• East Asian Journal of Business Economics (EAJBE)
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• v.7 no.4
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• pp.41-49
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• 2019

Purpose - This paper empirically investigates what factors contribute to corporate investments under financial constraint condition in the Korean stock market. In the paper, tangible assets' growth rate and fixed assets' growth rate were employed as investment performance and total assets were also used for comparison purpose. Research design and methodology - Samples are constructed by manufacturing firms listed on the stock market of Korea as well as those who settle accounts in December from 2001 to 2018. Financial institutions are excluded from the sample as their accounting procedures, governance and regulations differ. This study adopted a fixed panel regression model to assess the sample construction including yearly and cross-sectional data. Results - This results support the literatures that major shareholders showed positive significance to investment in financially unconstrained firms and no significance to investment in financially constrained firms. ROA showed positive significance to investment in financially unconstrained and constrained firms, whereas firm size showed negative significance to investment in financially unconstrained and constrained firms. Debt showed no positive significance to investment in financially unconstrained firms and negative significance to investment in financially constrained firms. Conclusions - This paper documented evidence that ROA and firm size are important factors to investment irrespective of firms' financial constraints. And this paper also supports that major shareholders give positive impact to investments in financially unconstrained firms. This means that financial constraints itself rule corporate' investment decision in financially constrained firms.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.14 no.11
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• pp.5434-5441
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• 2013

Using longitudinal data of 575 sample from 122 firms in large business conglomerates from 2001 to 2008, this study examines the impact of controlling shareholders' control-ownership disparity on executive compensation. The empirical study finds that controlling shareholders' control-ownership disparity is negatively related to the level of executive compensation and moderate negatively the relation between firm performance and executive compensation. This finding suggests that controlling shareholders' control rights in excess of ownership rights lead to decreased executive compensation in order to relieve the concerns of stakeholder about the potential agency costs of controlling shareholder, and have, on the other hand, entrenchment effects on the decision of executive compensation by decreasing its sensitivity on firm performance.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.5 no.4
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• pp.127-133
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• 2018

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is one of the strategies for managing firms' business activities but may have heterogeneity depending on ownership structures. This study investigates the association between group-affiliation and CSR activities. Drawing on a theory from the prior research, this study predicts that group-affiliated firms are less likely to invest on CSR activities. For instance, prior research finds that controlling shareholders expropriate the values of minority shareholders. As one of the motivations of investing on CSR activities is the harmonization among the stakeholders, it leads to the prediction that firms controlled by large shareholders are less likely to engage in CSR activities. Second, group-affiliated firms under poor financial performance benefit from other group members through sharing their financial resources. Thus, there is less incentive for managers of group-affiliated firms to increase their financial performance by conducting CSR. By leveraging firms listed in Korean stock market and CSR score from Korea Economic Justice Institute, the result shows that the group-affiliation is negatively related to CSR activities. The result is consistent in case of applying propensity score-matched sample. Based on the findings of this study, this paper contributes to the related literature by showing the significant association between group-affiliation and CSR decisions.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.11
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• pp.669-677
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• 2020

The study aims to compare the effects of employing investment deposits (joint and specified investment deposits) in Islamic banks, and investment deposits (term deposits and deposits with notification) at conventional banks, on shareholders' profitability, represented by the earnings per share (EPS), in light of operational profits as a controlling variable. Data related to the study variables was collected from the annual financial reports published by the study sample banks, during the period (2009-2018). The study relies on multiple regression to test the hypotheses of the study. The high adjusted R² to explain the change in EPS for Islamic banks model as compared to conventional banks, is a result of the high difference between investment deposits (specified and joint) at Jordanian Islamic banks and investment deposits (term deposits and deposits with notification) at Jordanian conventional banks. The study found that it is important for the managements of Islamic banks to adopt a uniform method to combine speculative funds, in order to develop and improve shareholders' profitability. The study recommended Islamic banks to follow practical, methodological and transparent approaches to calculate the rates of Murabaha profit margins between shareholders and depositors, while also taking into consideration some of the issues which could be harmful for the competition between Islamic and conventional banks.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.12 no.12
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• pp.5558-5563
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• 2011

Using longitudinal data of 108 firms in large business conglomerates from 2001 to 2009, this study examines the impact of controlling shareholders' control-ownership disparity on R&D investment. The study finds that control-ownership disparity is negatively related to R&D intensity. This empirical result suggests that controlling shareholders' control rights in excess of ownership rights incent controlling shareholders' expropriation for their private interests, leading to decreased R&D investment which enhances firm value in the long term.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.53-58
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• 2022

Purpose: Controlling and minority shareholders sometimes have conflicting interests. Controlling shareholders who do not have adequate monitoring can exhibit a strong tendency to maximize their personal wealth. In this case, cash holdings can be the easiest means for them to pursue their personal interests. This study examined whether the largest shareholder's ownership proportion affected the speed at which firms adjust their cash holdings to target levels in Korean distribution and service companies. Research design, data, and methodology: The study uses regression analysis to examine 834 firm-year samples listed on the KOSPI between 2013 and 2018 in the distribution and service sectors. Results: The largest shareholder's ownership is positively related to a firm's cash holdings adjustment speed. That is, the larger the largest shareholder's ownership, the faster the firm adjusts its cash holdings to achieve the target level. Conclusions: This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that the cash holdings adjustment speed in Korean service and distribution companies is affected by the largest shareholder's ownership. As the agency problem between controlling and minority shareholders in Korea is a major issue, minority owners' sensitivity to agency costs may help restrict controlling owners' ability to maximize their personal wealth.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.26 no.2
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• pp.33-61
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• 2009

From the perspective of corporate governance, we examine the acquirers' performance of mergers and acquisitions in KOSDAQ Market. The empirical results of our study show that inside an executive shareholders and outside minor shareholders, affect acquirers' performance in M&A's : the ownership of outside minor shareholders is positively correlated with the performance of acquirers. and, the ownership of insiders, such as that of an executive shareholders, does have significant effect on the performance of M&A's. Since the current literature concludes that the improvement of corporate governance in KOSDAQ Market would enhance the shareholders' wealth, the results of our study implies that outside minor investors, as well as insiders, are playing an important role in the corporate governance.

• Journal of the Korea Safety Management & Science
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.255-260
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• 2009

The purposes of this study is to verify whether insider trader get the excess return using inside information. For this we divide inside traders into four groups according to their ownership: maximum shareholder, main shareholders, 5% shareholders and executives. Also we categorize inside traders into three groups: personal investor, foreign investor and institutional investors. After insiders trade their stock, excess return is reported for 20days and the size of excess return of executives and institutional investor is larger than that of other groups. It means more strict monitoring system is needed in the domestic stock market.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.28 no.1
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• pp.105-113
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• 2005

I investigate whether the efficient ratios used as the proxies of the agency costs maintained by Ang et al.(2000) is significant. Utilizing a sample of 77 manufacturing companies listed on the KOSDAQ from the TS2000 of the KSDA, The results are as follows. Agency costs are found to be decreasing with the ownership share of controlling shareholders and accounting performance becomes higher. But firm value measured by Tobin's Q ratio becomes lower according as the ownership of the controlling shareholders increases. If agency costs decrease in proportion to controlling shareholder's share, firm value should be higher according to the agency theory by Jensen and Meckling(I976). But the results of the empirical test of this study are inconsistent with Jensen and Meckling's(1976). Therefore the following study on the more useful proxies stand for agency costs should be needed.

• International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.103-109
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• 2023

This study examines the association between ownership structure and labor investment efficiency. Specifically, this study investigates whether owner-manager firms, where managers own a large percentage of shares in the firm, involve in more efficient labor investment. Based on the management entrenchment hypothesis, managers are more likely to make labor investment decisions to maximize their private benefits rather than creating value for shareholders, resulting in lower efficiency in labor investment. On the other hand, according to the incentive alignment hypothesis, managers tend to make labor investment decisions that will improve future firm performance as their interests are aligned with those of shareholders. In this situation, owner-manager firms are expected to have higher efficiency in labor investment. Our empirical results show that owner-manager firms engage in more efficient labor investment, which contributes to long-term firm value. This study provides empirical evidence that firms' labor investment behavior can vary depending on the characteristics of the ownership structure.