• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.129
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• pp.111-140
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• 2014

In this paper, the main subjects with which I deal are as follows: (1) Is Distancing Philosophy from the real ruling power a way of practical-philosophical resistance, based on social reformation as a axiological directivity of Kim Tae-Gil's ethical thought, though it is negative type of resistance? Or is it a sort of transformed value-free opportunist behavior which allows antidemocratic ruling group to coerce the people into submission, assuming an uncompromising stand seemingly? (2) Is Kim's defense argument on the opening of the course of National Ethics and the all-out activation of National Ethics education under Park's Yushin Regime derived from his own philosophical belief? Or is it brought out from the external conditions and circumstances surrounding Kim Tae-Gil which forces him to participate in the national undertaking for the settlement of the course of National Ethics in the university? The 'provisional' answers about the two subjects are as follows: (1) Kim's Distancing Philosophy is a type of practical philosophical revolt against the dictatorship power under Yushin Regime, though it is negative form of resistance. We can accept this philosophical elucidation above all by confirming the fact that the reform of reality is the main ethical trait running through his entire ethical thought system. However distancing philosophy disclose the crucial limits to allow itself to boil to the philosophical practice compromising with real ruling power eventually, though it is intended upon its own social ethical directivity and conviction. (2) The primary factor which affects Kim to propose such an advocation argument on the course of National Ethics and the education of National Ethics is the external conditions and circumstances surrounding him, especially the power-relation between he and ruling group and intimate human relation between he and his superior philosophers who carries out the role of a ideologue for the Yushin Regime, rather than his own philosophical belief. But no matter what primary factor, Kim's action to make a advocating argument to support the course and the education of National Ethics is to blame, on that account that he cannot adequately his social responsibility and role given to him as a reformist moral philosopher who will pursue the realization of righteous democratic society. Along with that, It is not too enough to criticize him sharply for such defending action. The reason is that his supporting stance for National Ethics education is brought out, by not adhering closely to the philosophical way of distancing from the dictatorial power devoid of political legitimacy and moral justification.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.145
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• pp.351-380
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• 2018

In every society, citizens must decide how to punish criminals, uphold the virtue of justice, and preserve the security of the community. In doing so, the members of society must ask themselves how they will punish those who carry out the most abhorrent of crimes. Many common responses to such a question is that death is an acceptable punishment for the most severe crimes. But to draw some theoretical distinction between a crime that deserves incarceration and a crime that is so heinous that it deserves capital punishment is subject to three errors. First, what possible line could be drawn? To decide on a particular number of deaths or to employ any standard would be arbitrary. Second, the use of a line would trivialize and undermine the deaths of those whose murderers fell below the standard. Third, any and all executions still are unjust, as the State should not degrade the institution of justice and dehumanize an individual who, although he or she has no respect for other human life, is still a living person. Simply put, all murders are heinous, all are completely unacceptable, and deserve the greatest punishment of the land; however, death as punishment is inappropriate. Also, while this article arrives at the conclusion that the death penalty is an inappropriate form of punishment, I have not offered an acceptable alternative that would appease those who believe capital offenders deserve a punishment that differs in its quality and severity. This is a burden that, admittedly, I am unable to meet. I finally conclude that the death penalty is unjustified retribution. This is the only claim that can effectively shift the intellectual paradigms of the participants in the debate. The continued use of the death penalty in society can only be determined and influenced by the collective conscience of the members of that society. As stated at the outset of this article, it is this essentially moral conflict regarding what is just and degrading that forms the backdrop for the past changes in and the present operation of our system of imposing death as a punishment for crime.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.35 no.1
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• pp.63-101
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• 2020

'Flight safety zone' means a zone that the Minister of National Defense designates under Articles 4 and 6 of the Protection of Military Bases and Installations Act (hereinafter 'PMBIA') for the safety of flight during takeoff and landing of military aircrafts. The purpose of flight safety zone is to contribute to the national security by providing necessary measures for the protection of military bases and installations and smooth conduct of military operations. In this case, when the state set and used the flight safety zone, the landowner claimed restitution of unjust enrichment against the country. This article is an analysis based on the existing legal theory regarding the legitimacy of plaintiff's claim, and the summary of the discussion is as follows. A person who without any legal ground derives a benefit from the property or services of another and thereby causes loss to the latter shall be bound to return such benefit (Article 741 of the Civil Act). Since the subject matter is an infringing profit, the defendant must prove that he has a legitimate right to retain the profit. The State reserves the right to use over the land designated as a flight safety zone in accordance with legitimate procedures established by the PMBIA for the safe takeoff and landing of military aircrafts. Therefore, it cannot be said that the State gained an unjust enrichment equivalent to the rent over the land without legal cause. Expropriation, use or restriction of private property from public necessity and compensation therefor shall be governed by Act: provided, that in such a case, just compensation shall be paid (Article 23 (1) of the Constitution of The Republic of KOREA). Since there is not any provision in the PMBIA for loss compensation for the case where a flight safety zone is set over land as in this case, next question would be whether or not it is unconstitutional. Even if it is designated as a flight safety zone and the use and profits of the land are limited, the justification of the purpose of the flight safety zone system, the appropriateness of the means, the minimization of infringement, and the balance of legal interests are still recognized; thus just not having any loss compensation clause does not make the act unconstitutional. In conclusion, plaintiff's claim for loss compensation based on the 'Act on Acquisition of and Compensation for land, etc. for Public Works Projects', which has no provision for loss compensation due to public limits, is unjust.

• Strategy21
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• s.46
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• pp.239-276
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• 2020

The failure of early economic sanctions aimed at hurting the overall economies of targeted states called for a more sophisticated design of economic sanctions. This paved way for the advent of 'smart sanctions,' which target the supporters of the regime instead of the public mass. Despite controversies over the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a coercive tool to change the behavior of a targeted state, the transformation from 'comprehensive sanctions' to 'smart sanctions' is gaining the status of a legitimate method to impose punishment on states that do not conform to international norms, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction in this particular context of the paper. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council proved that it can come to an accord on imposing economic sanctions over adopting resolutions on waging military war with targeted states. The North Korean nuclear issue has been the biggest security threat to countries in the region, even for China out of fear that further developments of nuclear weapons in North Korea might lead to a 'domino-effect,' leading to nuclear proliferation in the Northeast Asia region. Economic sanctions had been adopted by the UNSC as early as 2006 after the first North Korean nuclear test and has continually strengthened sanctions measures at each stage of North Korean weapons development. While dubious of the effectiveness of early sanctions on North Korea, recent sanctions that limit North Korea's exports of coal and imports of oil seem to have an impact on the regime, inducing Kim Jong-un to commit to peaceful talks since 2018. The purpose of this paper is to add a variable to the factors determining the success of economic sanctions on North Korea: preventing North Korea's evasion efforts by conducting illegal transshipments at sea. I first analyze the cause of recent success in the economic sanctions that led Kim Jong-un to engage in talks and add the maritime element to the argument. There are three conditions for the success of the sanctions regime, and they are: (1) smart sanctions, targeting commodities and support groups (elites) vital to regime survival., (2) China's faithful participation in the sanctions regime, and finally, (3) preventing North Korea's maritime evasion efforts.