• 제목/요약/키워드: WTO ASCM

검색결과 3건 처리시간 0.017초

WTO보조금 협정하의 분쟁사례 연구 - 조선 및 하이닉스 반도체의 보조금 분쟁을 중심으로 - (A Study on the Dispute Case under the WTO ASCM - Focus on the Subsidy for Korean Shipbuilding and Hynix Semiconductor(DRAM) -)

  • 김지용
    • 통상정보연구
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    • 제9권1호
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    • pp.451-465
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    • 2007
  • It is true that every country which includes the developing country has planned own economic development through government subsidies. Korea also has developed their some major industry through supporting government subsidies. Under the WTO structure, however, government's specific supports for export firms come under prohibited subsidy and subsidy supporting must be based on WTO ASCM(Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures). The purpose of this paper was to study on the WTO ASCM and to analyze cases on the shipbuilding and Hynix DRAM dispute which Korean concerned major subsidy issue. Korea has been undergoing subsidy dispute with EU and U.S.A. concerned matter of shipbuilding and Hynix DRAM respectively. From this research results were as follow : First of all, the WTO ASCM introduced a definition of subsidy and divided subsidies into three categories and was legally bound through dispute settlement mechanism and implemented by all WTO members. Also, through analyzing cases, results were indicated that Korea wins a lawsuit against the matter of shipbuilding subsidy whereas losing the lawsuit against the matter of DRAM subsidy. It means that the case of shipbuilding subsidy do not violation WTO ASCM and the case of Hynix DARAM is against WTO ASCM. Additionally, as we see the dispute cases concerned Korean industry, it is necessary that government should operate subsidies which were provided for certain governmental policy as consisted with WTO ASCM.

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WTO 보조금 분쟁을 대비한 수출신용제도 운영방안에 관한 연구 (A Study on the Operation of Export Credit Policy preparing for possible WTO ASCM Disputes)

  • 오원석;김필준;백승택
    • 무역상무연구
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    • 제57권
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    • pp.283-303
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    • 2013
  • When a trade conflict arises related to an officially supported export credit programme, The World Trade Organization(WTO), decides on whether the programme is a forbidden subsidy stipulated in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures(the ASCM Agreement). Korea was taken to the WTO panel two times for the export credit programme. One is the semiconductor case in 2002 and the other was the shipbuilding disputes in 2004. And, In 2012, the U.S. Commerce Department ruled K-SURE's export insurance for Korean refrigerator manufacturers as a forbidden subsidy even if the case was not taken to the WTO. This paper examines the significance of export credit programmes on the WTO ASCM Agreement and discusses how to operate these programmes so they would not infringe upon the Agreement by analyzing the actual cases of WTO subsidy conflicts that involved Korean enterprises in relation to export credit programmes for the purpose of determining the related issues and impacts. From this research the results were as follows: First, on whether export credit is a prohibited subsidy, the deciding factor was whether a benefit has been conferred to the beneficiary. On the presence of a benefit, the WTO panel used market benchmarks as the main criteria. Thus, official export credit agencies(ECAs) should be careful not to provide export credit support which had been granted to the beneficiary at better than market terms. Second, in the case of export credit, the special status of ECA as a public body receiving government support itself does not constitute a subsidy. However, caution must be taken not to provide export credit that may lead to WTO ASCM subsidy conflicts involving a certain exporter or industry by setting up clear and valid regulations and fair work processes in the operation of export credit programmes. Third, item (j) of Annex I cannot be interpreted reversely as this item is for interpreting the presence of a prohibited subsidy, not the presence of a benefit. Thus, an export credit program that confers a financial contribution, a benefit and specificity, could qualify as a prohibited subsidy. Fourth, ECAs not only have to maintain long-term account balance but also introduce additional measures to meet this long-term balance such as a clear and systematic premium system. Finally, export credit programmes that are not defined in item (j) of Annex I of the ASCM Agreement would not deemed as an prohibited export subsidy as long as the continued support of the programmes are not being forced.

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수출신용과 관련하여 우리나라 조선산업에 대한 WTO 무역분쟁 연구 (Study on the WTO Disputes over the Korean Shipbuilding Industry in Relation to Export Credit)

  • 이경래
    • 무역학회지
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    • 제44권1호
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    • pp.129-142
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    • 2019
  • This paper draws implications on the ship finance of the Korean ECAs for shipbuilding industry from the perspective of WTO ASCM through studying the trade disputes on export credits. In consideration of the underwriting practice on the case-by-case basis, the ECAs' law regimes and their ship finance programs as such would be judged not conferring a benefit. The ship finance of international commercial banks could be treated as a market benchmark for the purpose of determining the existence of benefit in the ECA ship finance. The ECAs share securities with international commercial banks for the same exposure to the risks in a syndicate. Therefore, WTO DSB would rule that the ECA ship finance confers no benefit for individual transactions. The items (j) and (k-1) of ASCM Annex I are not allowed to interpret a contrario.