• Title/Summary/Keyword: US-North Korea Summit

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An Exploratory Study on the 2018 North Korea-U.S. Summit News and Singapore's Place Branding

  • Seol, Jinah
    • Journal of Internet Computing and Services
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    • v.21 no.1
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    • pp.147-157
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    • 2020
  • The purpose of this paper is to examine how mainstream international media cover a major political event like the 2018 North Korea-U.S. Summit and how place branding effect is manifested on the Internet. A quantitative content analysis was conducted. A total of 1,990 relevant Internet news stories were collected from May 9 to June 17, 2018 and the types of media mentions Singapore as country and brand received were analyzed. As expected, Singapore garnered worldwide media coverage which in turn helped promote the island-nation's brand. International media reported on Singapore as a Summit location while also highlighting it as an important and attractive, cultural, historical destination. The study's findings indicate that global broadcasters such as CNN and BBC played the biggest role during the Summit in disseminating images of Singapore and landmarks as attractive places. Finally, the visual aspect of the event coverage also served as a formidable marketing instrument in bolstering the nation's brand.

Nuclear Weapons Deployment and Diplomatic Bargaining Leverage: The Case of the January 2018 Hawaiian Ballistic Missile Attack False Alarm

  • Benedict E. DeDominicis
    • International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology
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    • v.11 no.1
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    • pp.110-134
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    • 2023
  • North Korea's development and deployment of nuclear weapons increases Pyongyang's diplomatic bargaining leverage. It is a strategic response to counteract the great expansion in US leverage with the collapse of the USSR. Post-Cold War American influence and hegemony is justified partly by claiming victory in successfully containing an allegedly imperialist Soviet Union. The US created and led formal and informal international institutions as part of its decades-long containment grand strategy against the USSR. The US now exploits these institutions to expedite US unilateral global preeminence. Third World regimes perceived as remnants of the Cold War era that resist accommodating to American demands are stereotyped as rogue states. Rogue regimes are criminal offenders who should be brought to justice, i.e. regime change is required. The initiation of summit diplomacy between US President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un occurred following the January 2018 Hawaiian ballistic missile false alarm. This event and its political consequences illustrate the efficacy of nuclear weapons as bargaining leverage for so-called rogue actors. North Korea is highly unlikely to surrender those weapons that were the instigation for the subsequent summit diplomacy that occurred. A broader, critical trend-focused strategic analysis is necessary to adopt a longer-term view of the on-going Korean nuclear crisis. The aim would be to conceptualize long-term policies that increase the probability that nuclear weapons capability becomes a largely irrelevant issue in interaction between Pyongyang, Seoul, Beijing and Washington.

Evaluation and Forecast of North Korea's Nuclear Policy through Libya Model (리비아 모델을 통한 북한의 핵 정책 평가와 전망)

  • Han, Seung Jo;Shin, Jin
    • Convergence Security Journal
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    • v.18 no.3
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    • pp.113-122
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    • 2018
  • The issue of security on the Korean peninsula is facing the greatest upheaval in 2018 with the inter-Korean summit and the US-North Korea summit. North Korea has pursued the parallel policy developing military and economic at the same time. However, North Korea is changing its route to give up nuclear weapons and focus on the economy through summit talks. Since the change in North Korea is similar to that of Libya in the past, it is necessary to analyze why North Korea is trying to abandon its nuclear program and how the process is flowing compared to the case of Libya. The Libya model was constructed and analyzed in terms of international and domestic perpectives and recognition of the situation by leadership. North Korea's nuclear policy was evaluated based on the Libya model. The nuclear development of Libya and North Korea has caused diplomatic and economic pressures from the international community and ultimately led to instability of the regime. Two countries have tried to abandon nuclear program in order to solve the instability of the regime, also gain the economic reward insead. Libya took economic benefits and secured some of the stability of the regime, but the regime collapsed under the wave of democracy due to the influx of foreign capital and ideas. North Korea will seek diplomatic and economic gains with the example of Libya, but will try to limit as much as possible the culture of democracy and the full opening that can be incidental.

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The Pyeongchang 2018 Olympic Winter Games and North Korea's Denuclearization (2018 평창동계올림픽과 북한의 비핵화)

  • Lee, Hong Jong
    • Korea and Global Affairs
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    • v.2 no.1
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    • pp.93-112
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    • 2018
  • The Pyeongchang 2018 Olympic Winter Games is a good example of functionalism in integration theories. President Moon Jae-in is extremely lucky to play host to the Winter Olympics. Moon should be particularly happy to have declared the 23rd Winter Games open, because a handful of North Korean athletes marched into the Pyeongchang Stadium as members of a joint team from "Corea," the result of his strenuous efforts to have the North participate in the world festival of sports on snow and ice. But the president of this divided nation hardly draws envy from other world leaders, as he is faced with the daunting task of accommodating the selfish positions of surrounding powers concerning North Korean nuclear and missile threats. North Korea, a trivial competitor in winter sports, scored big outside the games' sporting arenas by inviting President Moon to summit talks in Pyongyang. As a precondition for a 2018 summit, Pyongyang will first ask for the cessation of the annual joint Korea-US military exercises. President Moon invested a lot in the Olympic delegates from the North. Korea's leader will now have to start a truly difficult game which will require the best of best strategies as well as a great deal of wisdom and tenacity not only to deal with the weapons of mass destruction-toting North Koreans, but also with allies. On the other hand, Moon needs to make the effort to reset domestic politics with tolerance and compromise, so he can better concentrate on the conundrum of North Korean nuclear and missile threats.

The First Year of the Moon Jae-In Government: An Assessment (문재인 정부 1년의 평가와 전망)

  • Kang, Won-Taek
    • Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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    • v.24 no.1
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    • pp.5-29
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    • 2018
  • This paper aims at making an assessment about the first year of the Moon Jae-in government. President Moon was elected amid political insecurity over the impeachment of then-president Park Geun-hye. However, the Moon administration settled in fairly smoothly despite no transition period of presidential power. Political and economic stability was soon restored, and the tensions between the US and North Korea over the North's nuclear weapons program were, to some extent, managed along with the agreement of the North-South summit and the US-North Korea summit. Pyeongchang hosted the 2018 winter olympics and paralympics successfully. Moon continued very positive approval ratings of higher than 70%. However, he has something to be desired. His leadership seems to rely heavily on a limited number of close staff in the Blue House, alienating the governing the Minjoo Party of Korea. He should build better relationship with opposition parties particularly given a divided government. Rectification of the lingering negative practices should also produce institutional solutions. Above all, Moon should carefully watch out to prevent scandals over corruption and power abuse around him and his family, which would lead to a precipitous decline of the approval ratings and the abrupt weakening of the leadership.

Recent Progress and Tasks of Arms Control in South and North Korea (최근 남북한 군비통제의 추진현황과 과제)

  • Kim, Kang-nyeong
    • Korea and Global Affairs
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    • v.3 no.2
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    • pp.87-130
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    • 2019
  • This paper aims to analyze the recent progress(current situation) and tasks of arms control in North and South Korea. To this end the paper is composed of 5 chapters titled instruction; recent progress(current situation) of arms control in South and North Korea; constraints and tasks of arms control on the Korean peninsula; and conclusion. One of the most important tasks for the establishment of a peace structure for the coexistence of the Korean people in the 21st century is the realization of military control in order to resolve the acute military confrontation situation and mutual threats. With the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics, the North-South summit and the subsequent talks for peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, the North Korea-US summit, and subsequent talks are creating conditions for trust building and arms control between the two Koreas. The military trust between the two Koreas and operational arms control are being achieved through the declaration of the April 27 Panmunjom and the 'Military Agreement for the Implementation of the Panmunjom Declaration.' However, since there are constraints on the control of arms control, such as the persistence of hostility and distrust of the two Koreas, the defense treaty between the two Koreas and neighboring countries, the competition of neighboring countries and the complex interests of the Korean peninsula, Trust Building is important. We should resolve the issue of arms control between the two Koreas, taking into account the trend of international arms control over the internal and external dynamics of the Korean peninsula gradually and carefully, with a vision of long-term unification security.

Trends and Prospects of N. Korea Military Provocations After the Sinking of ROKS Cheon-an (천안함 폭침 이후 북한의 군사도발 양상과 전망)

  • Kim, Sung-Man
    • Strategy21
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    • s.34
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    • pp.58-92
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    • 2014
  • Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

Utilization plan of HUMINT in order to Overcome North Korea's WMD Treats: Focus on Modern Application 'use of spies' in the book of Art of War by Sun Tzu (북한의 WMD 위협 극복을 위한 인간정보 운용방안 : 손자병법 '용간편' 현대적 적용을 중심으로)

  • Lee, Jong Ho;Kim, Yeon Jun
    • Convergence Security Journal
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    • v.19 no.1
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    • pp.135-144
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    • 2019
  • Recently, the Kim Jong Eun regime announced the completion of nuclear armed forces, and has been holding a summit meeting between the ROK and the US administration to promote the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula by the complete dismissal of the North Korean nuclear weapons toward the international community and the Republic of Korea. North Korea's Kim Jong Eun declares complete denuclearization, but in order to complete the real denuclearization of the Korean peninsula we seek, we need more practical preparation and preparation. In modern international society, the jungle law logic is applied precisely. A country that is not prepared cannot exist in history unless it believes only the good will of the other party and makes substantial preparations. Therefore, the top priority for us to prepare at this point is to obtain and manage complete information on the reality of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction. In particular, the weapons of mass destruction possessed by North Korea must be identified early on, and preparations for such weapons are essential, due to the seriousness of the damage. Therefore, this study complements the inherent limitations of modernized technology information in order to obtain accurate information on North Korea's threat of weapons of mass destruction, which is a serious issue directly linked to the survival of the Korean people and the state, And the operation plan was specified.