• 한국유통학회지:유통연구
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• 제16권2호
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• pp.119-138
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• 2011

지난 십년동안 인터넷을 통한 전자상거래는 빠른 속도로 성장해 왔다. 이러한 인터넷의 발달은 기업들의 사업방식에 많은 변화를 유도했으며, 그 중에서도 마케팅경로의 구조와 경로 구성원들 사이의 관계에 중요한 변화를 초래하고 있다. 각 기업이 처한 시장환경은 다양하며 이 다양한 시장 환경은 인터넷 경로가 각 시장에 미치는 효과를 조절하는 역할을 한다. 이러한 시장의 다양성에도 불구하고 지금까지의 선행연구들은 각기 특정한 하나의 시장상황(unique setting)을 상정하여 인터넷경로 도입이 그 시장에 미치는 영향을 분석하는데 그쳐왔다. 이러한 기존 연구의 공백을 채우기 위해 본 연구는 시장의 다양성을 소비자의 지리적 분포, 시장의 인터넷 수용도의 측면에서 살펴보고 이러한 시장 환경이 인터넷 경로 도입 효과에 미치는 영향에 관하여 조사해 보고자 한다. 이를 위해 본 연구는 다양한 소비자들의 지리적 분포, 경쟁강도, 소비자의 인터넷 상거래에 대한 수용도 등을 포함한 다양한 시장 환경을 수요모형에 반영시켜 그 영향력 분석을 가능하도록 하였다. 그러나, 다양한 시장 요소를 모형에 반영하는 과정에서 수요모형이 복잡한 구조를 가지게 되었다. 이 문제를 극복하고 게임이론의 균형해를 도출하기 위해 Newton-Raphson algorithm을 사용한 numerical search 방법을 사용하였다. 분석결과 두 종류의 경로에 대한 소비자선호의 분포에 따라 생산자의 가격차별정도, 생산자와 독립소매상 간의 경로이윤 배분율, 그리고 인터넷경로 도입이 각 경로주체의 이윤 향상에 도움이 되는지의 여부, 소비자잉여 등이 달라질 수 있음을 발견하였다. 끝으로 연구의 학술적, 실무적 시사점과 한계점 및 향후 연구방향도 논의되었다.

• 마케팅과학연구
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• 제19권1호
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• pp.37-46
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• 2009

The Census Bureau of the Department of Commerce announced in May 2008 that U.S. retail e-commerce sales for 2006 reached $ 107 billion, up from $ 87 billion in 2005 - an increase of 22 percent. From 2001 to 2006, retail e-sales increased at an average annual growth rate of 25.4 percent. The explosive growth of E-Commerce has caused profound changes in marketing channel relationships and structures in many industries. Despite the great potential implications for both academicians and practitioners, there still exists a great deal of uncertainty about the impact of the Internet channel introduction on distribution channel management. The purpose of this study is to investigate how the ownership of the new Internet channel affects the existing channel members and consumers. To explore the above research questions, this study conducts well-controlled mathematical experiments to isolate the impact of the Internet channel by comparing before and after the Internet channel entry. The model consists of a monopolist manufacturer selling its product through a channel system including one independent physical store before the entry of an Internet store. The addition of the Internet store to this channel system results in a mixed channel comprised of two different types of channels. The new Internet store can be launched by the independent physical store such as Bestbuy. In this case, the physical retailer coordinates the two types of stores to maximize the joint profits from the two stores. The Internet store also can be introduced by an independent Internet retailer such as Amazon. In this case, a retail level competition occurs between the two types of stores. Although the manufacturer sells only one product, consumers view each product-outlet pair as a unique offering. Thus, the introduction of the Internet channel provides two product offerings for consumers. The channel structures analyzed in this study are illustrated in Fig.1. It is assumed that the manufacturer plays as a Stackelberg leader maximizing its own profits with the foresight of the independent retailer's optimal responses as typically assumed in previous analytical channel studies. As a Stackelberg follower, the independent physical retailer or independent Internet retailer maximizes its own profits, conditional on the manufacturer's wholesale price. The price competition between two the independent retailers is assumed to be a Bertrand Nash game. For simplicity, the marginal cost is set at zero, as typically assumed in this type of study. In order to explore the research questions above, this study develops a game theoretic model that possesses the following three key characteristics. First, the model explicitly captures the fact that an Internet channel and a physical store exist in two independent dimensions (one in physical space and the other in cyber space). This enables this model to demonstrate that the effect of adding an Internet store is different from that of adding another physical store. Second, the model reflects the fact that consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences for using a physical store and for using an Internet channel. Third, the model captures the vertical strategic interactions between an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer, making it possible to analyze the channel structure issues discussed in this paper. Although numerous previous models capture this vertical dimension of marketing channels, none simultaneously incorporates the three characteristics reflected in this model. The analysis results are summarized in Table 1. When the new Internet channel is introduced by the existing physical retailer and the retailer coordinates both types of stores to maximize the joint profits from the both stores, retail prices increase due to a combination of the coordination of the retail prices and the wider market coverage. The quantity sold does not significantly increase despite the wider market coverage, because the excessively high retail prices alleviate the market coverage effect to a degree. Interestingly, the coordinated total retail profits are lower than the combined retail profits of two competing independent retailers. This implies that when a physical retailer opens an Internet channel, the retailers could be better off managing the two channels separately rather than coordinating them, unless they have the foresight of the manufacturer's pricing behavior. It is also found that the introduction of an Internet channel affects the power balance of the channel. The retail competition is strong when an independent Internet store joins a channel with an independent physical retailer. This implies that each retailer in this structure has weak channel power. Due to intense retail competition, the manufacturer uses its channel power to increase its wholesale price to extract more profits from the total channel profit. However, the retailers cannot increase retail prices accordingly because of the intense retail level competition, leading to lower channel power. In this case, consumer welfare increases due to the wider market coverage and lower retail prices caused by the retail competition. The model employed for this study is not designed to capture all the characteristics of the Internet channel. The theoretical model in this study can also be applied for any stores that are not geographically constrained such as TV home shopping or catalog sales via mail. The reasons the model in this study is names as "Internet" are as follows: first, the most representative example of the stores that are not geographically constrained is the Internet. Second, catalog sales usually determine the target markets using the pre-specified mailing lists. In this aspect, the model used in this study is closer to the Internet than catalog sales. However, it would be a desirable future research direction to mathematically and theoretically distinguish the core differences among the stores that are not geographically constrained. The model is simplified by a set of assumptions to obtain mathematical traceability. First, this study assumes the price is the only strategic tool for competition. In the real world, however, various marketing variables can be used for competition. Therefore, a more realistic model can be designed if a model incorporates other various marketing variables such as service levels or operation costs. Second, this study assumes the market with one monopoly manufacturer. Therefore, the results from this study should be carefully interpreted considering this limitation. Future research could extend this limitation by introducing manufacturer level competition. Finally, some of the results are drawn from the assumption that the monopoly manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader. Although this is a standard assumption among game theoretic studies of this kind, we could gain deeper understanding and generalize our findings beyond this assumption if the model is analyzed by different game rules.