• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.32 no.3
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• pp.47-70
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• 2022

This paper studies legal regulation of the public policy exception in the Russian Federation and domestic judicial practice on the issue. It reviews current legislation and analyzes a number of recent court cases where an arbitral award rendered by a foreign arbitration body was refused recognition and enforcement based on public policy violation. By doing so, it contributes to the knowledge on the concept of public policy in the Russian legal system and how public policy can affect the process of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards on its territory. The review of court cases demonstrates different aspects of how the public policy exception can be applied by Russian arbitrazh courts. Such decisions can provide a clearer picture of the kinds of situation that can lead to invoking the public policy clause by the court. Also, it is of practical value as persons preparing to file a claim or to be a defendant in a Russian court can be required to present existing court decisions in support of their claim or defence.

• Cross-Cultural Studies
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• v.43
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• pp.289-326
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• 2016

The strategy of "soft power" in the foreign and internal policies of modern Russia is one of the important factors in the implementation of public policies, and the influence of soft power is increasingly becoming stronger and gaining new forms and methods of implementation. The Russian government exerts efforts to form a positive image of Russia in the international arena, in order to strengthen the country's competitiveness, based on active use of "soft power." Currently, Russian cultural policy is developing in two main directions. In the internal policy sphere, the Russian government emphasizes national unity and civic solidarity, and fosters a sense of patriotism and national pride. In the sphere of foreign policy, the Russian government is attempting to regain its status as a great power and to create a new image of Russia that is different from that of the former Soviet Russia. In this article, we examine and analyze various aspects of the hidden political mechanisms involved in mega-sporting events, in particular the Sochi Olympics, from the viewpoint of Russian internal and foreign policy. We address the major functions of mega-sporting events and their influence in the political realm. The political impact of mega-sports projects can even compensate for economic losses incurred during the preparation and hosting of the Olympic games. In this respect, we can define mega-sporting events as one of the main components of soft power; such events reflect the basic directions of internal and foreign policy in post-Soviet Russia, which are to form and promote an image of Russia using national branding. In order to fairly and objectively analyze the recognition and perception held by Russians of the significance of mega-sporting events, in this work, we carefully studied the results of various surveys conducted by the Russian research organization VCIOM (Russian Public Opinion Research Center) before and after Russia hosted the Winter Olympic games in Sochi (2014) and the Summer Olympic games in Kazan (2013). Furthermore, on the basis of the ranking of national brands by Simon Anholt (Anholt Nation Brands Index - NBI), and on the basis of the ranking of 100 national brands conducted by the British consulting company "Brand Finance" (Brand Finance Nation Brands 100), we minutely trace the development and qualitative change in Russia's image and the role of the mega-sporting projects. This article also examines the Kremlin's internal and foreign policies that were successfully carried out in practical terms. This study contributes to the understanding of the value of mega-sporting events from the point of view of cultural policy of the current ruling party of Russia. This standpoint allows us to outline the main directions of Russian cultural policy and to suggest perspectives on the branding strategy of modern Russia, including strategies related to consolidating Russia's position in the international arena.

• International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.209-215
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• 2020

Russia has an interesting history as a donor, recipient and re-emerging donor in international development assistance (IDA). This article introduces the history, policy and challenges of Russian IDA, and provides suggestions for such challenges. The main barrier to Russian IDA is the absence of a central government agency and Russia can learn from other country's experience. Concerning lack of data on the provision of assistance to each sector of IDA and the large number of recipient countries, Russia can learn from Korea particularly in education sector. With respect to building a system ensuring the efficiency of the Russian IDA works, a tool for analysis of the effect of the Russian IDA programmes may be drawn in consultation with international institutions or successful programmes of other donor countries.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.183-220
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• 2019

Bearing in mind the strategic and pivotal importance of Egypt over the Arab, African, Middle Eastern, Islamic and even global level; this paper aimed to figure out how and why the Egyptian foreign policy has been changed over time; and whether the flourishing of Egyptian-Russian relations represent a shift from West to East; and show how the historical experiences affecting the relations between Egypt and Russia; moreover, explains why Russia supported June $30^{th}$ revolution while it opposed January $25^{th}$ revolution only two years earlier and other Arab Spring revolutions from one side; and why Egypt accepted to further develop its relations with Russia from the other side.

• Journal of International Area Studies (JIAS)
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.31-60
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• 2011

Medvedev administration has adopted new foreign policy line because of Obama administration's 'Reset' policy and Global economic crisis. The objectives of Medvedev's new foreign policy are the creation of a favorable external environment and the efficient use of external resources for Russia's economic modernization. To achieve these goals, Medvedev's government fleshed out such specific action plans as the avoidance of conflicts with other powers, the prevention of conflicts around Russia's borders, the activation of capital investment, and the introduction of advanced technology from the outside. This foreign policy line takes shape in the building of a foundation for strategic cooperation with the United States, the preparation for 'Modernization Alliance' with Europe, the management of cooperation and conflict with China and Japan, and the introduction of a dual strategy of strategic stability and economic integration in relations with post-soviet states. In Russia's new foreign policy line the strengthening of relations with the United States and Europe acquires highest priority. However, this does not mean a return to a 'pro-Western liberal line' in the early 1990s. The ultimate goal of Russia's 'modernization' program still lies in the rebuilding of a powerful Russia in accordance with the multipolar world order that was Putin administration's foreign policy line. In this context, foreign policy change under Medvedev administration could be defined as a 'program change at international level' that signifies a change in the means to achieve goals without changing them.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.2 no.2
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• pp.111-141
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• 2018

By the middle of 2018 there are signs of China's entry into a new period of development, characterized by a change in the old model: "market reforms-inner-party democratization - moderate foreign policy" to another: "market reforms - Xi Jinping personality cult - offensive foreign policy." This model contains the risks of arising of the contradiction between economic freedom and political-ideological rigidity which can lead to destabilization of the political life. However, in the current positive economic dynamics, these risks may come out, rather, in the medium and long term. Today, the political situation in China remains stable - despite growing dissatisfaction in scientific expert and educational circles due to increased control over the intellectual sphere by the authorities. The need for a new redistribution of power between central and provincial authorities could potentially disrupt political stability in the medium term, but, at the moment, is not a critical negative factor. The economic situation is positive-stable. Forecasts indicate a possible increase in China's GDP in 2018 at 6.5%. At the same time, there are negative expectations in connection with the Sino-US and potentially Sino-European "trade war". In the Chinese foreign policy, as a response to Western pressure, China increasingly uses the Russian direction of its diplomacy in the expanded version of Russia + SCO. The nuance here is seen in China's adjusted approach to the SCO: first of all, not as a mechanism for cooperation with Russia, but as an organization that allows using Russia's potential for pressure on the US in the Sino-US strategic rivalry. In the second half of 2018, the Chinese economy will continue to develop steadily, albeit with unresolved traditional problems (debts of provinces and state-owned enterprises, ineffective state sector, risks on the financial and real estate market). In politics, discontent with the cult of Xi will accumulate, but without real threats to its power. Weakening in economic opposition between China and the United States is possible due to Beijing's search for compromises on tariffs, intellectual property, trade deficit. To find such trade-offs, Xi will use the so-called. "Personal diplomacy" of direct contacts with Trump.

• International Area Studies Review
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.789-812
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• 2009

This paper aims to analyse the historical-cultural sources of Azerbaijani national identity through the aspects of the Persian, the Turkish and the Russian influences, and to illuminate its complex characteristics. Then it will be examined the impact and consequences that the Azerbaijani identity exerted on its foreign policy. In the modern world, identities are formed and represented within a variety of shifting social, political, economic, cultural, and discursive contexts. Such understandings can have exclusionary consequences, particularly in pluralistic environments. Since its independence, the PFA government resorted to the arguments of ethnic origin and Azerbaijan's Turkishness to achieve its goals. Domestically, the failure of the ethnicity-based foreign policy was so great that even Azerbaijani Kurds, who under the Soviets had been virtually absorbed into the Azeri population, felt alienated and betrayed. Internationally, Azerbaijan turned Russia and Iran against itself and reduced bargaining power of Turkey since the latter grew increasingly concerned not to exacerbate its relations with Russia.

• International Journal of Computer Science & Network Security
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• v.22 no.9
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• pp.169-174
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• 2022

The purpose of the study is to research the legal nature and essence of corrupt behavior, as well as the international and national legal aspects of the fight against corruption. The article discloses the relation between the factual results of the operation of anti-corruption normative and legal acts and the goals and objectives for which they were adopted. The effectiveness of the regulatory effect and quality of anti-corruption legislation is determined by the example of the Russian Federation. The article provides an analysis of theoretical aspects of the theory and history of the formation and development of anti-corruption legislation (on the example of Russia and some other countries, as well as international legal norms) giving several practical examples from foreign legislation demonstrating the structure of the system of government bodies battling against corrupt behavior (including its latent forms). The authors suggest that there is a need for a unified conception of information and propaganda support of state anti-corruption activities. This will make it possible to inform the population that the state is actively working to prevent corruption threats and to bring perpetrators to justice, as well as contribute to citizens' trust in the state policy in this area. At the same time, it is necessary to regularly inform the citizens about the provisions of the anti-corruption legislation, explaining the importance of their observance.

• (The)Korea Educational Review
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• v.23 no.1
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• pp.57-81
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• 2017

The purpose of this study is to summarise the educational meanings of Official Foreign Language Schools(hereafter, OFLS) in Korea, 1895-1906. Especially, I try to find out the foreign language policy of the Joseon Dynasty and the comparative superiority between six foreign language schools - Japanese School, English School, French School, Russian School, Chinese School, and German School - through the traits of teachers and the change of students numbers at the Regulation Period. As a part of Kabo Reforms, the government had abolished the of Civil Service Examination System and status system, and foreign languages worked as a cultural capital to acquire modern civilization and to escalate one's social status. The results were as follows: Firstly, the OFLS have to be regarded as one of the highest educational institute during the Regulation Period. The eligibility of the OFLS was over 15 years old, but most of the incoming students were over 20 years old. Secondly, many of the OFLS's teachers were specialists of military, diplomat and mechanics. Especially, Martel, the teacher of French school played an important role for the neutral diplomacy policy of the Great Korean(Dae-Han) Empire during the Regulation Period. Thirdly, the recruit of new members of the OFLS was affected by the political and social circumstances at that time. Fourthly, the statistics of incoming students during the Regulation Period was concentrated on Chinese school, French school, and English school in due order. Thus, it differed from the commonly accepted ideas of students' statistics which was concentrated on English School and Japanese School. Fifthly, the OFLS were not only for the training of official interpreters(譯官通事), but also the cultivation of civil servants who could become statesman.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.1 no.2
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• pp.31-43
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• 2017

The article is devoted to the theoretical and practical analysis of Chinese global leadership. The concept of leadership is applied as a methodology, which involves identifying the main factors, such as strategic power, the attractiveness of political institutions, the ability to provide acceptable ideas and the presence of allies that contribute to a comprehensive analysis of the country's leadership potential. The authors also describe the relevance of Chinese global leadership and analyze its domestic, economic and international causes. Moreover, the ''Belt and Road'' initiative is defined as the main mechanism for providing the influence of China on the global level which is now being changed its quantitative component, namely the increasing attention to the security aspects of this initiative. In addition to that, it is important to note that China maintains its economic and political positions in Africa, Central Asia and South-East Asia. Africa has a special role in the Chinese ''Belt and Road'' initiative as a recipient of Chinese investments and a site for the deployment of China's naval facilities to protect the trade routes. On the regional level, China will strive to become a leader of the trade and economic processes in the Asia-Pacific region, the South China Sea and the North Korea nuclear program issues. The American factor in modern international relations, namely so-called "Trump factor", which means the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris Agreement, will cause demand for Chinese leadership in the Asia-Pacific region and in the world as well. However, in this case a number of questions arise: is China prepared for this? Is Beijing able to bear greater responsibility? Does China have the potential for this? The article concludes that China will not become global leaders in the next 20-30 years, because of internal (political reforms) and foreign policy reasons (doctrinal formulation of foreign policy initiatives, military-political and economic power, international posture and relations with other states). The authors believe that the implementation of Chinese leadership is possible not on the condition of confrontation between China and the United States, but on the establishing of constructive relations between these countries. The last meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping showed a trend for creating channels for dialogue between Beijing and Washington, which can become the basis for interaction. An important place in the work is given to the analysis of development and forecasting the evolution of Russian-Chinese and U.S.-China relations. As for Russia, Moscow should conduct a policy that will not allow it to become a ''junior partner'' of China.