• The KIPS Transactions:PartC
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• v.18C no.1
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• pp.1-6
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• 2011

The performance and practicality of cryptosystem for encryption, decryption, and primality test is primarily determined by the implementation efficiency of the modular exponentiation of $a^b$(mod n). To compute $a^b$(mod n), the standard binary squaring still seems to be the best choice. But, the d-ary, (d=2,3,4,5,6) method is more efficient in large b bits. This paper suggests m-numeral system modular exponentiation. This method can be apply to$b{\equiv}0$(mod m), $2{\leq}m{\leq}16$. And, also suggests the another method that is exit the algorithm in the case of the result is 1 or a.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.18 no.4
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• pp.17-25
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• 2008

Because Chinese Remainder Theorem based RSA (RSA CRT) offers a faster version of modular exponentiation than ordinary repeated squaring, it is promoting with standard. Unfortunately there are major security issues associated with RSA CRT, since Bellcore announced a fault-based cryptanalysis against RSA CRT in 1996. In 1997, Shamir developed a countermeasure using error free immune checking procedure. And soon it became known that the this checking procedure can not effect as the countermeasures. Recently Yen proposed two hardware fault immune protocols for RSA CRT, and this two protocols do not assume the existence of checking procedure. However, in FDTC 2006, the method of attack against the Yen's two protocols was introduced. In this paper, the main purpose is to present a countermeasure against the method of attack from FDTC 2006 for CRT-RSA. The proposed countermeasure use a characteristic bit operation and dose not consider an additional operation.