• Analyses & Alternatives
• /
• v.7 no.3
• /
• pp.1-26
• /
• 2023

This article will analyze and forecast important variables and dynamics in global power politics after the war in Ukraine. It tries to use several perspectives to analyze international relations, particularly liberal internationalism and structural realism. In short, core variables are as follows; First, how is the US-led liberal international order and globalization being adjusted? Second, how will the U.S.-China strategic competition, which is the biggest and structural variable, cause changes in the international order in the future? The third variable, how stable are Sino-Russia relations in the context of a structuring U.S.-China-Russia strategic new triangle? Fourth, to what extent will third middle hedging states outside the U.S. and China be able to exercise strategic autonomy in the face of multipolarization? To summarize, the first of these four variables is the largest basic variable at the global political and economic level in terms of its impact on the international community, and it has been led by the United States. The second variable, in terms of actors, seems to be the most influential structural variable in global competition, and the US-China strategic competition is likely to be a long game. Thus the world will not be able to escape the influence of the competition between the two global powers. For South Korea, this second variable is probably the biggest external variable and dilemma. The third variable, the stability of Sino-Russia relations, determines balance of global power in the 21st century. The U.S.-China-Russia strategic new triangle, as seen in the current war in Ukraine, will operate as the greatest power variable in not only global power competition but also changes in the international order. Just as the U.S. is eager for a Sino-Russia fragmentation strategy, such as a Tito-style wedge policy to manage balance of power in the early years of the Cold War, it needs a reverse Kissinger strategy to reset the U.S.-Russia relationship, in order to push for a Sino-Russia splitting in the 21st century. But with the war in Ukraine, it seems that this fragmentation strategy has already been broken. In the context of Northeast Asia, whether or not the stability of Sino-Russia relations depends not only on the United States, but also on the Korean Peninsula. Finally, the fourth variable is a dependent variable that emerged as a result of the interaction of the above three variables, but simultaneously it remains to be seen that this variable is likely to act as the most dynamic and independent variable that can promote multilateralism, multipolarization, and pan-regionalism of the global international community in the future. Taking into account these four variables together, we can make an outlook on the change in the international order.

• Analyses & Alternatives
• /
• v.7 no.1
• /
• pp.229-258
• /
• 2023

For the main countries of the Asia-Pacific region, the United States, China and Russia, a situation of "new normality" is emerging. Moreover, for each of the countries, this "new normality" has its own meaning. For the United States, this is an aggravation of the military confrontation with China in the Taiwan Strait. For China, this is an increase in the degree of rivalry with the United States and a slowdown in the pace of economic development with a very high probability of their decline in the future. For Russia, this is an almost complete curtailment of relations with the United States against the background of a special military operation and imposed sanctions. These nuances, in addition to the results of the 20th CPC Congress, will determine the main trends in Sino-American and Sino-Russian relations. It seems that China's attitude towards Russia will not change against the background of the Ukrainian crisis. Beijing will maintain a position of "benevolent neutrality" towards Moscow. At the same time, the balance between "goodwill" and "neutrality" may vary depending on the scope of Sino-Russian cooperation. For example, in the economic sphere, Chinese companies will be afraid to cooperate with Russian partners for fear of secondary sanctions. However, in general, Russia will retain its importance for China as the strongest anti-American pole. In relations with the United States, China will continue to firmly defend its interests, while at the same time not excluding the normalization of relations with Washington in certain areas of cooperation: strategic stability, non-traditional threats, ecology, etc. In general, the decisions of the 20th CPC Congress do not allow us to say either in favor or against the idea of China's readiness to resume dialogue with the United States in the post-congress period. Sino-American relations, as noted above, have their own logic and will probably continue to develop within its framework. However, so are Sino-Russian relations. Within the framework of these logics, Beijing seems to continue to balance between the two vectors of its foreign policy. On the one hand, this is the development of bilateral cooperation with Russia in order to strengthen its own negotiating positions in the confrontation with the United States: military cooperation with an emphasis on joint exercises, political cooperation based on anti-Americanism, economic cooperation with an eye to the risks of secondary sanctions. On the other hand, it is unacceptable for China to recognize the collapse of Ukraine, the inadmissibility of a direct military clash with the United States and the extreme undesirability of further aggravation of relations with the United States on the factor of Chinese friendship with Russia.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
• /
• v.20 no.2
• /
• pp.138-156
• /
• 2021

The aim of this article is to describe direction of Sino-Russian relations toward a new epoch - as the decision-making centers of both countries define them - indicating the commitment to building the future international order. It includes the synthesis of evolution of relations, descriptions of cooperation building of mutual confidence by both sides in variety of institutions; analyses of geo-economic relations emphasizing their geostrategic dimension and finally dynamics showing how two great powers want to achieve new areas of cooperation focused on building multipolar world order which is the essence of "new epoch". The argument goes towards recognizing the relationship as a "hhybrid alliance". This hybridity is a structural factor that can constrain the use of new dimensions of asymmetric interdependence as political leverage especially by United States against the two non-western powers but also facilitate to use it against West.

• Analyses & Alternatives
• /
• v.2 no.2
• /
• pp.111-141
• /
• 2018

By the middle of 2018 there are signs of China's entry into a new period of development, characterized by a change in the old model: "market reforms-inner-party democratization - moderate foreign policy" to another: "market reforms - Xi Jinping personality cult - offensive foreign policy." This model contains the risks of arising of the contradiction between economic freedom and political-ideological rigidity which can lead to destabilization of the political life. However, in the current positive economic dynamics, these risks may come out, rather, in the medium and long term. Today, the political situation in China remains stable - despite growing dissatisfaction in scientific expert and educational circles due to increased control over the intellectual sphere by the authorities. The need for a new redistribution of power between central and provincial authorities could potentially disrupt political stability in the medium term, but, at the moment, is not a critical negative factor. The economic situation is positive-stable. Forecasts indicate a possible increase in China's GDP in 2018 at 6.5%. At the same time, there are negative expectations in connection with the Sino-US and potentially Sino-European "trade war". In the Chinese foreign policy, as a response to Western pressure, China increasingly uses the Russian direction of its diplomacy in the expanded version of Russia + SCO. The nuance here is seen in China's adjusted approach to the SCO: first of all, not as a mechanism for cooperation with Russia, but as an organization that allows using Russia's potential for pressure on the US in the Sino-US strategic rivalry. In the second half of 2018, the Chinese economy will continue to develop steadily, albeit with unresolved traditional problems (debts of provinces and state-owned enterprises, ineffective state sector, risks on the financial and real estate market). In politics, discontent with the cult of Xi will accumulate, but without real threats to its power. Weakening in economic opposition between China and the United States is possible due to Beijing's search for compromises on tariffs, intellectual property, trade deficit. To find such trade-offs, Xi will use the so-called. "Personal diplomacy" of direct contacts with Trump.