India, Southeast Asia in general, and Siam in particular share a long history of cultural and commercial relations. Located in each other's extended neighbourhood, India and Thailand have a shared maritime boundary in the Andaman Sea. Situated in the strategic position, midway between West Asia on the one hand and East Asia on the other, India and Siam combined played a significant role in the maritime transactions in Asia and beyond. The geographical proximity between India and Siam led to multifaceted maritime interactions and exchanges. Siam was in the Indian sphere of cultural, religious, philosophical, technical, and linguistic influence much before the Common Era. The cultural and mercantile networks between India and Siam are well-attested by archaeological and literary sources. The archaeological findings in Siam and other Southeast Asian countries have revealed the dynamic trade and cultural exchange between India and Southeast Asia since the pre-Common Era. The Takola (modern Takua Pa) area served as a more suitable landing place for Indian merchants and there existed the settlement of the Indian mercantile community. Ligor (Nakhon Si Thammarat), Jaya (Chaiya), Patalung (Phatalung), U Thong, Ban Don Tha Pet, Ban U Taphao, Khao Sam Kaeo, and many other sites in Siam have brought to light a large variety of objects which demonstrate that ancient Siam had close mercantile contact with India as well as the Mediterranean world and China. The paper discusses in detail the cultural and trade links between India and Siam and their impact on the Maritime Silk Road.
Arif Dirlik in Postmodernity's Histories sees the issue of re-ethnicization in the case of John Huang, China's alleged attempt at lobbying the Clinton administration. In this view, Americans with Chinese surnames were suspected by the US Justice Department to be possible spies working for Beijing. Reethnicization here seems to serve the mainstream society in reducing an ethnic minority to a group of aliens operating for their countries of origin. However, re-ethnicization is not necessarily a one-way oppressive operation; it is often made use of by the ethnic minorities in their efforts to adapt to their country of arrival. Haroon and Karim, the protagonists of Hanif Kureishi's The Buddha of Suburbia, are cases in point. They are portrayed as winning social recognition and securing a place of their own within the hostile host society through a strategic use of re-ethnicization, that is, masquerading as 'genuine Orientals.' This study brings to light possible fallacies or misguided expectations concerning the political position of first- and second-generation immigrants. One of the fallacies is found in the racist metropolis, which regards the ethnic minorities as a sort of resident aliens, no matter what immigrant generation the latter belongs to. Another fallacy is found in the kind of postcolonial criticism that automatically regards an anti-racist critique advanced by people like Kureishi as something motivated by a confrontational tactic, that is, an attempt at subverting the colonial power relations. The conclusion of this study is that Kureishi's agenda, as presented in The Buddha of Suburbia, is neither the preservation of an ethnic identity nor the subversion of colonial power relations but survival in the metropolis. On this account Kureish's agenda can be called a micro-politics.
This study aims to serve as a critical comparison of the currently controversial 'new cold war' discourse. It took three triggers for the 'new cold war' discourse to emerge as a major issue in the media and academia and to have real political impact. With the launch of China's 'Belt and Road' project and Russia's annexation of Crimea leading to the 'Ukraine crisis,' the 'new cold war' discourse has begun to take shape. Trump's U.S.-China trade spat has brought the 'new cold war' debate to the forefront. The 'new cold war' debate is currently being intensified by the Biden administration's framing of "democracy versus authoritarianism" and Putin's invasion of Ukraine. Currently, there is no consensus among scholars on whether the controversial 'new cold war' is a new version, or a continuation of the historically defined concept of the Cold War. The term 'New Cold War' is less of an analytical concept and more of a topical term that has yet to achieve analytical status, let alone a theoretical validation and systematization, and the related debate remains at the level of assertion or discourse. Through this comparative analysis, I will argue that the ongoing discourse of the 'New Cold War' does not have the instrumental explanatory power to analyze the transitional phenomena of the world order today.
North Korea conducted a total of six nuclear tests from the 1st test of 2006 to September, 2017. North Korea developed an armed forces security strategy at the level of regime protection and defense to respond to U.S. hostile policy. However, it is certain that strategic goals of North Korea's nuclear test were to overcome a crisis in North Korea's regime through US-North Korea negotiation and complete nuclear armed forces for socialist unification on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's continuous nuclear test is a direct factor in threatening peace on the Korean Peninsula and an indirect factor in security dynamics of Northeast Asia. The U.N. Security Council has enforced sanctions against North Korea through six resolutions against North Korea's reckless nuclear test for the past 10 years. However, Kim Jong-Un's regime is in a position to stick to simultaneous pursuit of nuclear and economic development in spite of anti-North sanction of international society including U.N. and U.S.A. It is understood that North Korea was stimulated to conduct intense nuclear test as U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction was not effective on North Korea. Full-scale and local wars are expected as military options, one of anti-North sanctions of the Trump administration. The Trump administration has attempted diplomatic pressure strategy as a secondary boycott unlike previous administrations. Nevertheless, North Korea has stood against U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction with brinkmanship tactics, announcing full-scale military confrontation against U.S. It is judged that North Korea will pursue simultaneous nuclear weapons and economic development in terms of regime survival. North Korea will have less strategic choices in that its regime may collapse because of realistic national strategy between U.S.A. and China.
Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
/
v.5
no.1
/
pp.45-67
/
2010
On July 21st in 2005, People's Bank of China (PBOC) turned the currency peg against the U.S. dollar into managed currency system based on a basket of unnamed currencies under China's exchanged rate regime. This change means that China's enterprises are not free from currency fluctuations. The purpose of this study is to analyze the relations between Renminbi fluctuations in the floating exchange rate and financial results of venture companies. The process and outcomes of this study are as follows, First, in order to measure the financial results of venture companies, I choose venture companies in Shandong Province listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) at random and several quarter financial sheets according to safety ratios, profitability ratios, growth ratios, activity ratios. Second, I arrange the daily Renminbi exchange rate data announced from July 21st, 2005 to December 31st, 2008 by PBOC into the quarterly data. Third, in order to confirm the relations between Renminbi fluctuations and financial results of venture companies, I carry out Pearson's correlation analysis. As a result, the revaluation of the Chinese Renminbi has weakly negative effects on debt ratio, total assets turnover ratio and equity turnover ratio in statistics. But the revaluation of the Chinese Renminbi is not related to other financial index in statistics. The result of this study is that the revaluation of the Chinese Renminbi has little influence on the export and import of Chinese venture companies and certifies the fact that Chinese venture companies have much foreign currency assets. In addition to avoid the currency exposure risk, this study shows the effective method about currency exposure risk which adjusts proportion of Renminbi to foreign currency.
On July 21st in 2005, People's Bank of China (PBOC) turned the currency peg against the U.S. dollar into managed currency system based on a basket of unnamed currencies under China's exchanged rate regime. This change means that China's enterprises are not free from currency fluctuations. The purpose of this study is to analyze the relations between Renminbi fluctuations in the floating exchange rate and financial results of venture companies. The process and outcomes of this study are as follows, First, in order to measure the financial results of venture companies, I choose venture companies in Shandong Province listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) at random and several quarter financial sheets according to safety ratios, profitability ratios, growth ratios, activity ratios. Second, I arrange the daily Renminbi exchange rate data announced from July 21st, 2005 to December 31st, 2008 by PBOC into the quarterly data. Third, in order to confirm the relations between Renminbi fluctuations and financial results of venture companies, I carry out Pearson's correlation analysis. As a result, the revaluation of the Chinese Renminbi has weakly negative effects on debt ratio, total assets turnover ratio and equity turnover ratio in statistics. But the revaluation of the Chinese Renminbi is not related to other financial index in statistics. The result of this study is that the revaluation of the Chinese Renminbi has little influence on the export and import of Chinese venture companies and certifies the fact that Chinese venture companies have much foreign currency assets. In addition to avoid the currency exposure risk, this study shows the effective method about currency exposure risk which adjusts proportion of Renminbi to foreign currency.
$\ulcorner$The South-North Joint Declaration$\lrcorner$ of June 15, 2000 made by President Kim Dae Jung and National Defense Committee Chairman Kim Jong Il will contribute to the activation of economic exchange between south and north Korea. To realize the fundamental spirit of the South-North Joint Declaration, the authorities concerned of south and north Korea have reached an agreement titled $\ulcorner$Agreement on Settlement Procedure of Commercial Disputes$\lrcorner$ last December. In this connection, a speedy and reasonable settlement of commercial disputes arising therefrom is becoming a problem of vital importance between south and north Korea. Also, south and north arbitral institutions have to consider a possible arbitration agreement carefully to solve the disputes systematically under the Agreement, which will serve as an example for similar arrangements and possible harmonization in East-West commercial relations. A variety of dispute settlements including friendly consultations, conciliation and arbitration will be used more frequently within the framework of the bilateral agreements of governmental or non-governmental level which have been concluded in the past between socialist and capitalistic economy countries. There is a growing tendency that East-West trade parties recognize and accept the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in their contracts. So it is advisable to use the UNCITRAL Rules in arbitrations of south and north Korea in case that the interested parties fail to agree on applicable rules. Finally it should be noted that pre-arbitral settlement called ‘joint conciliation’ should be reflected in the settlement mechanism of commercial disputes between south and north Korean parties as proved to be successful between the U.S. and China trade in the past.
The National League for Democracy (NLD) has restored a civilian government since the military had taken political power in 1962 as a result of general elections on 7, November 2015. But Daw Aung San Suu Kyi could not take part in the presidential election due to some restraints in constitution, so new government created the state counsellor position and the ministry of sate counsellor's office against military's resistance. It never publicized whether the military has to back to barracks including abolish of military's occupying the parliament seats. The ruling party is still taking laissez-faire to the military's political and economic role. The National level Ceasefire Agreement called the 21st Panglong conference launched in the end of August for a week, but stakeholders only insisted their demands. Rohingya issue is not involved in the 21st Panglong conference which aims to achieve national unity. The U.S. fully lifted a comprehensive sanction toward Myanmar since 1993, Japan promised huge grant assistance succeeding the former quasi civilian government. China strived to restore alienated relations of two countries. Although Korea kept Official Development Assistance, the summit which was planed two times in 2016 did not hold. The civilian government announced twelve points of developmental agenda in July 2016, instead of destroying the national development policy of the Thein Sein government. This agenda only showed the direction of policy not road map which was the same trend of the former government. The main direction of economic development stressed agriculture but manufacture like light industry was ignored.
The purpose of this study is to examine and assess the major characteristics and changes of politics, economy, and diplomacy in Thailand in 2016. Specifically, it reviewed the New Constitution that was passed in 2016, the confrontation between different political forces and the trend of military regime around the New Constitution, and the political instability caused by the accession of the new king to the throne. This study also set out to figure out changes to the economy and foreign relations of the country, including its relations with South Korea, under the military regime and make predictions for the impact and future prospects of King Bhumibol Adulyadej's death on the politics and economy of the country. In 2016, the politics of Thailand took a step further toward the transfer of power to civil government and established a foundation for an authoritarian system. The draft of the New Constitution, which does not seem to be democratic, was approved by a referendum and enabled the military authorities to continue their political interventions, even after the general election. The New Constitution, in particular, reduces the power of political parties itself in addition to simply keeping the Thaksin's party in check; thus, anticipating ongoing conflicts between the military authorities and political parties. In this situation, the absence of King Bhumibol Adulyadej, who used to play a decisive role in promoting the political stability of the country, and the accession of the new king to the throne raise concerns about the acceleration of political instability, which has continued after the coup and influenced the diplomatic relations of the country. Today, Thailand is distancing itself from Western nations that do not recognize the current military regime including the U.S.A. and EU member states and instead maintains a rapidly friendly and close relation with China. In 2016, the economy of Thailand made a gradual recovery rather than high growth. The death of King Bhumibol Adulyadej has exerted limited direct economic impacts only on individual consumption and tourism and is not likely to cause a recession. An economic crisis will, however, be unavoidable if the political confrontations escalate before the general election to transfer power to the civil government.
A Basic Plan for the Promotion of Space Development (hereinafter referred to as "basic plan"), which prescribes mid- and long-term policy objectives and basic direction-setting on space development every five years, is one of the matters to be deliberated by the National Space Committee. Confirmed February 2018 by the Committee, the 3rd Basic Plan has a unique matter, compared to the 2nd Basic Plan. It is to construct "Korean Positioning System(KPS)". Almost every country in the world including Korea has been relying on GPS. On the occasion of the shooting down of a Korean Air flight 007 by Soviet Russia, GPS Standard Positioning Service has been open to the world. Due to technical errors of GPS or conflict of interests between countries in international relations, however, the above Service can be interrupted at any time. Such cessation might bring extensive damage to the social, economic and security domains of every country. This is why some countries has been constructing an independent global or regional satellite navigation system: EU(Galileo), Russia(Glonass), India(NaVic), Japan(QZSS), and China(Beidou). So does South Korea. Once KPS is built, it is expected to make use of the system in various areas such as transportation, aviation, disaster, construction, defense, ocean, distribution, telecommunication, etc. For this, a pan-governmental governance is needed to be established. And this governance must be based on the law. Korea is richly experienced in developing and operating individually satellite itself, but it has little experience in the simultaneous development and operation of the satellites, ground, and users systems, such as KPS. Therefore we need to review overseas cases, in order to minimize trial and error. U.S. GPS is a classic example.
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