• Journal of Korean Tunnelling and Underground Space Association
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• v.20 no.6
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• pp.1125-1146
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• 2018

Segment lining applied to the TBM tunnel is mainly made of concrete, and it requires sufficient structural capacity to resist loads received during the construction and also after the completion. When segment lining is design to the Limit State Design, both Ultimate Limit State (ULS) and Service Limit State (SLS) should be met for the possible load cases that covers both permanent and temporary load cases - such as load applied by TBM. When design segment lining, it is important to check structural capacity at the joints as both temporary and permanent loads are always transferred through the segment joints, and sometimes the load applied to the joint is high enough to damage the segment - so called bursting failure. According to the various design guides from UK (PAS 8810, 2016), compression stress at the joint surface can generate bursting failure of the segment. This is normally from the TBM's jacking force applied at the circumferential joint, and the lining's hoop thrust generated from the permanent loads applied at the radial joint. Therefore, precast concrete segment lining's joints shall be designed to have sufficient structural capacity to resist bursting stresses generated by the TBM's jacking force and by the hoop thrust. In this study, bursting stress at the segment joints are calculated, and the joint's structural capacity was assessed using Leonhardt (1964) and FEM analysis for three different design cases. For those three analysis cases, hoop thrust at the radial joint was calculated with the application of the most widely used limit state design codes Eurocode and AASHTO LRFD (2017). For the circumferential joints bursting design, an assumed TBM jack force was used with considering of the construction tolerance of the segments and the eccentricity of the jack's position. The analysis results show reinforcement is needed as joint bursting stresses exceeds the allowable tensile strength of concrete. This highlights that joint bursting check shall be considered as a mandatory design item in the limit state design of the segment lining.

• KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
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• v.26 no.6C
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• pp.395-406
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• 2006

Drilled shafts are a common foundation solution for large concentrated loads. Such piles are generally constructed by drilling through softer soils into rock and the section of the shaft which is drilled through rock contributes most of the load bearing capacity. Drilled shafts derive their bearing capacity from both shaft and base resistance components. The length and diameter of the rock socket must be sufficient to carry the loads imposed on the pile safely without excessive settlements. The base resistance component can contribute significantly to the ultimate capacity of the pile. However, the shaft resistance is typically mobilized at considerably smaller pile movements than that of the base. In addition, the base response can be adversely affected by any debris that is left in the bottom of the socket. The reliability of base response therefore depends on the use of a construction and inspection technique which leaves the socket free of debris. This may be difficult and costly to achieve, particularly in deep sockets, which are often drilled under water or drilling slurry. As a consequence of these factors, shaft resistance generally dominates pile performance at working loads. The efforts to improve the prediction of drilled shaft performance are therefore primarily concerned with the complex mechanisms of shaft resistance development. The shaft resistance only is concerned in this study. The nature of the interface between the concrete pile shaft and the surrounding rock is critically important to the performance of the pile, and is heavily influenced by the construction practices. In this study, the influences of asperity characteristics such as the heights and angles, the strength characteristics and elastic constants of surrounding rock masses and the depth and length of rock socket, et. al. on the shaft resistance of drilled shafts are investigated from elasto-plastic analyses( FLAC). Through the parametric studies, among the parameters, the vertical stress on the top layer of socket, the height of asperity and cohesion and poison's ratio of rock masses are major influence factors on the unit peak shaft resistance.

• Journal of the Korean Wood Science and Technology
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• v.2 no.2
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• pp.8-12
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• 1974

1. If one unity is given to the prongs whose ends touch each other for estimating the internal stresses occuring in it, the internal stresses which are developed in the open prongs can be evaluated by the ratio to the unity. In accordance with the above statement, an equation was derived as follows. For employing this equation, the prongs should be made as shown in Fig. I, and be measured A and B' as indicated in Fig. l. A more precise value will result as the angle (J becomes smaller. $CH=\frac{(A-B') (4W+A) (4W-A)}{2A[(2W+(A-B')][2W-(A-B')]}{\times}100%$ where A is thickness of the prong, B' is the distance between the two prongs shown in Fig. 1 and CH is the value of internal stress expressed by percentage. It precision is not required, the equation can be simplified as follows. $CH=\frac{A-B'}{A}{\times}200%$ 2. Under scheduled drying condition III the kiln, when the weight of a sample board is constant, the moisture content of the shell of a sample board in the case of a normal casehardening is lower than that of the equilibrium moisture content which is indicated by the Forest Products Laboratory, U. S. Department of Agriculture. This result is usually true, especially in a thin sample board. A thick unseasoned or reverse casehardened sample does not follow in the above statement. 3. The results in the comparison of drying rate with five different kinds of wood given in Table 1 show that the these drying rates, i.e., the quantity of water evaporated from the surface area of I centimeter square per hour, are graded by the order of their magnitude as follows. (1) Ginkgo biloba Linne (2) Diospyros Kaki Thumberg. (3) Pinus densiflora Sieb. et Zucc. (4) Larix kaempheri Sargent (5) Castanea crenata Sieb. et Zucc. It is shown, for example, that at the moisture content of 20 percent the highest value revealed by the Ginkgo biloba is in the order of 3.8 times as great as that for Castanea crenata Sieb. & Zucc. which has the lowest value. Especially below the moisture content of 26 percent, the drying rate, i.e., the function of moisture content in percentage, is represented by the linear equation. All of these linear equations are highly significant in testing the confficient of X i. e., moisture content in percentage. In the Table 2, the symbols are expressed as follows; Y is the quantity of water evaporated from the surface area of 1 centimeter square per hour, and X is the moisture content of the percentage. The drying rate is plotted against the moisture content of the percentage as in Fig. 2. 4. One hundred times the ratio(P%) of the number of samples occuring in the CH 4 class (from 76 to 100% of CH ratio) within the total number of saplmes tested to those of the total which underlie the given SR ratio is measured in Table 3. (The 9% indicated above is assumed as the danger probability in percentage). In summarizing above results, the conclusion is in Table 4. NOTE: In Table 4, the column numbers such as 1. 2 and 3 imply as follows, respectively. 1) The minimum SR ratio which does not reveal the CH 4, class is indicated as in the column 1. 2) The extent of SR ratio which is confined in the safety allowance of 30 percent is shown in the column 2. 3) The lowest limitation of SR ratio which gives the most danger probability of 100 percent is shown in column 3. In analyzing above results, it is clear that chestnut and larch easly form internal stress in comparison with persimmon and pine. However, in considering the fact that the revers, casehardening occured in fir and ginkgo, under the same drying condition with the others, it is deduced that fir and ginkgo form normal casehardening with difficulty in comparison with the other species tested. 5. All kinds of drying defects except casehardening are developed when the internal stresses are in excess of the ultimate strength of material in the case of long-lime loading. Under the drying condition at temperature of $170^{\circ}F$ and the lower humidity. the drying defects are not so severe. However, under the same conditions at $200^{\circ}F$, the lower humidity and not end coated, all sample boards develop severe drying defects. Especially the chestnut was very prone to form the drying defects such as casehardening and splitting.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.