• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.75-84
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• 2004

In this paper, we present a related key differential attack on Full-round GOST Firstly, we present a distinguishing attack on full rounds of GOST, which can distinguish it from random oracle with probability 1- 64$2^{64}$ using a related key differential characteristic. We will also show that H. Seki et al.'s idea can be applied to attack on 31 rounds of GOST combining our related key differential characteristic. Lastly, we propose a related key differential attack on full rounds of GOST. In this attack we can recover 12 bits of the master key with $2^{35}$ chosen plaintexts and $2^{36}$ encryption times for the 91.7% expectation of success rate.