• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.31 no.3
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• pp.25-42
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• 2021

Arbitration is an alternative dispute resolution mechanism based on the parties' agreement to resolve any disputes parties may have by arbitration rather than litigation in court. Parties' consent to arbitrate, which must be manifest in the parties' arbitration clause or agreement, is the foundation for arbitration; thus, the language of an arbitration agreement is often of utmost importance in determining the intent of the parties regarding many aspects of arbitration proceedings, such as, the scope of arbitral proceedings, arbitral seat, and authority of arbitral tribunals, among others. Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela (2019) that ambiguity in arbitration agreement as to availability of class arbitration should be resolved in favor of individual arbitration, and therefore, class arbitration would be precluded. Such holding was met with criticism by four separate dissenting opinions, in which the dissenting Justices have disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the arbitration agreement at issue, as well as, its rejection of application of state law in resolving contractual ambiguity. This article analyzes the Supreme Court's decision and reviews the Court's approach in construction of the arbitration agreement. Nevertheless, because the Supreme Court declined to provide clear guidelines as to precisely what contractual basis is required to permit class arbitration, either silence or ambiguity in arbitration agreements will be resolved by disallowing class arbitration.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.10 no.3
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• pp.143-162
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• 2008

The Title 19 of the U.S. Code covers custom duties and is the heart of international trade regulation in the U.S.. Among the provisions in Title 19, is Chapter 4, the Tariff Act of 1930. Under U.S. Antidumping duty law, dumping occurs when `subject merchandise' is imported into the U.S. and sold at less than `fair value.' The administration of U.S. Antidumping duty law is shared between the Department of Commerce('Commerce') and International Trade Commission('USITC'). The U.S. Court of International Trade ("CIT") and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC") decided the review of antidumping duty ("AD") determinations and administrative review results issued by the Commerce and the USITC, as well as the review of countervailing duty ("CVD") decisions. In Eurodif S.A. v. United States, the CAFC considered the important issue of whether the antidumping and countervailing duty laws apply to sales and purchases of services--in this case, the sale or purchase of enrichment services. Although the federal courts had considered the issue of whether a sale of enrichment services constitutes a sale of goods, the issue had never arisen in the context of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws. Also this is the first time that the Supreme Court has ever agreed to consider an antidumping case.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.3-35
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• 2017

For recent years, several disputes between Korean consumers and multinational companies have arisen. Since the disputes were big and material that children's safety was at issue, a question started if Korean law properly has protected consumers' rights against multinational companies. While the Korean legal society tried to legislate punitive compensation with this concern, the U.S. Supreme Court reached an interesting case law regarding consumer contracts. A recent trend on consumer contracts in the United States shows that general terms have arbitration clause with class action waiver. As much as international arbitration has worked as the most effective resolution in international commercial disputes, the concept is still foreign and the experts are not approachable to lay individual consumers. However, class action in arbitration can hugely help for lay individual consumers to bring a case before arbitration tribunal. California courts consistently showed the analysis that the practical impact of prohibiting class action in arbitration clause is to ban lay individual consumers from fighting for their rights. However, the Supreme Court held that the arbitration clause shall be enforced as parties agree even if consumers practically cannot fight for their rights in the end. Even though consumer contracts are a typical example of lack of parity and of adhesive contract, the Supreme Court still applies liberalism that parties are equal in power and free to agree. This case law has a crucial implication since Korean consumers buy goods and services from the U.S. and other countries in everyday life. Accordingly, they are deemed to agree on the dispute resolution clauses, which might violate their constitutional right to bring their cases before the adjudication tribunal. This issue could be more important than adopting punitive compensation because consumers' rights are not necessarily governed by Korean law but by the governing law of the general terms and conditions chosen and written by the multinational companies. Thus this paper studies and analyzes the practical reality of international arbitration and influence of arbitration clause with class action waiver with the U.S. Supreme Court and California case laws.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.32 no.3
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• pp.29-46
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• 2022

Until recently, there has been a circuit split as to whether parties to foreign private arbitral proceedings could seek assistance from the U.S. courts for discovery pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1782. The circuit courts have differed on the issue of whether a private arbitral proceeding may be considered a "proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal" in terms of the statute, which would ultimately allow or disallow judicial assistance in taking of evidence by the U.S. district courts for use in the requested proceedings. While the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the applicability of §1782 in its Intel decision in 2004, it had not established a test as to what constitutes a foreign or international tribunal for the purposes of §1782, thereby leaving it open for lower courts to continue to interpret §1782 in their own ways, as requests for judicial assistance in taking of evidence are filed. In the recent decision of ZF Auto. US, Inc., v. Luxshare, Ltd., the Supreme Court has finally clarified that in order for an arbitral panel to be a "foreign or international tribunal" under §1782, such panels must exercise governmental authority conferred by one nation or multiple nations. Therefore, private commercial arbitral panels are not "foreign or international tribunal(s)" for the purposes of §1782 because they do not constitute governmental or intergovernmental adjudicative bodies. Such holding is necessary and legitimate for interested parties in international arbitration, as well as, potential parties of arbitration who are contemplating alternative dispute resolution for their dispute(s).

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.59-90
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• 2015

Since 1855, the federal courts of the United States have been empowered to assist in the gathering of evidence for use before foreign tribunals. Today, the source of that authority is 28 U.S.C. ${\S}1782$ which permits the courts to order a person "to give [ ] testimony... or to produce a document ... for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal${\cdots}$ ." It was generally assumed, until the United States Supreme Court's decision of Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. in 2004, that arbitration tribunals were not "foreign tribunals" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. ${\S}1782$. While the issue in Intel did not involve an arbitration tribunal, a statement by the Supreme Court in dicta has called into question the exact parameters of the words "foreign tribunal," resulting in a split of opinion among the federal courts of the United States. This article explores the legislative history of 28 U.S.C. ${\S}1782$, examines the United States Supreme Court decision in Intel, and discusses the split among the courts of the United States regarding the interpretation of "foreign tribunal." The article further surveys emerging issues: is an arbitration tribunal in a case involving foreign parties and seated in the United States a "foreign tribunal"; does agreeing to the use of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration circumscribe the use of 28 U.S.C. ${\S}1782$; can a party be ordered to produce documents located outside the United States; and is there a role for judicial estoppel in determining whether an application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ${\S}1782$ should be granted?

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.11 no.3
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• pp.265-286
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• 2009

Dumping describes the practice of international price discrimination whereby a producer or exporter sells merchandise in an export market at less than fair value. The U.S. antidumping statutory framework is embodied in the Tariff Act of 1930. The Act states that "dumping" refers to the sale or likely sale of goods at less than fair value. 19 U.S.C. $\S$ 1677(34). The Commerce Department and the Commission are jointly responsible for administering the antidumping law. Commerce determines whether foreign merchandise is being sold in the United States at less than fair value, and the Commission determines whether a domestic industry producing a product like the imported merchandise has been materially injured or threatened with material injury by reason of imports of that product. Recently, in U.S. v. Eurodif, the Supreme Court held the question whether the Commerce can reasonably determin that foreign merchandise has been sold within the meaning of the antidumping law in U.S.. Should 19 U.S.C. Section 1673, which calls for "antidumping" duties on foreign goods, but not services, that sell at less than fair value in the U.S., apply to imported low enriched uranium? Yes. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice David H. Souter, the Supreme Court held that the Commerce Department's view of imported low enriched uranium, as the sale of goods rather than services, was permissible. It reasoned that, since 19 U.S.C. Section 1673 did not specify whether it applied to the production of low enriched uranium, it was left to the reasonable interpretation of the Commerce Department to determine. Accordingly, the Court found the Commerce Department interpreted the statute reasonably.

• The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.63-89
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• 2014

In 1976, the Dalkon Shield-intrauterine device injured several thousand women in U.S.A. which caused the changes of medical deivce regulation. The Medical Device Regulation Act or Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) was introduce. As part of the process of regulating medical devices, the MDA divides medical devices into three categories. The class II, and III devices which have moderate harm or more can use the section 510 (k), premarket notification process if the manufacturer can establish that its device is "substantially equivalent" to a device that was marketed before 1976. In 21 U.S.C. ${\S}$ 360k(a), MDA introduced a provision which expressly preempts competing state laws or regulations. After that, the judicial debates had began over the proper interpretation and application of Section 360(k) In February 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Riegel v. Medtronic that manufacturer approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)'s pre-market approval process are preempted from liability, even when the devices have defective design or lack of labeling. But the Supreme Court ruled in Medtronic Inc. v. Lora Lohr that the manufactures which use the section 510 (k) process cannot be preempted and in Bausch v. Stryker Corp. that manufactures which violated the CGMP standard are also liable to the damage of patient at the state courts. In 2009, the Supreme Court ruled in Wyeth v. Levine that patients harmed by prescription drugs can claim damages in state courts. This may cause a double standard between prescription drugs and medical devices. FDA Preemption is the legal theory in the United States that exempts product manufacturers from tort claims regarding Food and Drug Administration approved products. FDA Preemption has been a highly contentious issue. In general, consumer groups are against it while the FDA and pharmaceutical manufacturers are in favor of it. This issues also influences the theory of product liability of U.S.A. Complete immunity preemption is an issue need to be more declared.

• Korean journal of communication and information
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• v.55
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• pp.5-32
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• 2011

This paper is a comparative analysis of constitutional decisions in which the Korea Consitutional Court and the United States Supreme Court applied the void for vagueness doctrine into free expression issues. Common aspects are: both courts applied the void for vagueness doctrine on the grounds that vague laws bring chilling effect on freedom of expression. Acknowledging inevitable uncertainties in lawmaking and legal jargons, however, both courts required minimum standards in the void for vagueness doctrine. In the cases where unclear legal meanings resulted in constitutional challenges, both courts adopted the "narrowing construction" by the courts or judges based on average/ordinary person's understanding. The biggest differences between the two constitutional courts are their approach to the degrees of vagueness allowed in free expression cases. The U.S. Supreme Court underscored the necessity of narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards. Meanwhile, the Korea Constitutional Court relaxed its standards in some cases such as the National Security Law cases, even though it admitted the possibility of curtailing the right to free expression. The Court reasoned that those laws, though vague, brought with bigger social interests and are necessary tools in dealing with changing world.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.12
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• pp.555-586
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• 1999

United States has extended the extraterritorial application of U.S. Antitrust Law in 1990s. First, The U.S. Federal Supreme Court declared in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California that the extraterritorial application of U.S. Antitrust Law is according to Effect Doctrine. Therefore, U.S. Antirust Division and FTC will continue to base their assertions of juridiction on the test of direct, substantial and foreseeable effects on U.S. interests. Second, U.S. Antitrust Law apply to foreign conduct that such conduct has direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. domestic or import commerce and export commerce. Third, United States has extended the extraterritorial application of U.S. Antitrust Law on international licensing contract or international merger. Forth, United States impose criminal responsbility of U.S. Antitrust Law on the foreign anticompetitive conduct. Therefore, our government and industries must consider the corresponding stratigies against the extension of the extraterritorial application of U.S. Antitrust Law.

• The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
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• v.10 no.1
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• pp.263-305
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• 2009

Is it lawful to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment applied to a patient in a terminal condition or permanent unconscious condition? In Korea, there are no such laws or regulations which control affairs related to the withholding or withdrawal life-support treatment and active euthanasia as the Natural Death Act or the Death with Dignity Act in the U. S. A. And in addition there has had no precedent of Supreme Court. Recently Supreme Court has pronounced a historical judgment on a terminal care case. The court allowed the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from a patient in a permanent unconscious state. Fundamentally the court judged that the continuation of that medical treatment would infringe dignity and value of a patient as a human being. And the court required some legal grounds to consider such withdrawal or withholding of medical care lawful. The legal grounds are as follow. First, the patient is in a incurable and irreversible condition and already entered a stage of death. Second, the patient executed a directive, in advance, directing the withholding or withdrawal of life-support treatment in a incurable and irreversible condition or in a terminal condition. Otherwise, at least, the patient's will would be presumed through his/her character, view of value, philosophy, religious faith and career etc. I regard if a patient is in a incurable and irreversible condition or in a terminal condition, the medical contract between a patient and a doctor would be terminated because of the actual impossibility of achievement of it's purpose. So I think the discontinuation of life-sustaining care would be legally allowed without depending on the patient's own will.