• 중소기업융합학회논문지
• /
• 제6권4호
• /
• pp.59-64
• /
• 2016

IETF에서 표준화한 6LoWPAN(IPv6 over Low Power Wireless Sensor Network)는 무선 센서 노드들의 이동성을 지원 하지 못한다. 무선 센서 노드가 CPU, 메모리, 배터리 사용에 있어 많은 제약을 받기 때문에 Mobile IPv6와 같은 기존의 프로토콜들을 적용하기 쉽지 않다. 본 논문에서는 이러한 센서 노드들의 이동성을 지원하기 위해 핸드오버 절차 수행을 호스트가 하지 않는 FPMIPv6(Fast PMIPv6)에 대한 기존 연구 분석을 바탕으로 6LoWPAN와 연동하는 새로운 이동성 관리 구조와 방안을 제안하였다. 연동을 위해 6LoWPAN에서 현재 사용되지 않는 dispatch code pattern의 사용을 제안하였으며, 핸드오버 과정에서 인증 지연으로 발생하는 패킷 손실을 줄이고 재전송으로 인해 발생하는 센서 노드의 전력 소모를 최소화하기 위해 MAG과 MAC, MAC와 AAA 사이에 임시 보증(temporary guarantee) 및 트러스트 관계(trust relationship)라는 새로운 개념을 도입하였다. 새롭게 제안된 인증절차와 구조는 인증 지연으로 인한 핸드오버 절단과 패킷 손실 및 재전송을 크게 줄일 것으로 예상된다.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권31호
• /
• pp.190-219
• /
• 2013

Since Korea and Japan established diplomatic relationship, Relationship between Korea and Japan has not been easygoing. There are two most explosive, and noticeable ones among topics which have affected the relationship ; Dokdo and Historical Distortion. Without these issues, relationship between two countries will take a turn for the better. However, unfortunately, it seems that it is almost never going to happen. There is the Japanese conservative right-wing who has an influence on those two issues. The right-wing takes regard getting negative view or finding out dark past as an action from Self-torture view of history, and tries to dilute the Japanese sense of guilt on past invasions to neighbor countries. Moreover, to become a "normal country", they are trying to revise Constitution of the Japan so that Japan can possess the military and re-arm, dispatch troops abroad, and get the right to break the war. In other words, they expect Japan to become a powerful nation with great influence on Asia and world, as the period in which Japan conquered Korean peninsula, China, and South-Eastern nations. Japan still harbours secret romanticism for bygone days of imperialist glory. That is why neighbors want to never make the painful history happen again. In order to deal with this effort, most of all, it is required to assert better argument with a careful, thorough analysis on Japanese opinion about Dokdo. There might be a hidden card which can be accepted in the international society considering Japanese persistent effort to make Dokdo disputed area, and that is why we have to know that it is. In addition, it is needed to secure a high-quality professional manpower because the issues of Dokdo and Historical Distortion are primarily the matter of logic and references. The professional manpower should have open-minded to break down walls of their own majors. We have to introduce our achievements and stances to the international society vigorously. As a definite way to solve these problems, we have to develop national power. We have to possess naval forces and coast guard to protect our territory and Koreans overseas. There are not many options Korea can do to Japan, except protesting denunciation, and pressing a joint efforts. Most of the suggestions stated before are what have to be conducted domestically. It is a miserable condition, because two problems are Japanese domestic issues, but they become international issues and we have to seek a solution for ourselves.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권34호
• /
• pp.58-92
• /
• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.