• Strategy21
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• s.30
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• pp.31-62
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• 2012

It is a commons sense that the Republic of Korea is a maritime state that depends its survival on International Trade and International Economy. Korea was a peninsula and do it can be both maritime and continental state by its choice. However, after the national division in 1945, South Korea had became a virtual island and pursue a maritime way for national development in the past 60 plus years. Now, South Korea is becoming a world's 12 th largest major trading and maritime state. South Korea has far more ships per capita than any other nations in the world and its economy is heavily depend upon the imports and exports with other nations in the world that pass through the oceans. Therefore, the Koreans regard the security of the sea lanes of communication as vital to the survival of the nation. The SLOC is the life line for Republic of Korea. Since the early 1990s, immediately after the Cold War was over, South Koreans began to recognize the importance of Sea Routes and thus began to build a navy that can handle with the new problems of the post Cold War era. However, the maritime security environments of the Republic of Korea today is shaky and dangerous. Almost every water near the Korean peninsula, some kind of international confrontations are going on. Territorial disputes on Dok do, Senkaku, Scarbrough, Shisha, Nansha and Eodo between and among Korea, Japan, China, Taiwan, Phillipines, Indonesia and Vietnam are the examples. In this essay, the author argues that the S. Korean efforts and capabilities to deal with these challenges are not enough and exhorts more efforts and more powerful navy for the Korean people.

• Journal of Fisheries and Marine Sciences Education
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.150-183
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• 1999

Korea-Japan Fisheries Agreement concluded in 1965 made a contribution to the stable development of fisheries relationship for both countries until the year of 1980. From the time on thereafter a series of respectable fishery disputes occurred throughout the period of fisheries self-regulation in accordance with alteration of home and abroad conditions. And both countries marched into a cooperation era by enforcement of the new fisheries agreement from the 23 January 1999, because the Fisheries Agreement system of 1965 had many limitations to settle the fundamental fisheries problems. In this paper, the author carried out the legal interpretation, arrangement of historical facts and evaluation of actual results of the Korea-Japan Fisheries Agreement of 1965. The key contents of the Fisheries Agreement were the establishment of 12-nautical mile exclusive fishery zone and the joint-control fishery zone under the principles of maintenance of MSY for fishery resources, freedom of high seas and mutual cooperation. The legal foundation of the conclusion of the Fisheries Agreement were the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952 and the four International Conventions on the Law of the Sea of 1958. During the 33 years, the fisheries power of Korea made a rapid stride, on the other hand that of Japan was almost stagnated. And in the meantime, there were very important development on the international law of the sea, for instant, the settlement of 12-nautical mile territorial sea regime and the establishment of 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone regime. Annual meetings of the Joint Fisheries Committee were not successful to fill the role for conservation of fishery resources. The Fisheries Self-Regulation Agreement concluded in 1980 was also insufficient to accept the new international regime on the law of the sea, for that reason it was terminated on 23 January 1999. But it is true that the Fisheries Agreement of 1965 made a contribution to normalization of fisheries relationship between both countries and fisheries development of Korea.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.30 no.2
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• pp.1-23
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• 1999

In the Northeast Asian region fisheries agreements of the past regarding high seas as an agreement area were transformed or new agreements were introduced in order to conform to the EEZ regime. However, the existing joint regulatory zone which “open” status is somewhat similar to the high sea not only disappear, but also two new systems were established. To begin with, parties of the agreement claimed their EEZs to be from the territorial sea baselines to the extent set forth, problem of the fishery access of the other party under the agreement is to be solved on the principle of reciprocity and on recognizing of the catch results achieved in the past. In regards to the overlapping zones like neutral zone of the East Sea of Korea(Sea of Japan) and neutral zone to the south of the Cheju Island, provisional measures zones in the Yellow Sea and in the East China Sea, and transitional zone of the Yellow Sea special fisheries management systems reflecting the legal character of the zone involved are applied. Moreover, as fisheries agreements defining open sea as an agreement zone are not able to conform to the EEZ regime, so new fisheries agreements must be taken out from old systems and conceptions, and must be understood and enforced from the new point view. Therefore, countermeasures needed to do so should be developed, and their basic structure is as follows. Firstly, the basic concept of the EEZ regime requires that the coastal states have sovereign rights on their sea zones' natural resources and bear responsibilities appropriate to their allowed jurisdiction. Each Northeast Asian state should adjust the structure of fishing industries and employ advanced fisheries management system, and should make efforts toward such issues of the state policy as increasing fishery resources and preserving ocean environment. Secondly, measures should be developed to solve the international fisheries disputes which are to occur under enforcement of the new fisheries agreements system. In regards to the acts of violation the fisheries laws in the foreign EEZ the principle of jail sentence prohibition is established by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and every fisheries agreement reflects this principle. Therefore, the present question is to consider concrete measures to enable the easy release of the seamen, who violated fisheries laws slightly and well-intently, through establishment and management of the guarantee fund needed to make collateral reasonable. Thirdly, Korean-Russian and Russian-Japanese fisheries relations were formed on the basis of the EEZ regime, since 1992 and 1977 respectively, and are expected to maintain mutually beneficial cooperative character. As for Korean-Chinese-Japanese fisheries relations, the operational problems of overlapping zones, and problem of the permits for EEZ mutual access should be solved on the basis of the principle of reciprocity and equity rather than unilaterally from any side.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.323-351
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• 2018

Adopted in Western Pacific Naval Symposium(WPNS) 2014, Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea(CUES) has been the most valuable output of WPNS history. Written and suggested by Australian Navy in 1999, the goal of CUES is to decrease the possibility of the naval conflict by establishing the code among international navies in the Western Pacific region. Facing many oppositions and requirement of People's Liberation Army Navy(PLAN) in WPNS 2012 and 2013, but it finally adopted in WPNS 2014, with many changes in detailed provisions. From then, navies in the Western Pacific region have followed CUES to prevent maritime conflicts in the region, CUES, however, sometimes does not work correctly. Contents of CUES is the mixture of the parts of Multinational Maritime Tactical Signal and Maneuvering Book(MTP) and International Regulations for Preventing Collision at Sea 1972(CORLEGs). There are means of radio communications such as frequency and signals, instructions for maneuvering and so on. Thus, it is not a new document for the U.S. Navy and its allies, but it requires training to implicate at sea for navies other than U.S. allies, like PLAN. Lots of provisions in CUES were changed because of the opposition of PLAN, and CUES has many shortcomings and practical limitations. First, since CUES is non-legally binding, and there are no methods to force the naval assets on the sea to follow. Second, CUES is only applied to naval assets; naval ships - warships, naval auxiliaries, and submarines - and naval aircraft. Third, the geographical scope in CUES is not clear. Fourth, there is no provision for submerged submarines. Finally, CUES has no time-based framework or roadmap for training. In this regard, there would be six recommendations for improvement. First, CUES should be reviewed by WPNS or other international institutions, while keeping non-binding status so that WPNS could send signals to the navies which do not answer CUES on the sea. Second, the participation of Maritime Law Enforcements(MLEs) such as coast guard is inevitable. Third, navies would use full text of MTP rather than current CUES, which extracts some parts of MTP. Fourth, CUES needs provisions with respect to submerged submarines, which recognizes as offensive weapons themselves. Fifth, the geographic scope of CUES should be clear. Since there are some countries in which claim that a rock with a concrete structure is their territory, CUES should be applied on every sea including EEZ and territorial seas. Finally, the detailed training plan is required to implicate CUES at sea. Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) is a good exercise to train CUES, because almost all WPNS member countries except six countries are participating in RIMPAC. CUES is a meaningful document not only for navies but also for nation-states in the region. To prevent escalation of conflict in the region, potentially caused by an unplanned collision at sea, CUES should be applied more strictly. CUES will continue to be in subsequent WPNS and therefore continue to improve in the effectiveness as both an operational and diplomatic agreement.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.112-129
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• 2018

Produced by Chinese local television stations, Maritime Silk Road is a documentary which adopts ancient Maritime Silk Road as a historical nostalgia to interpret "the Belt and Road Initiative", a contemporary Chinese economic, political, and cultural strategy put forward by Chinese government mainly aiming at the countries of Southeast Asia. The main body of this article has three parts and the first part analyses how the documentary adopts computer-generated imagery (CGI) to create a historical nostalgia about ancient Maritime Silk Road in the period of Imperial China. At the same time, this part also presents a sense of diasporic nostalgia of the overseas Chinese. This historical and diasporic nostalgia is related to Chinese President Xi Jinping's political discourse: "Chinese dream" that propagandises to build a strong China put forward by Xi in 2013. The second part analyses how this historical and diasporic nostalgia legitimates Xi's "Chinese dream" and how it responds to recent territorial dispute when China continuously claims its territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea. In this light, the documentary repeatedly mentions two political rhetoric: "coexistence" (gongcun) and "mutual benefit"(huli gongying) as a practical strategy to deal with the dispute between China and some countries of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In the third section, the concept of "community of common destiny" (mingyun gongtongti) is adopted by the documentary to depict a convenient and effective organization of China and ASEAN, which is framed as an ultimate goal that Chinese government is depicted as the potential leader of this nostalgic community. At the same time, by providing different and even opposite viewpoints, this article discusses three controversial political rhetoric to present how historical and diasporic nostalgia is politicalized and served for Chinese diplomacy and national interest. Overall, this article argues that the documentary creates a glorious ancient Maritime Silk Road, as a sense of nostalgia, to expand China's economic and political influence, to respond to the controversial issues, and to reassert China's leadership as the centre of Asia.

• Maritime Security
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.1-44
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• 2021

China's new Maritime Policy Law (MPL) purports to regulate the duties of China's maritime police agencies, including the China Coast Guard, and safeguard China's sovereignty, security, and rights and interest. The MPL has potentially far-reaching application, as China claims extensive maritime areas off its mainland and in the South China Sea. This expansive application of maritime law enforcement jurisdiction is problematic given that most of China's maritime claims are inconsistent with international law. To the extent that the MPL purports to assert jurisdiction over foreign flagged vessels in disputed areas or on the high seas, it contravenes international law. Numerous provisions of the MPL regarding the use of force are also inconsistent with international rules and standards governing the use of maritime law enforcement jurisdiction, as well as the UN Charter's prohibition on the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. China could use the MPL as a subterfuge to advance its illegal territorial and maritime claims in the South and East China Seas and interfere with coastal State resource rights in their respective exclusive economic zone.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Navigation
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.61-86
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• 1991

This paper aims to investigated the reasonable objectiveness of trading areas on the Korea Ship Safety Act and to make a regulated proposal of trading areas. To achieve the above mentioned object, we analyzed the existing rules and other related circumstances of maritime fields. On the basis of this viewpoint, this paper was focused on three topics of concern : (1) the relationship between the ship Safety Act and other Maritime Acts. (2) the legislative examples of foreign countries, (3) the reasonable revised reasons of trading areas. In this paper, we proposed following four matters such as (1) the modification of ship's length and speed which are the designative basis of trading areas, (2) the extension of the smooth sea area to limit of territorial seas (3) the extension of the near-coastal area to the coasts of the P.R.C., Japan, the U.S.S.R and the R.O.C ., and rename of its area into the near & greater coastal area, (4) the annulment of greater-coastal area.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.41
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• pp.185-202
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• 2009

With the rapid development of oil and chemical industry in the late 20C, massive transportation of oil by oil tanker vessel has grown and it caused the big oil pollution accidents. When oil spill from the oil tanker, damages reach into the astronomical figures in economically and damages affect wide area and many people with break the balance of ecosystem. Recently in Korea, the oil pollution accidents has occurred frequently as growing of oil consumption and it caused large-scale damages to the victim. Oil pollution in Korea offshore takes not only Korean fisherman from their life ground and break the ecosystem but it takes too much time and money to recover. To minimize oil pollution damages, it is necessary to make pre-caution effort as a ship owner and relevant government bodies should endeavor to prevent from more damages. But once oil pollution accidents occurs in territorial sea, compensation for victim is very important. But it is true that compensation is not paid to victim smoothly. So this study aims at the problems of oil pollution compensation to the Korean victim and find the best way to get reasonable compensation.

• Proceedings of the Korean Society of Marine Engineers Conference
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• 2006.06a
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• pp.135-136
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• 2006

There are several Disputes relating to the delimitation of maritime boundary and the policy of maritime jurisdiction of the states around the Korea Peninsula. These disputes are connected with the place of 'Tokdo' dominated practically by Korea, 'Senkaku islands' dominated practically by Japan, and 'Kurile islands' that is under disputing between Russia and Japan. North Korea has also the problem. The delimitation of Maritime Boundary among these States would be concluded in very near future. Therefore, we need to understand the maritime jurisdiction policy of these states. South Korea also has to set the policy.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.45-52
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• 2002

Recently there have been growing disputes between neighboring local governments over jurisdictional rights or property rights of ocean resources in Korean coastal waters. The reasons for the disputes come mainly from the increasing interests by local governments that begin to see the oceans as the source of resources and wealth. The maritime dispute is more complicated and sticky than the inland ones, and requires not only socio-economical but political approach, therefore sometimes demanding a plenty of time and endeavor. Also coastal states that have suffered from maritime boundary problems have different issues under the different environment and historical background. For Korea, as the maritime boundary issue has very recently soared to the surface, though it was latent for the period as long as 20 years, we have just taken steps toward an institutional approach on it, seemingly more to go to reach an agreeable resolutions to the disputes. This paper highlighted the issues surrounding the maritime boundary on the sea surrounding Korean peninsular after addressing the current situation of the boundary disputes. It will help explore and assess the possible solutions to the boundary conflicts over the lateral boundary between local governments.