• Korean journal of communication and information
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• v.66
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• pp.242-272
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• 2014

This study examines why follow-up investigative programs about the sinking of the Cheonan Patrol Combat Corvette(ROKS Cheonan) have not been produced, despite much speculation surrounding the cause of the sinking since November 2010, when KBS investigative program, In-Depth 60 Minutes which had covered the incident was aired. We have uncovered four reasons through a series of in-depth interviews with producers and reporters, as follows. First, Korean military authorities monopolized relevant information, while the producers could not prove or confirm the validity of the findings of the JIG(Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group)'s report because the facts had been revealed partially and selectively by the authorities and the press' scientific investigation were rejected by the authorities. Second, the crew of In-Depth 60 Minutes was subjected to severe disciplinary action by the Korea Communications Commission. This caused a chilling effect, - it broke the producers' resolve to further explore the reason behind the sinking. Furthermore, the screening of the investigative documentary, Project Cheonan Ship was cancelled without prior notice, presumably by the power of the State and markets. Third, the reorganization and shake-up of personnel by broadcasting stations' presidents appointed by the power of the State crushed the spirit of PD Journalism. Finally, the "red purge" factions stigmatized by the political or military, or the mainstream press, caused the producers or broadcasters to engage in self-censorship. The idea has been used in Korea as a smoke screen to deflect public attention. Nevertheless, the producers hope to shed light on the Cheonan sinking incident and to prove reasonable doubts by pursuing follow-up investigations.

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.37-64
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• 2014

The year 2010 has been regarded as a year of China's assertive diplomacy. A series of China's behavior--including China's critical reaction to the U.S. for its sales of weapons to Taiwan, the Dalai Lama's visit to President Obama, China's arbitrary designation of 'core interests' over the South China Sea, China's inordinate reactions to the sinking of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong bombardment, and China's activities in the Senkaku/Diaoyu island areas--has served as the witnesses to China's assertive diplomacy in 2010. The major causes of China's assertive diplomacy can be summed up by three factors: potential power transition from U.S. to China; emerging China's nationalism; and the recession of the Tao Guang Yang Hui as a diplomatic principle. But a majority of Western sinologists claim that China's assertive diplomacy is defensive in terms of its character. China's neighboring states, however, perceive its assertive diplomacy as diplomatic threat. Due to these states' geographical proximity and capability gaps with China, these neighbors experience difficulties in coping with China's behavior. In particular, China's coercive economic diplomacy, in which China tends to manipulate the neighbors' economic dependency on China for its diplomatic leverage, is a case in point for China's assertive diplomacy. China's assertiveness seems to be continued even after the inauguration of Xi Jinping government. Although the Xi government's diplomatic rhetorics in "New Type of Great Power Relationship" and the "Convention for Neighboring States Policy" sound friendly and cooperative, its subsequent behavior, like unilateral announcement of Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (CADIZ), does not conform with its rhetoric. Overall, China's assertiveness has been consolidated as a fashion of its diplomacy, and it is likely to continue in its relations with neighbors. As a neighboring state, the ROK should approach to it with more balanced attitude. In addition, it needs to find out a new diplomatic leverage to deal with China in accordance with its security environment, in which China plays a growing role.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.5-26
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• 2013

The South Korean society has experienced many changes since the sinking of ROKS Cheonan. The government reviewed its defense posture and adopted the 5·24 Measure in its relations with North Korea. As a result, the people of South Korea became more conscious of security situations on the Korean peninsula while North Korea's economy suffered badly. Meanwhile, the South Korean government has taken a flexible stance toward North Korea in terms of exchange and cooperation since September 2011. The flexible stance was to manage inter-Korea relations in a stable manner and relieve the hardships of the North Korean people while preserving the spirits and purposes of the 5·24 Measure. The UN Security Council adopted twenty-six resolutions and statements on North Korea since June 25, 1950. They include thirteen U.N. Security Council resolutions including those concerning nuclear weapons or missile programs, nine Presidential statements, and four press statements. Resolution 82, the first U.N. resolution on North Korea, came when the Korean War broke out. Resolution 825, the first one related to nuclear or missile programs, was adopted in response to North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT. Apart from these U.N. resolutions, the United States has imposed separate sanctions against North Korea. North Korea's nuclear weapons program can be considered in comparison with that of Iran in terms of the consequences they create for the regional security. The Security Council has adopted six resolutions on Iran so far. One should note that the resolutions on Iran have had much stronger sanctions compared to those imposed on North Korea. That is, while the North Korea case may be viewed as a more serious threat to international security from the perspective of nuclear weapons development or proliferation, tougher sanctions have been placed on Iran. There are two approaches that South Korea should take in addressing the related issues. First, we should aim to reduce the gap between sanctions imposed on Iran and North Korea. It is difficult to understand that a country with more serious problems is rewarded with lighter sanctions. We should take measures through the Security Council Sanctions Committee to make individuals and groups in North Korea that play a central role in developing nuclear weapons and missiles subject to additional sanctions. Second, we have to change. Other countries in the international community have become tired of North Korea's nuclear issue and now they look to South Korea for initiative. We should correctly understand this current situation and play a leading role within our capacity. Knowingly and unknowingly, the notion that the North Korean nuclear issue may be left to South Korea has been spread around the international community. Although the situation is grave, we should try to open a new horizon in ushering in the unification era by taking the initiative with confidence that there is a looming hope ahead of us. For these tasks, we should stop thinking in the old way that has been ossified for the last two decades. We should not be pushed around by neighboring great powers in dealing with North Korea related issues anymore; we should take the initiative with resolution that we will play our role at the center of four great powers and with confidence that we can do it. Based on the confidence that the Republic of Korea has become a country with enough capacity to take the initiative, we should establish a 'National Grand Strategy' representing South Korea's strategic vision that the unification is the ultimate solution to the problems related to North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.24
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• pp.1-31
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• 2010

This article aims to identify organizational factors that influence the performance of implementation of the U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and to investigate the strength and direction of their effects. Explanatory variables include administrative resources, organizational culture, litigation cost, and the complexity of FOIA requests. The study will analyze quantitative secondary data from official statistics of federal agencies and the 2006 Federal Human Capital Survey as well as qualitative data from semi-structured interviews of FOIA officers. The results of statistical analyses are as follows : FOIA funding significantly affects median processing time and number of requests pending. There is a significant relationship between bureaucratic culture and number of requests pending, but not between bureaucratic culture and number of requests pending. There exists a significant relationship between the cost of FOIA litigation to federal agencies and the performance of FOIA implementation. There exists a significant relationship between the complexity of FOIA requests and the performance of FOIA implementation. This study also has important implication in South Korea, which has been under a sharp confrontation with North Korea for more than 50 years. As illustrated by the conflict between people's right to know and national security during the investigation of recent Sinking of the ROKS Cheonan, efforts should be made to prepare legal and institutional mechanism for freedom of information policy which can maintain a balance between conflicting values as well as efficient information disclosure in Korea.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.37
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• pp.29-50
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• 2013

With the recent global threats of terrorism as well as religious conflicts, Northeast Asian countries including South Korea, China, and Japan are experiencing particularly serious security crises as demonstrated by North Korea's threats of nuclear weapons testings and long-range missile launching as well as military provocation toward South Korea such as sinking of ROKS Cheonan and bombardment of Yeonpyeong island and the territorial dispute between China and Japan over Senkaku Islands(Diaoyu Islands). As a result, Park Geun Hye Administration of South Korea and the 2nd Abe Shinzo Cabinet of Japan, both recently established, are making efforts to improve their national security and crisis management policies. One of the key elements of such efforts is the strengthening of National Security Council(NSC) or its equivalent organization as the control tower of national security policy, modeled after the NSC of the United States. This paper compares NSC organization of Korea, the U.S., and Japan and draws policy insights focusing on the current political and national security situation South Korea is facing. Although organizational structure, function, and history of NSC of each country differs, it can be inferred from this comparison that NSC-type of organizations can play an important role as a control tower of security and emergency management policies.