• Title/Summary/Keyword: Sino-Korea Trade

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Eurasian Naval Power on Display: Sino-Russian Naval Exercises under Presidents Xi and Putin (유라시아 지역의 해군 전력 과시: 시진핑 주석과 푸틴 대통령 체제 하에 펼쳐지는 중러 해상합동훈련)

  • Richard Weitz
    • Maritime Security
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    • v.5 no.1
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    • pp.1-53
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    • 2022
  • One manifestation of the contemporary era of renewed great power competition has been the deepening relationship between China and Russia. Their strengthening military ties, notwithstanding their lack of a formal defense alliance, have been especially striking. Since China and Russia deploy two of the world's most powerful navies, their growing maritime cooperation has been one of the most significant international security developments of recent years. The Sino-Russian naval exercises, involving varying platforms and locations, have built on years of high-level personnel exchanges, large Russian weapons sales to China, the Sino-Russia Treaty of Friendship, and other forms of cooperation. Though the joint Sino-Russian naval drills began soon after Beijing and Moscow ended their Cold War confrontation, these exercises have become much more important during the last decade, essentially becoming a core pillar of their expanding defense partnership. China and Russia now conduct more naval exercises in more places and with more types of weapons systems than ever before. In the future, Chinese and Russian maritime drills will likely encompass new locations, capabilities, and partners-including possibly the Arctic, hypersonic delivery systems, and novel African, Asian, and Middle East partners-as well as continue such recent innovations as conducting joint naval patrols and combined arms maritime drills. China and Russia pursue several objectives through their bilateral naval cooperation. The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation lacks a mutual defense clause, but does provide for consultations about common threats. The naval exercises, which rehearse non-traditional along with traditional missions (e.g., counter-piracy and humanitarian relief as well as with high-end warfighting), provide a means to enhance their response to such mutual challenges through coordinated military activities. Though the exercises may not realize substantial interoperability gains regarding combat capabilities, the drills do highlight to foreign audiences the Sino-Russian capacity to project coordinated naval power globally. This messaging is important given the reliance of China and Russia on the world's oceans for trade and the two countries' maritime territorial disputes with other countries. The exercises can also improve their national military capabilities as well as help them learn more about the tactics, techniques, and procedures of each other. The rising Chinese Navy especially benefits from working with the Russian armed forces, which have more experience conducting maritime missions, particularly in combat operations involving multiple combat arms, than the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On the negative side, these exercises, by enhancing their combat capabilities, may make Chinese and Russian policymakers more willing to employ military force or run escalatory risks in confrontations with other states. All these impacts are amplified in Northeast Asia, where the Chinese and Russian navies conduct most of their joint exercises. Northeast Asia has become an area of intensifying maritime confrontations involving China and Russia against the United States and Japan, with South Korea situated uneasily between them. The growing ties between the Chinese and Russian navies have complicated South Korean-U.S. military planning, diverted resources from concentrating against North Korea, and worsened the regional security environment. Naval planners in the United States, South Korea, and Japan will increasingly need to consider scenarios involving both the Chinese and Russian navies. For example, South Korean and U.S. policymakers need to prepare for situations in which coordinated Chinese and Russian military aggression overtaxes the Pentagon, obligating the South Korean Navy to rapidly backfill for any U.S.-allied security gaps that arise on the Korean Peninsula. Potentially reinforcing Chinese and Russian naval support to North Korea in a maritime confrontation with South Korea and its allies would present another serious challenge. Building on the commitment of Japan and South Korea to strengthen security ties, future exercises involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States should expand to consider these potential contingencies.

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The Determinants and their Time-Varying Spillovers on Liquefied Natural Gas Import Prices in China Based on TVP-FAVAR Model

  • Ying Huang;Yusheng Jiao
    • Journal of Information Processing Systems
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    • v.20 no.1
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    • pp.93-104
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    • 2024
  • China is playing more predominant role in the liquefied natural gas (LNG) market worldwide and LNG import price is subject to various factors both at home and abroad. Nevertheless, previous studies rarely heed a multiple of factors. A time-varying parameter factor augmented vector auto-regression (TVP-FAVAR) model is adopted to discover the determinants of China's LNG import price and their dynamic impacts from January 2012 to December 2021. According to the findings, market fundamentals have a greater impact on the import price of natural gas in China than overall economic demand, financial considerations, and world oil prices. The primary determinants include domestic gas consumption, consumer confidence and other demand-side information. Then, there are diverse and time-varying spillover effects of the four common determinants on the volatility of China's LNG import price at different intervals and time nodes. The price volatility is more sensitive and long-lasting to domestic natural gas pricing reform than other negative shocks such as the Sino-US trade war and the COVID-19 pandemic. The results in this study further proves the importance of domestic natural gas market liberalization. China ought to do more to support the further marketization of natural gas prices while working harder to guarantee natural gas supplies.

Research Trends of 'One Belt One Road' in Korean Academic Circles

  • Tu, Bo;Shi, Jin;You, Nan;Tu, Huazhong
    • Journal of Information Science Theory and Practice
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    • v.8 no.4
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    • pp.40-54
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    • 2020
  • This proposed work aims to understand the Korean Academic Circle (KAC)'s research trend on the "One Belt One Road" (OBOR) by employing a quantitative analysis of the recent research articles published by the KAC. To do so, this proposed research has used the well-known network analysis software, Ucinet 6, by which the papers on related topics are collected and filtered from Korea Citation Index. To perform the analytical selection, the proposed work has chosen 'keywords' as the core research object and performed analysis from transverse to longitudinal aspects, and from holistic to individual aspects, respectively; and from this, the KAC's research trend on OBOR is derived. The present work has established that the KAC's attention is continuously increasing on OBOR and has sustainability. Centered on the OBOR, Korean researchers have spread their studies in various dimensions ranging from the issues like China's political economy to Sino-Korea economic and trade exchanges, and so on. The KAC has even combined OBOR with Korea's international development initiatives, which can help Korea benefit from active and sustainable cooperation with China. Moreover, the proposed work has found that Korean researchers have also actively expressed their growing attention, highlighted Korea's interest, and showed concern about China hegemony and Sinocentrism in their recent documented research works.

China's Informal Economic Sanctions (중국의 비공식적 경제 제재)

  • Cho, Hyungjin
    • Analyses & Alternatives
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    • v.5 no.1
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    • pp.25-57
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    • 2021
  • As the strategic competition between the United States and China for global hegemony intensifies, China is using economic sanctions against other countries more and more frequently. Republic of Korea, which has China as its largest trading partner but is an ally of the United States, is more likely to be a target of economic sanctions, as seen in China's retaliation toward its deployment of a THAAD missile-defense system. Against the background, this paper analyzes China's economic sanctions, especially focusing on its informality. China does not publicly declare economic sanctions in most cases, such as Korean one, in which the trade structure is in its favor and can take advantage of its position as a big buyer with huge markets. However, China responds in a more open and formal manner when it is related to its core interests, when it is impossible to exert substantial sanctions effect and when mutual disputes intensify and cannot maintain informality. Korea, which is vulnerable to China's informal economic sanctions, should prepare for them by analyzing the characteristics of China's economic sanctions in depth and thinking about various strategies and measures in advance.

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North Korea, Apparel Production Networks and UN Sanctions: Resilience through Informality (북한 의류 생산네트워크와 UN 제재)

  • Lee, Jong-Woon;Gray, Kevin
    • Journal of the Economic Geographical Society of Korea
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    • v.23 no.4
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    • pp.373-394
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    • 2020
  • The strengthening of multilateral international sanctions against North Korea has raised questions as to how effective they are in exerting pressure on the country's economy. In this paper, we address this question by examining their impact on the country's integration into regional and global apparel production networks. North Korea has in the past decade become an increasingly competitive exporter of apparel on the basis of consignment-based processing arrangements. Official trade data shows a sharp drop in North Korean exports of clothing since the sectoral ban in 2017. There is evidence to suggest, however, that exports have continued on a more informal and clandestine basis. North Korea's integration into apparel production networks has also taken the form of the dispatch of workers to factories in China's northeastern border regions. Yet there is evidence that the recent sanctions imposed on such practices has similarly led to illicit practices such as working on visitors' visas, often with the help of Chinese enterprises and local government. The resilience of North Korea's integration into apparel production networks follows a capitalist logic and is result of the highly profitable nature of apparel production for all actors concerned and a correspondingly strong desire to evade sanctions. As such, the analysis contributes to the literature on sanctions that suggests that the measures may contribute to emergence of growing informal and illicit practices and to the role of the clandestine economy.

A Feasibility Study on Rail-Ferry Systems: Focused on Sino-Korea Transport Routes (한.중간 열차페리운행에 관한 연구 - 수도권항만을 중심으로 -)

  • Park, Chang-Ho;Ahn, Seung-Bum;Kim, Hyeong-Il
    • Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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    • v.23 no.2
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    • pp.87-107
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    • 2007
  • A rapid growth of interregional trade between China and Korea requires new development and expansion of ports. Currently, there is no rail-ferry system between China and Korea, however, a rapid growth of car-ferry industry shows possibilities. Several candidate cities and regions in East part of China and West part of Korea are selected. We identified times in clearance and station-to-station services as major benefits. We compared three transport modes including candidate cities and regions: container ships, car-ferry and rail-ferry. We used AHP (Analytic Hierarchy Process) as an evaluation method to select most competitive rail-ferry routes between two countries. We also used 7-point Likert scales to find out bottlenecks and factors to introduce rail-ferry services as other questionnaires. As a result, Rail Ferry System(RFS) is a little expensive due to wagon loading efficiency in cargo hold of the ship compared to Car Ferry System or Liner Shipping System. But RFS is recommendable in case of Block Train transport between Korea and EU area by may of TCR and TSR comparing Car Ferry System, because it can reduce total transport cost and connecting procedure at border lines of passing countries.

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The Effects of North Korea's Mineral Export on Various Imports (북한의 광물 수출과 품목별 수입: 대중무역을 중심으로)

  • Kim, Dawool;Kim, Minjung;Kim, Byung-Yeon
    • Economic Analysis
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    • v.26 no.2
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    • pp.72-113
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    • 2020
  • This study investigates the relationship between mineral exports to China, North Korea's most important source of foreign currency acquisition, and its imports of various items from China from the first quarter of 1995 through to the third quarter of 2019. The results from a cointegration analysis suggest that there exists a long-run equilibrium relationship between mineral exports and imports of food, fuel, and some intermediate goods, such as industrial supplies, parts, and accessories. The results from a vector autoregression using first-differenced variables indicate that the short-run relationship between mineral exports and imports is different between the period before and after the third quarter of 2010. Prior to structural changes, i.e., before the third quarter of 2010, import shocks affected mineral exports. However, after the third quarter of 2010, an increase in mineral exports led to an increase in the import of vehicles, intermediate goods, and luxury goods. This paper shows both the possibilities and the limits that mineral exports can contribute to North Korea's economic growth. The results, which show that mineral exports have a long-run relationship with intermediate goods, such as industrial supplies, parts and accessories, imply that mineral exports to China could have a positive effect on the North Korean economy. However, the fact that mineral exports do not have any significant effect on the import of machinery and equipment, which helps the accumulation of capital formation, shows that mineral exports have a limited effect on inducing long-term growth in the North Korean economy.