• Proceedings of the Korean Nuclear Society Conference
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• 1996.11a
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• pp.395-400
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• 1996

Scoping analyses for the Safety Injection System (SIS) configuration for Korean Next Generation Reactor (KNGR) are peformed in this study. The KNGR SIS consists of four mechanically separated hydraulic trains. Each hydraulic train consisting of a High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) pump and a Safety Injection Tank (SIT) is connected to the Direct Vessel Injection (DVI) nozzle located above the elevation of cold leg and thus injects water into the upper portion of reactor vessel annulus. Also, the KNGR is going to adopt the advanced design feature of passive fluidic device which will be installed in the discharge line of SIT to allow more effective use of borated water during the transient of large break LOCA. To determine the feasible configuration and capacity of SIT and HPSI pump with the elimination of the Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) pump for KNGR, licensing design basis evaluations are performed for the limiting large break LOCA. The study shows that the DVI injection with the fluidic device SIT enhances the SIS performance by allowing more effective use of borated water for an extended period of time during the large break LOCA.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Gas
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• v.26 no.6
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• pp.9-15
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• 2022

In order to verify the durability of the high-pressure hydrogen tank in the operating pressure range, a hydraulic rupture test should be performed. However, if the bubbles generated by the initial injection process of water are attached to the inner wall of the tank and remain, a sudden pressure change of the bubbles during the rupture of the pressurized tank may cause shock and noise. Therefore, in this study, the flow velocity required to remove the bubbles remaining on the inner wall of the tank was predicted through simplified formulas, and the shape of the injection nozzle to maintain the flow velocity was determined based on the shape of the hydrogen tank for the hydrogen bus. In addition, a numerical model was developed to predict the change in flow velocity according to the inlet pressure, and an experiment was performed through a model tank to prove the validity of the prediction result. As a result of the experiment, the flow velocity near the tank wall was similar to the predicted value of the analysis model, and when the inlet pressure was 1.5 to 5.5 bar, the minimum size of the removable bubble was predicted to be about 2.2 to 4.6 mm.

• Proceedings of the Korean Nuclear Society Conference
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• 2002.10a
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• pp.111-111
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• 2002

• Proceedings of the Korean Nuclear Society Conference
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• 2001.10a
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• pp.190-190
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• 2001

• Proceedings of the Korean Nuclear Society Conference
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• 2002.10a
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• pp.135-135
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• 2002

• 유체기계공업학회:학술대회논문집
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• 2004.12a
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• pp.635-640
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• 2004

The present paper provides the design specifications and working principle of flow controlling vortex valve which will be adopted in a Korean next generation reactor (APR1400). The vortex valve is installed inside the pressurized safety injection tank of APR1400, and it passively controls the water discharge flowrate from the tank. In the present study, the performance of the vortex valve have been evaluated throughout the repeated experiments in the full-scale test facility called VAPER(VAlve Performance Evaluation Rig). Based on the experimental results, it is confirmed that the currently developed vortex valve satisfies the major performance requirements of APR1400 plant design in view of the peak discharge flowrate, pressure loss coefficient, and total discharge duration time. To achieve the highest quality of the experimental results, a quality assurance program for vortex valve tests has been strictly applied.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.31 no.5
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• pp.476-485
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• 1999

In order to evaluate the gravity-injection capability to maintain core cooling after a loss-of-shutdown-cooling event during shutdown operation, the plant conditions of the Yong Gwang Units 3&4 were reviewed. The six cases of possible gravity-injection paths from the refueling water tank (RWT) were identified and the thermal-hydraulic analyses were performed using the RELAP5/MOD3.2 code. The core cooling capability was significantly dependent on the gravity-injection path, the RCS opening, and the injection rate. In the cases with the pressurizer manway opening higher than the RWT water level, the coolant was held up in the pressurizer and the system pressure continued increasing after gravity-injection. The gravity injection eventually stopped due to the high system pressure and the core was uncovered. In the cases with the injection path and opening on the same leg side, the core cooling was dependent on whether the water injected from the RWT passed the core region or not. However, in the cases with the injection path and opening on the different leg side, the system was well depressurized after gravity-injection and the core boiling was successfully prevented for a long-term transient. In addition, from the sensitivity study on the gravity-injection flow rate, it was found that about 54 kg/s of injection rate was required to maintain the core cooling and the core cooling could be provided for about 10.6 hours after event with that injection rate from the RWT. Those analysis results would provide useful information to operators coping with the event.

• The KSFM Journal of Fluid Machinery
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• v.17 no.6
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• pp.104-108
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• 2014

The recent Fukushima nuclear power plant accidents shows that the core make up at high RCS pressure condition is very important to prevent core melting. The core make up flow at high pressure condition should be driven by gravity force or passive forces because the AC-powered safety features are not available during a Station Black Out (SBO) accident. The reactor Coolant System (RCS) mass inventory is continuously decreased by releasing steam through the pressurizer safety valves after reactor trip during a SBO accident. The core will be melted down within 2~3 hours without core make up action by active or passive mode. In the new design concept of a Hybrid Safety Injection Tank (Hybrid SIT) both for low and high RCS pressure conditions, the low pressure nitrogen gas serves as a charging pressure for a LBLOCA injection mode, while the PZR high pressure steam provides an equalizing pressure for a high pressure injection mode such as a SBO accident. After the pressure equalizing process by battery driven initiation valve at a high pressure SBO condition, the Hybrid SIT injection water will be passively injected into the reactor downcomer by gravity head. The SBO simulation by MARS code show that the core makeup injection flow through the Hybrid SIT continued up to the SIT empty condition, and the core heatup is delayed as much.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.33 no.1
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• pp.12-24
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• 2001

The post-LOCA long term cooling (LTC) performance of the Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plant (KSNPP) is analyzed for both small break loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCA) and large break LOCA at cold leg. The RELAP5/MOD3.2.2 beta code is used to calculate the LTC sequences based on the LTC plan of the Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plants (KSNPP). A standard input model is developed such that LOCA and the followed LTC sequence can be calculated in a single run for both small break LOCA and large break LOCA. A spectrum of small break LOCA ranging from \ulcorner.02 to 0.5 k2 of break area and a double-ended guillotine break are analyzed. Through the code calculations, the thermal-hydraulic behavior and the boron behavior are evaluated and the effect of the important action including the safety injection tank (SIT isolation and the simultaneous injection in LTC procedure is investigated. As a result, it is found that the sufficient margin is available in avoiding the boron precipitation in the core. It is also found that a further specific condition for the SIT isolation action need to be setup and it is recommended that the early initiation of the simultaneous injection be taken for larger break LTC sequences.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Safety
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• v.37 no.4
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• pp.129-138
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• 2022

A new method for injecting cooling water into the Korean research reactor (KRR) in the event of beam tube rupture is proposed in this paper. Moreover, the research evaluates the risk to the reactor core in terms of core damage frequency (CDF). The proposed method maintains the cooling water in the chimney at a certain level in the tank to prevent nuclear fuel damage solely by gravitational coolant feeding from the emergency water supply system (EWSS). This technique does not require sump recirculation operations described in the current procedure for resolving beam tube accidents. The reduction in the risk to the core in the event of beam tube rupture that can be achieved by the proposed change in the cooling water injection design is quantified as follows. 1) The total CDF of the KRR for the proposed design change is approximately 4.17E-06/yr, which is 8.4% lower than the CDF of the current design (4.55E-06/yr). 2) The CDF for beam tube rupture is 7.10E-08/yr, which represents an 84.1% decrease compared with that of the current design (4.49E-07/yr). In addition to this quantitative reduction in risk, the modified cooling water injection design maintains a supply of pure coolant to the EWSS tank. This means that the reactor does not require decontamination after an accident. Thermal hydraulic analysis proves that the water level in the reactor pool does not cause damage to the nuclear fuel cladding after beam tube rupture. This is because the amount of water in the chimney can be regulated by the EWSS function. The EWSS supplies emergency water to the reactor core to compensate for the evaporation of coolant in the core, thus allowing water to cover the fuel assemblies in the reactor core over a sufficient amount of time.