• Title/Summary/Keyword: The Eurasian Dream

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A Paper on the Relation of Ship Management and Obligation to Exercise Due Diligence in Making the Vessel Seaworthy (선박관리와 감항능력주의의무에 관한 연구)

  • Jeong, Jun-Sik
    • Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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    • v.21 no.4
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    • pp.121-139
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    • 2005
  • The case, Papera Traders Co. Ltd. and Others v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. Ltd and Another(The Eurasian Dream), was occurred on July, 1998 when the ISM Code became mandatory under SOLAS and from that date it applied to oil tankers, chemical tankers, gas carriers, bulk carriers and cargo high-speed craft of 500 gross tonnage and above. On July 23, 1998, a fire started on the deck of pure car carrier Eurasian Dream while in port at Sharjah. The source of fuel was the stevedores action of pouring petrol or transferring fuel in some way - refueling or pouring into a carburettor. The fire eventually destroyed or damaged the vessels cargo of new and second-hand vehicles and rendered the vessel itself a constructive total loss. Justice Cresswell held that the fire that destroyed or damaged the cargo was due to the unseaworthiness of the vessel they have the burden of proving that the vessel was unseaworthy before and at the beginning of the voyage and that the loss or damage was caused by that unseaworthiness. This case was a dispute between dependent and claimant alleging that the carrier should provide "properly man, equip and supply the ship and keep the ship so manned" under Hague-Visby Rules. Although ISM code was not officially applied to the carriage by car carriers until July 2002, a rule based on the code had customarily been employed as a mean for international dispute resolution. Examining the above case closely, the purpose of this study is to explore the relation of ship management and obligation to exercise due diligence in making the vessel seaworthy.

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Implications of China's Maritime Power and BRI : Future China- ROK Strategic Cooperative Partnership Relations (중국의 해양강국 및 일대일로 구상과 미래 한·중 협력 전망)

  • Yoon, Sukjoon
    • Strategy21
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    • s.37
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    • pp.104-143
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    • 2015
  • China's new grand strategy, the "One Belt, One Road Initiative" (also Belt Road Initiative, or BRI) has two primary components: Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the "Silk Road Economic Belt" in September 2013 during a visit to Kazakhstan, and the "21st Century Maritime Silk Route Economic Belt" in a speech to the Indonesian parliament the following month. The BRI is intended to supply China with energy and new markets, and also to integrate the countries of Central Asia, the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), and the Indian Ocean Region - though not Northeast Asia - into the "Chinese Dream". The project will be supported by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), due to open in 2016 with 57 founding members from all around the world, and China has already promised US$ 50 billion in seed funding. China's vision includes networks of energy pipelines, railways, sea port facilities and logistics hubs; these will have obvious commercial benefits, but also huge geopolitical significance. China seems to have two distinct aims: externally, to restore its historical sphere of influence; and internally, to cope with income inequalities by creating middle-class jobs through enhanced trade and the broader development of its economy. In South Korea, opinion on the BRI is sharply polarized. Economic and industrial interests, including Korea Railroad Corporation (KORAIL), support South Korean involvement in the BRI and closer economic interactions with China. They see how the BRI fits nicely with President Park Geun-hye's Eurasia Initiative, and anticipate significant commercial benefits for South Korea from better connections to energy-rich Russia and the consumer markets of Europe and Central Asia. They welcome the prospect of reduced trade barriers between China and South Korea, and of improved transport infrastructure, and perceive the political risks as manageable. But some ardently pro-US pundits worry that the political risks of the BRI are too high. They cast doubt on the feasibility of implementing the BRI, and warn that although it has been portrayed primarily in economic terms, it actually reveals a crucial Chinese geopolitical strategy. They are fearful of China's growing regional dominance, and worried that the BRI is ultimately a means to supplant the prevailing US-led regional security structure and restore the Middle Kingdom order, with China as the only power that matters in the region. According to this view, once China has complete control of the regional logistics hubs and sea ports, this will severely limit the autonomy of China's neighbors, including South Korea, who will have to toe the Chinese line, both economically and politically, or risk their own peace and prosperity.