• The Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business
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• v.9 no.6
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• pp.49-55
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• 2018

Purpose - This paper examines the effect of related party transactions on crash firm-specific stock price crash risk. Ownership of a typical Korean conglomerate is concentrated in a single family. In those entities, management and board positions are often filled by family members. Therefore, a dominant shareholder can benefit from related party transactions. In Korea, firms have to report related party transactions in financial statement footnotes. However, those are not disclosed in detail. The more related party transactions are the greater information risk. Thus, companies with related party transactions are likely to experience stock price crashes. Research design, data, and methodology - 2,598 firm-year observations are used for the main analysis. Those samples are from TS2000 database from 2009 to 2013, and the database covers KOSPI-listed firms in Korea. The proxy for related party transactions (RTP) is calculated by dividing total transactions to the related-party by total sales. A dummy variable is used as a dependent variable (CRASH) in the regression model. Logistic regression is used to explain the relationship between related party transactions and crash risk. Then, the sample was separated into two groups; tunneling firms and propping firms. The relation between related party transactions and crash risk variances with features of the transaction were investigated. Results - Using a sample of KOSPI-listed firms in TS2000 database for the period of 2009-2013, I find that stock price crash risk increases as the trade volume of related-party transactions increases. Specifically, I find that the coefficient of RPT is significantly positive, supporting the prediction. In addition, this relationship is strong and robust in tunneling firms. Conclusions - The results report that firms with related party transactions are more likely to experience stock price crashes. The results mean that related party transactions increase the possibility of future stock price crashes by enlarging information asymmetry between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. In case of tunneling, it could be seen that related party transactions are positively associated with stock crash risk. The result implies that the characteristic of the transaction influences crash risk. This study is related to a literature that investigates the effect of related party transactions on the stock market.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.21 no.9
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• pp.584-595
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• 2020

This study relates to the effect from enforcement of regulations in 2014 against controlling shareholder expropriation in Korean corporations. The relationship change between related party transactions (RPTs) and the corporate values of listed Korean corporations is analyzed for the five-year period before and after enforcement of the regulations (2009-2013 and 2014-2018). Three types of RPTs regarding long-term supply contracts, loans, and credit were adopted for analysis. Following are the results of a regression analysis with panel data that consist of 6,534 firm-year observations. First shown is that the enforcement of regulations affects the relationship between RPTs and corporate value. Specifically, for all corporations, the result implies that the purpose of expropriation is weakened, and the efficiency and transparency of transactions in corporations are enhanced due to enforcement of the regulations. Secondly, the extent to which the regulations exert influence on designated and non-designated corporations differs. Regulation enforcement seems to be more influential on non-designated corporations than on designated ones for the efficiency and transparency of transactions in the long-term contract type of RPT.