• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제13권1호
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• pp.152-171
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• 2019

In opportunistic networks, nodes may appear some selfishness while transmitting the message, however, most of the existing research works consider the individual selfishness or social selfishness respectively, and these two types of selfishness may coexist in opportunistic networks. In this paper, we propose an Incentive Aware Routing based on Game Theory for selfish OPPNETs, named IAR-GT, which uses Rubinstein-Stahl bargaining game model to incentivize selfish nodes cooperation in data forwarding. IAR-GT scheme not only considers the resources of nodes, but also uses a new method to calculate the social ties between them. Trace-driven simulations show that our incentive aware routing scheme achieves better performances than comparing schemes under two types of selfishness coexistence environments.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제6권4호
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• pp.973-988
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• 2012

Delay tolerant networks (DTNs) characterized by the lack of guaranteed end-to-end paths exploit opportunistic data forwarding mechanism, which depends on the hypothesis that nodes are willing to store, carry, and forward the in-transit messages in an opportunistic way. However, this hypothesis might easily be violated by the presence of selfish nodes constrained with energy, bandwidth, and processing power. To address this problem, we propose a practical reputation-based incentive scheme, named PRI, to stimulate honest forwarding and discipline selfish behavior. A novel concept of successful forwarding credential and an observation protocol are presented to cope with the detection of nodes' behavior, and a reputation model is proposed to determine egoistic individuals. The simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness and practicality of our proposal.