• Strategy21
• /
• s.32
• /
• pp.5-35
• /
• 2013

The purpose of this thesis is to suggest how to plan ROK(Republic of Korea) Navy's strategy concerning to JOAC(Joint Operation Access Concept) and ASB(Air-Sea Battle) concept of US(United States) armed forces. Since 2006, US armed forces has been developing CONOPS(Concepts of Operations), JOAC & ASB. These concepts will not only affect security environment for Korea Peninsula and West Pacific Area, but also will be affected to ROK Navy's Strategy. Therefore, Korea Navy has to consider and review those concepts and should discuss the way to secure peace of Korea Peninsula. JOAC & ASB have been developed for securing operational access ability of US armed forces against enemy forces. A2/AD(Anti-Access, Area-Denial) is the strategy of possible enemy forces against US forces' approaching into the operation area and impede operations within area. US forces had to overcome enemy's A2/AD strategy in coming century to protect national interest and sustain global leadership. The main concept of JOAC & ASB is "Cross-domain Synergy", which means 'to eliminate duplicate and improve joint operability containing space and cyber operation area.' Korea Navy's acceptance of JOAC & ASB without any revising is not a rational choice. Without the amendment some problems can be occurred by the Korea navy's acceptance for the original version of JOAC & ASB. Those are "Missing differences of operation environment between Korea and US", "Impediment from neighbor nations, especially PRC (People's Republic of China)", and "Impediment inside from Korea armed forces". Therefore, Korea Navy has to evaluate and find out the way to solve for JOAC & ASB to apply for their strategy and minimise those possible problems above. This thesis is expected to be the solution.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
• /
• s.13
• /
• pp.1-41
• /
• 2016

US 8th Army in the attack on the Western Front was a situation that was frustrated by the 13th Corps Communist army. To this time support this, goals that have been granted to the US 1st Marine Division that initiated the attack in Mupyonri direction, lack the potential to achieve was not decisive. It was a operation specific erroneous judgment that occurred because there was no one accurately grasp the battlefield of the situation the wrong UN Forces Command. Tactical victory can be to maximize the operation outcomes. However, there is no possible failure of the operation is to expand the tactical success. This is because the failure of the operation, because directly linked to the success or failure of the war. Tactical victory can be to maximize the operation outcomes. However, operation specific failure is not it possible to expand the tactical victory. Therefore tactical success of the US 1st Marine Division, can not compensate for operation specific failure of the United Nations Forces Command. However, Chinese Communist Army 9th Corps is obsessed only victory of tactics to annihilate the US 1st Marine Division, by being fixation to the Chosin whole area, it was not possible to run a operational operation. Therefore tactical success df the US 1st Marine Division, Chinese Communist Army 9th Corps is to extinguish the ability to increase the number of the 13th Corps of the Western Front, 8th Army US have contributed to have escaped the crisis. In addition, the US 10th Corps while maintaining the combat force, by an important role to withdraw through the sea, was able to complement the misjudgment of the operation.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
• /
• s.2
• /
• pp.121-163
• /
• 2004

Science technique development expanded into, not only land, sea, and air operations but also those of airspace, and cyber battle spaces. It is generally accepted at this time that space centric operations currently cannot be effectively divided from air operations. However, science and technology advancements make it possible to integrate Army, Navy, Airforce, and Marine forces into effective operations as never before. The Republic of Korea Armed Forces needs to establish a more effective joint concept. The US military, considered by many experts as the most effective in the world, understands the necessity of joint operations and accordingly has highly developed its own concept of joint operations. The US joint operational concepts demonstrated their effectiveness during the Iraqi War by dominating the battlefield through effective use of all combat and non-combat power. Following the US Iraqi War experience, the US Department of Defense continued to enhance Joint Capability through the acceleration of US Military Transformation involving all components. The future national security of the Republic of Korea, faced with the peculiarity of communist threat in the form of North Korea, and the conflicting interest of four strong powers; the United States, China, Japan, and Russia, depends on small but strong armed forces employing all available combat power through effective National and Military Strategy, and considering domestic and international constraints. In order to succeed in future wars, military operations following joint operational concepts must effectively employ all available combat power in a timely manner. The Republic of Korea Armed Forces must establish a joint forces concept in order to integrate all available combat power during employment. Therefore we must establish military operations that develop the military structure and organization, doctrine, weapon systems, training and education of our armed forces based on the key concept of joint operations.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.34
• /
• pp.58-92
• /
• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.41
• /
• pp.108-152
• /
• 2017

This paper aims to analyze hegemonic competition and the role of naval power. To this end the paper is composed of four chapters titled introduction, the role of naval power in the hegemonic competition, the role of naval power in the East Asia, and the lessons and implications for the Korean Peninsula. Since the modern era, the hegemonic competition in the East Asian region has been the intrusion and struggle process between the world system and the East Asian regional system, and the ocean between these two systems has become the goal and means of supremacy(hegemony). Currently, the hegemonic competition between the US and China consists of systemic competition at the global level and marine competition at the regional level. When South Korea is forced to make strategic choices in the course of the US-China hegemonic competition, naval power will be the first factor to be considered. The ROK is asymmetrically maintaining a deep dependency relationship with the United States in terms of security and China in relation to the economy. And while the ROK's national economic power is acquired from the ocean, the ROK's military power is imbalanced because it is centered on the ground forces. These international relations and asymmetric-unbalanced resources distribution will not be able to effectively cope with the hegemonic competition between the US and China in the future, and will limit Korea's strategic choice. Since naval power and forces are the prerequisites for the hegemonic competition or the maintenance of supremacy we must construct balanced naval forces(naval power) that are not subordinate to the ground forces at the national strategic level for the future of the country.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.42
• /
• pp.196-223
• /
• 2017

The aim of this paper is to analyze China's naval strengthening and threat reflected in submarines, aircraft, destroyers and missile capabilities and US Navy's counter-forces. China is strengthening its naval forces in accordance with its three-step naval force build-up plan, and the introduction of Russian destroyers and submarines is a foothold for China's naval enforcement. The Chinese Navy also converted the concept of the First-Second Island Chain Defense, which it had already maintained, to the concept of maritime layer defense. Currently, the Chinese Navy maintains the concept of a Three-Maritime Layer Defense which includes the South China Sea, where artificial islands are being built by China, in the First Layer Defense and the East China Sea in the Third Layer Defense. Along with the advancement of Chinese Navy's submarines, surface vessels and aircraft's operational capabilities, ballistic and cruise missile capabilities become a major threat to the US Navy. If a crisis occurs in the East China Sea or in the Taiwan Waters, the US Navy will face more difficulties in employing the Carrier Strike Group to manage the crisis. Meanwhile, if a crisis occurs on the Korean Peninsula, it will be a burden to dispatch Carrier Strike GroupS to the East and West Seas of the Korean Peninsula. For the stable future, the US Navy should develop a strategy to respond more effectively to the Chinese Navy, which is challenging new maritime supremacy in East Asia.

• Journal of the Korea Society for Simulation
• /
• v.17 no.1
• /
• pp.23-32
• /
• 2008

In this paper, we discuss the current status of ROK-US wargame model interoperability and propose the future federation architecture. ROK and US Armed Forces have made an effort to make their wargame model interoperable to fulfill operational requirements since 1999. Currently, they have achieved some degree of their final goals even though there is long way to go. ROK Armed Forces is now considering future federation architecture. We propose the future federation architecture of ROK-US wargame model interoperability considering technical advantages and system availability. It will be the next federation architecture led by ROK side for the ROK Armed Forces joint exercise and ROK-US combined exercise.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.41
• /
• pp.5-29
• /
• 2017

The Mahan's seapower theory has been the basis of US Navy to date as it can enjoy the supremacy status in all of the seas of the world. His theory is very straightforward. A nation can be a great country in the world just through the use of maritime commerce that could be protected by a strong and powerful navy. Mahan's theory on seapower was substantiated in the Spanish-American War with respect to how important the naval power is. The best thing to make US a great nation was to make sure that flow of international trade is smooth, and the unhindered trade could be made possible only by the destruction of enemy's fleet that may obstruct the SLOCs. That's why Mahan insisted that a strong navy was needed and a decisive battle by the navy's fleet at sea should be encouraged as a way of ensuring the safety of the SLOCs. The newly-arrived Trump administration seems to be in line with the Mahan's theory seapower in its policy on naval forces structure. It is expected that US will continue to support the Pivot to Asia policy that has been adopted by the previous administration through an increase in its naval fleet forces. The number of US navy ships will be 355 in 2030, rendering it much more powerful navy than before. The catch phrase "3rd Fleet Forward" proposed by the president Trump indicates that two carrier strike groups will be present in the Asia Pacific region, being able to make the confrontation between US and China more tense than before. The presence of the US naval forces in the area may function as some sort of pressure against China that Trump insisted had been responsible for the closure of 60,000 factories and the loss of 3,000,000 jobs in the United States.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
• /
• s.1
• /
• pp.71-111
• /
• 2003

The key lessons of the very complex modern war can be dangerously misleading to the outsiders. The efforts trying to draw lessons learned from the Iraq War (OIF : Operation Iraqi Freedom) may be biased by the view of point by Americans, because most of war episodes have been come from the Western media coverage. More serious bias can be committed thanks to the differences of warfighting doctrines and military technology between US forces and ROK forces. However, OIF-fought allied commanders and outside military experts said this campaign exemplified 21st-century warfare: swift, agile and decisive, employing overpowering technology to bring relentless violence to bear in many places at once. Even though the campaign evolved differently than anticipated, allied forces regrouped and regained the initiative remarkably quickly, thanks in large part to a new command flexibility, tied to new technology that made possible the more rapid sharing of data. These factors permitted "new air-land dynamic". The things that compel that are good sensors networked with good intelligence disseminated through a robust networking system, which then yields speed. Speed turns out to be a very important factor for conducting "Rapid Decisive Operations" relied on joint "Mass of Effects". ROK forces facing the heaviest ground threat in the world may learn more from Cold War era-typed US Army 3rd Infantry Division (3ID), which operating considerably beyond existing doctrine. 3ID flew its personnel into Kuwait to meet up with equipment already located in the region as pre-positioned stock. During OIF, the division conducted continuous offensive operations over 230km deep battlespace for 21 days. The lessons learned for ROK army to prepare tomorrow's war may be found from 3ID in its training, command and control, task organization, firepower and battlespace management, and logistics.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
• /
• v.41 no.3
• /
• pp.287-295
• /
• 2015

Due to the latest agreement between the military authorities of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States (US) of America, Korea's annual contribution to the budget of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) rose as high as close to 1 trillion won. This seemingly prohibitive amount has led to the questioning of military critics regarding determination criteria, wholesomeness of cost, alignment of incentives, and implementational transparency, etc. As these sources of mistrust can potentially undermine the congruence of alliance, we attempt to devise a scientific means to test the validity of Korea's budget contribution. Specifically, we use the real options approach (ROA) to estimating the interval of the fair prices of maintaining the USFK. We consider the USFK as an insurance against foreign incursions, and this enables us to assume their role as a put option. Upon a hypothetical war breakout, the daily cumulative size of the Korean economy is estimated by implementing the simulated loss ratios of assets and population. As a result, the strategic value (put premium) of the USFK is exponentially higher the sooner the US forces are augmented following an intrusion. Also, Korea's payments toward the USFK in 2011 and 2012 appear theoretically fairly valued.