• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.23
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• pp.99-128
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• 2008

This research analyzes some Korean historical figures and presents the core values of their leaderships so that we can bring up the theory of leadership which would be compatible with the current circumstances around Korea. Through this work, we expected that we would not only find out typical examples among historical leaders but also reaffirm our identities in our history. As a result of the research, it was possible to classify some figures in history into several patterns and discover their archetypal qualities. Those qualities were 'transform(實事)', 'challenge(決死)', 'energize(風流)', 'create(創案)', and 'envision(開新)' respectively. Among the qualities, this research concentrated on the quality of 'challenge', exclusively 'death-defying spirit'. This spirit is the one with which historical leaders could sacrifice their lives for their great causes. This research selected twelve figures as incarnations of death-defying spirit, who are Gyebaek(階伯), Ganggamchan(姜邯贊), Euljimundeok(乙支文德), Choeyoung(崔瑩),ChungMongju(鄭夢周), Seongsammun (成三問), Yisunsin(李舜臣), Gwakjaewoo(郭再祐), Choeikhyeon(崔益鉉), Anjunggeun(安重根), Yunbonggil(尹奉吉), Yijun(李儁). Through analyzing their core values and abilities and categorizing some historical cases into four spheres such as a private sphere, relations sphere, a community sphere, and a society sphere, we came to find a certain element in common among those figures. It was that they eventually took the lead by showing the goal and the ideal to their people at all times. Moreover, their goals were always not only obvious but also unwavering. In the second chapter, I described the core value in a private sphere, so called '志靑靑'. It implies that a leader should set his ultimate goal and then try to attain it with an unyielding will. Obvious self-confidence and unfailing self-creed are core values in a private sphere. In the third chapter, I described the core value in a relative sphere, the relationship between one and others. It is '守信結義'. It indicates that a leader should win confidence from others by discharging his duties in the relation with others. Confidence is the highest leveled affection to others. Thus, mutual reliance should be based on truthful sincerity and affection toward others. Stubbornness and strictness are needed not to be prompted by pity simultaneously. In the fourth chapter, I described the core value in a community sphere. It is '丹心合力'. For this value, what are required to a leader are both his community spirit and his loyalty to one's community. Moreover, the strong sense of responsibility and the attitude of taking an initiative among others are also required. Thus, it can be said that the great power to conduct the community is so called fine teamwork. What's more, the attitude of the leader can exert a great influence on his community. In the fifth chapter, I described the core value of death defying spirit in the society sphere. This value might be more definite and explicit than other ones described above. A leader should prepare willingly for one's death to fulfill his great duties. 'What to do' is more important for a leader than 'how to do'. That is to say, a leader should always do righteous things. Efficiency is nothing but one of his interests. A leader must be the one who behaves himself always according to righteousness. Unless a leader's behaviors are based on righteousness, it is absolutely impossible that a leader exerts his leadership toward people very efficiently. Thus, it can be said that a true leader is the one not only who is of morality and but also who tries to fulfill his duties.