors and aggravate conflicts Second, ROKA's exercise of independence in operational control should take place only after gaining restraint on North Korea's attack against the South, and the issues on nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction(WMD) has been resolved, and a peace regime has been reached. Furthermore, exercise of independence in wartime operational control should be promoted only if there is a guarantee that international trust and the military collaboration will be restored to a level beyond the present state. Third, the USFK and the Korean-US alliance is providing South Korea with national security, not to mention tremendous diplomatical, and economical benefits However, if the alliance between the two countries become weakened due to the exercise of the independence in operational control, we might suffer a great deal of loss. Even though reasonable justification and external independence may be gained through promoting independence in operational control, it should be promoted in a longitudinal manner because national security problems and conflicts may be intensified, and there is no actual profit in doing so. Fourth, if the Korean-US alliance becomes weakened and therefore the United States decides to discuss eastern-asia strategies, North Korea deterrence strategies, and Japanese rearmament issues with other neighboring countries, South Korea may become diplomatically isolated and a subordinate to surrounding countries, destroying the independence we have now instead of restoring it Therefore searching for means to reinforce international trust and collaboration between South Korea and the United States, and leaving ROKA’s independence in operational control as a long term objective would be a more realistic method.