• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.12 no.6
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• pp.2196-2207
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• 2017

This paper presents a two-stage market auction model in a pool-based electricity market, which explicitly takes into account the system network security. The security network-constrained market auction model considers the use of corrective control to yield economically efficient actions in the post-contingency state, while ensuring a certain security level. Under this framework, the proposed model shows not only for quantifying the correlation between secure system operation and efficient market operation, but also for providing transparent information on the pricing system security for market participants. The two-stage market auction procedure is formulated using Benders decomposition (BD). In the first stage, the market participants bid in the market for maximizing their profit, and the independent system operator (ISO) clears the market based on social welfare maximization. System network constraints incorporating post-contingency control actions are described in the second stage of the market auction procedure. The market solutions, along with the BD, yield nodal spot prices (NSPs) and nodal congestion prices (NCPs) as byproducts of the proposed two-stage market auction model. Two benchmark systems are used to test and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.1-7
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• 2006

In an electricity market, the spot market is normally integrated with a forward or future market. The advantage of the forward market is to allow the market participants to deal in a part or the whole trading portfolio at a fix price in advance and to avoid risk associated to the uncertain price of the spot market. Japan has introduced a continuous auction base forward market from April 2005. This paper analyzes the Japanese forward market rules and operations, and introduces a new algorithm that may improve the efficiency of the market itself. The proposed algorithm enables us to give consideration to the specific characteristics of the power system and to integrate them in the auction mechanism. The benefits of the proposed algorithm are verified on an electronic simulation platform and the results described in this paper.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.32 no.3
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• pp.200-209
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• 2006

Load building is an important step to make the delivery supply chain efficient. We present a family of load makeup algorithms using market based control strategy, named LoadMarket, in order to build efficient loads where each load consists of a certain number of finished products having destinations. LoadMarket adopts Clark-Wright algorithm for generating initial endowment for Load Traders who cooperate to minimize either total travel distance or the variance with respect to the travel distances of loads by means of the spot market or double-sided auction market mechanism. The efficiency of the LoadMarket algorithms is illustrated using simulation based experiments.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.5A no.1
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• pp.85-92
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• 2005

In this paper, Nash equilibriums of generation markets are investigated using a game theory application for simplified competitive electricity markets. We analyze the characteristics of equilibrium states in N-company spot markets modeled by uniform pricing auctions and propose a new method for obtaining Nash equilibriums of the auction. We assume that spot markets are operated as uniform pricing auctions and that each generation company submits its bids into the auction in the form of a seal-bid. Depending on the bids of generation companies, market demands are allocated to each company accordingly. The uniform pricing auction in this analysis can be formulated as a non-cooperative and static game in which generation companies correspond to players of the game. The coefficient of the bidding function of company-n is the strategy of player-n (company-n) and the payoff of player-n is defined as its profit from the uniform price auction. The solution of this game can be obtained using the concept of the non-cooperative equilibrium originating from the Nash idea. Based on the so called residual demand curve, we can derive the best response function of each generation company in the uniform pricing auction with N companies, analytically. Finally, we present an efficient means to obtain all the possible equilibrium set pairs and to examine their feasibilities as Nash equilibriums. A simple numerical example with three generation companies is demonstrated to illustrate the basic idea of the proposed methodology. From this, we can see the applicability of the proposed method to the real-world problem, even though further future analysis is required.

• Proceedings of the Korea Inteligent Information System Society Conference
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• 2003.05a
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• pp.255-263
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• 2003

A multi-agent system designed to represent newly deregulated electricity markets in the USA is aimed at testing the capability of the multi-agent model to replicate the observed price behavior in the wholesale market and developing a smart business intelligence which quickly searches the optimum offer strategy responding to the change in market environments. Simulation results show that the optimum offer strategy is to withhold expensive generating units and submit relatively low offers when demand is low, regardless of firm size; the optimum offer strategy during a period of high demand is either to withhold capacity or speculate for a large firm, while it is to be a price taker a small firm: all in all, the offer pattern observed in the market is close to the optimum strategy. From the firm's perspective, the demand-side participation as well as the intense competition dramatically reduces the chance of high excess profit.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.817-838
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• 2005

In this paper, the resource adequacy as well as the optimum fuel mix is obtained by the following procedures. First, the regulation body, the government agency, determine the reliability index as well as the optimum portfolio of the fuel mix during the planning horizon. Here, the resources with the characteristics of public goods such as demand-side management, renewable resources are assigned in advance. Also, the optimum portfolio is determined by reflecting the economics, environmental characteristics, public acceptance, regional supply and demand, etc. Second, the government announces the required amount of each fuel-type new resources during the planning horizon and the market participants bid to the government based on their own estimated fixed cost. Here, the government announces the winners of the each auction by plant type and the guaranteed fixed cost is determined by the marginal auction price by plant type. Third, the energy market is run and the surplus of each plant except their cost (guaranteed fixed cost and operating cost) is withdrew by the regulatory body. Here, to induce the generators to reduce their operating cost some incentives for each generator is given based on their performance. The performance is determined by the mechanism of the performance-based regulation (PBR). Here the free-riding performance should be subtracted to guarantee the transparent competition. Although the suggested mechanism looks like very regulated one, it provides two mechanism of the competition. That is, one is in the resource construction auction and the other is in the energy spot market. Also the advantages of the proposed method are it guarantee the proper resource adequacy as well as the desired fuel mix. However, this mechanism should be sustained during the transient period of the deregulation only. Therefore, generation resource planning procedure and market mechanisms are suggested to minimize possible stranded costs.