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A Study on Jurisdiction under the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions (국제항공테러협약의 관할권 연구)

  • Kim, Han-Taek
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.24 no.1
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    • pp.59-89
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    • 2009
  • The objectives of the 1963 Tokyo Convention cover a variety of subjects, with the intention of providing safety in aircraft, protection of life and property on board, and promoting the security of civil aviation. These objectives will be treated as follows: first, the unification of rules on jurisdiction; second, the question of filling the gap in jurisdiction; third, the scheme of maintaining law and order on board aircraft; fourth, the protection of persons acting in accordance with the Convention; fifth, the protection of the interests of disembarked persons; sixth, the question of hijacking of aircraft; and finally some general remarks on the objectives of the Convention. The Tokyo Convention mainly deals with general crimes such as murder, violence, robbery on board aircraft rather than aviation terrorism. The Article 11 of the Convention deals with hijacking in a simple way. As far as aviation terrorism is concerned 1970 Hague Convention and 1971 Montreal Convention cover the hijacking and sabotage respectively. The Problem of national jurisdiction over the offence and the offender was as tangled at the Hague and Montreal Convention, as under the Tokyo Convention. Under the Tokyo Convention the prime base of jurisdiction is the law of the flag (Article 3), but concurrent jurisdiction is also allowed on grounds of: territorial principle, active nationality and passive personality principle, security of the state, breach of flight rules, and exercise of jurisdiction necessary for the performance of obligations under multilateral agreements (Article 4). No Criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law is excluded [Article 3(2)]. However, Article 4 of the Hague Convention(hereafter Hague Article 4) and Article 5 of the Montreal Convention(hereafter Montreal Article 5), dealing with jurisdiction have moved a step further, inasmuch as the opening part of both paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Hague Article 4 and the Montreal Article 5 impose an obligation on all contracting states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over the offence (i.e., to ensure that their law is such that their courts will have jurisdiction to try offender in all the circumstances covered by Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5). The state of registration and the state where the aircraft lands with the hijacker still on board will have the most interest, and would be in the best position to prosecute him; the paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of the Montreal Article 5 deal with it, respectively. However, paragraph 1(b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraph 1(c) of the Montreal Article 5 do not specify if the aircraft is still under the control of the hijacker or if the hijacker has been overpowered by the aircraft commander, or if the offence has at all occurred in the airspace of the state of landing. The language of the paragraph would probably cover all these cases. The weaknesses of Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5 are however, patent. The Jurisdictions of the state of registration, the state of landing, the state of the lessee and the state where the offender is present, are concurrent. No priorities have been fixed despite a proposal to this effect in the Legal Committee and the Diplomatic Conference, and despite the fact that it was pointed out that the difficulty in accepting the Tokyo Convention has been the question of multiple jurisdiction, for the reason that it would be too difficult to determine the priorities. Disputes over the exercise of jurisdiction can be endemic, more so when Article 8(4) of the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention give every state mentioned in Hague Article 4(1) and Montreal Article 5(1) the right to seek extradition of the offender. A solution to the problem should not have been given up only because it was difficult. Hague Article 4(3) and Montreal Article 5(3) provide that they do not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. Thus the provisions of the two Conventions create additional obligations on the state, and do not exclude those already existing under national laws. Although the two Conventions do not require a state to establish jurisdiction over, for example, hijacking or sabotage committed by its own nationals in a foreign aircraft anywhere in the world, they do not preclude any contracting state from doing so. However, it has be noted that any jurisdiction established merely under the national law would not make the offence an extraditable one under Article 8 of the Hague and Montreal Convention. As far as international aviation terrorism is concerned 1988 Montreal Protocol and 1991 Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detention are added. The former deals with airport terrorism and the latter plastic explosives. Compared to the other International Terrorism Conventions, the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions do not have clauses of the passive personality principle. If the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions need to be revised in the future, those clauses containing the passive personality principle have to be inserted for the suppression of the international aviation terrorism more effectively. Article 3 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and Article 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would be models that the revised International Aviation Terrorism Conventions could follow in the future.

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The Liability for Space Activity of Launching State of Space Object and Improvement of Korea's Space Policy (우주물체 발사국의 우주활동에 대한 책임과 우리나라 우주정책의 개선방향)

  • Lee, Kang-Bin
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.28 no.2
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    • pp.295-347
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    • 2013
  • Korea launched the science satellite by the first launch vehicle Naro-ho(KSLV-1) at the Naro Space Center located at Oinarodo, Cohenggun Jellanamdo in August, 2009 and October, 2010. However, the first and second launch failed. At last, on January 30, 2013 the third launch of the launch vehicle Naro-ho has successfully launched and the Naro science satellite penetrated into the space orbit. Owing to the succeed of the launch of Naro-ho, Korea joined the space club by the eleventh turn following the United States, Russia, Japan and China. The United Nations adopted the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Rescue Agreement of 1968, the Liability Convention of 1972, the Regislation Convention of 1976, and Moon Agreement of 1979. Korea ratified the above space-related treaties except the Moon Agreement. Such space-related treaties regulate the international liability for the space activity by the launching state of the space object. Especially the Outer Space Treaty regulates the principle concerning the state's liability for the space activity. Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an object into outer space is internationally liable for damage to another State Party or to its natural or judicial persons by such object or its component parts on the earth, in air space or in outer space. Under the Liability Convention, a launching state shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight. The major nations of the world made national legislations to observe the above space-related treaties, and to promote the space development, and to regulate the space activity. In Korea, the United States, Russia and Japan, the national space-related legislation regulates the government's liability of the launching state of the space object. The national space-related legislations of the major nations are as follows : the Outer Space Development Promotion Act and Outer Space Damage Compensation Act of Korea, the National Aeronautic and Space Act and Commercial Space Launch Act of the United States, the Law on Space Activity of Russia, and the Law concerning Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency and Space Basic Act of Japan. In order to implement the government's liability of the launching state of space object under space-related treaties and national legislations, and to establish the standing as a strong space nation, Korea shall improve the space-related policy, laws and system as follows : Firstly, the legal system relating to the space development and the space activity shall be maintained. For this matter, the legal arrangement and maintenance shall be made to implement the government's policy and regulation relating to the space development and space activity. Also the legal system shall be maintained in accordance with the elements for consideration when enacting the national legislation relevant to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space adopted by UN COPUOS. Secondly, the liability system for the space damage shall be improved. For this matter, the articles relating to the liability for the damage and the right of claiming compensation for the expense already paid for the damage in case of the joint launch and consigned launch shall be regulated newly. Thirdly, the preservation policy for the space environment shall be established. For this matter, the consideration and preservation policy of the environment in the space development and use shall be established. Also the rule to mitigate the space debris shall be adopted. Fourthly, the international cooperation relating to the space activity shall be promoted. For this matter, the international cooperation obligation of the nation in the exploration and use of outer space shall be observed. Also through the international space-related cooperation, Korea shall secure the capacity of the space development and enter into the space advanced nation.

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Study on the effect of small and medium-sized businesses being selected as suitable business types, on the franchise industry (중소기업적합업종선정이 프랜차이즈산업에 미치는 영향에 관한 연구)

  • Kang, Chang-Dong;Shin, Geon-Chel;Jang, Jae Nam
    • Journal of Distribution Research
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    • v.17 no.5
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    • pp.1-23
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    • 2012
  • The conflict between major corporations and small and medium-sized businesses is being aggravated, the trickle down effect is not working properly, and, as the controversy surrounding the effectiveness of the business limiting system continues to swirl, the plan proposed to protect the business domain of small and medium-sized businesses, resolve polarization between these businesses and large corporations, and protect small family run stores is the suitable business type designation system for small and medium-sized businesses. The current status of carrying out this system of selecting suitable business types among small and medium-sized businesses involves receiving applications for 234 items among the suitable business types and items from small and medium-sized businesses in manufacturing, and then selecting the items of the consultative group by analyzing and investigating the actual conditions. Suitable business type designation in the service industry will involve designation with priority on business types that are experiencing social conflict. Three major classifications of the service industry, related to the livelihood of small and medium-sized businesses, will be first designated, and subsequently this will be expanded sequentially. However, there is the concern that when designated as a suitable business type or item, this will hinder the growth motive for small to medium-sized businesses, and designation all cause decrease in consumer welfare. Also it is highly likely that it will operate as a prior regulation, cause side-effects by limiting competition systematically, and also be in violation against the main regulations of the FTA system. Moreover, it is pointed out that the system does not sufficiently reflect reverse discrimination factor against large corporations. Because conflict between small to medium sized businesses and large corporations results from the expansion of corporations to the service industry, which is unrelated to their key industry, it is necessary to introduce an advanced contract method like a master franchise or local franchise system and to develop local small to medium sized businesses through a franchise system to protect these businesses and dealers. However, this method may have an effect that contributes to stronger competitiveness of small to medium sized franchise businesses by advancing their competitiveness and operational methods a step further, but also has many negative aspects. First, as revealed by the Ministry of Knowledge Economy, the franchise industry is contributing to the strengthening of competitiveness through the economy of scale by organizing existing individual proprietors and increasing the success rate of new businesses. It is also revealed to be a response measure by the government to stabilize the economy of ordinary people and is emphasized as a 'useful way' to revitalize the service industry and improve the competitiveness of individual proprietors, and has been involved in contributions to creating jobs and expanding the domestic market by providing various services to consumers. From this viewpoint, franchises fit the purpose of the suitable business type system and is not something that is against it. Second, designation as a suitable business type may decrease investment for overseas expansion, R&D, and food safety, as well negatively affect the expansion of overseas corporations that have entered the domestic market, due to the contraction and low morale of large domestic franchise corporations that have competitiveness internationally. Also because domestic franchise businesses are hard pressed to secure competitiveness with multinational overseas franchise corporations that are operating in Korea, the system may cause difficulty for domestic franchise businesses in securing international competitiveness and also may result in reverse discrimination against these overseas franchise corporations. Third, the designation of suitable business type and item can limit the opportunity of selection for consumers who have up to now used those products and can cause a negative effect that reduces consumer welfare. Also, because there is the possibility that the range of consumer selection may be reduced when a few small to medium size businesses monopolize the market, by causing reverse discrimination between these businesses, the role of determining the utility of products must be left ot the consumer not the government. Lastly, it is desirable that this is carried out with the supplementation of deficient parts in the future, because fair trade is already secured with the enforcement of the franchise trade law and the best trade standard of the Fair Trade Commission. Overlapping regulations by the suitable business type designation is an excessive restriction in the franchise industry. Now, it is necessary to establish in the domestic franchise industry an environment where a global franchise corporation, which spreads Korean culture around the world, is capable of growing, and the active support by the government is needed. Therefore, systems that do not consider the process or background of the growth of franchise businesses and harm these businesses for the sole reason of them being large corporations must be removed. The inhibition of growth to franchise enterprises may decrease the sales of franchise stores, in some cases even bankrupt them, as well as cause other problems. Therefore the suitable business type system should not hinder large corporations, and as both small dealers and small to medium size businesses both aim at improving competitiveness and combined growth, large corporations, small dealers and small to medium sized businesses, based on their mutual cooperation, should not include franchise corporations that continue business relations with them in this system.

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The lesson From Korean War (한국전쟁의 교훈과 대비 -병력수(兵力數) 및 부대수(部隊數)를 중심으로-)

  • Yoon, Il-Young
    • Journal of National Security and Military Science
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    • s.8
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    • pp.49-168
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    • 2010
  • Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.

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