• 기술혁신연구
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• 제24권2호
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• pp.177-205
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• 2016

점차 치열해지고 있는 경쟁환경은 기업들에게 생존을 위해 끊임없이 혁신적인 제품과 서비스를 창출하도록 요구하고 있다. 이러한 경쟁환경에 대응하기 위하여 기업들은 R&D 투자를 통하여 지속적인 혁신을 달성하고 있다. 이에 본 연구는 경쟁과 기업의 R&D 투자의 관계를 고찰하였다. 이를 위하여 경쟁을 실질적 경쟁과 잠재적 경쟁으로 이원화하여 각각이 기업의 R&D 투자에 미치는 영향을 관찰하였다. 또한 이 관계가 기업의 목표대비 성과 수준에 따라 어떻게 달라지는지 관찰하였다. 미국 Compustat 데이터로 실증분석을 수행한 결과, 실질적 경쟁은 기업의 R&D 투자를 감소시키는 경향이 있었던 반면 잠재적 경쟁은 R&D 투자를 증가시키는 경향이 있었다. 이에 대하여 목표대비 성과 수준의 조절효과는 기업의 성과가 목표보다 낮았을 때는 실질적 경쟁의 음(-)의 효과를 강화시키고, 잠재적 경쟁의 양(+)의 효과를 약화시켰고, 목표보다 높았을 때에도 실질적 경쟁의 음(-)의 효과를 강화 시키고, 잠재적 경쟁의 양(+)의 효과를 약화시켰으나 그 조절효과는 기업의 성과가 목표보다 낮았을 때보다 더욱 강하게 나타났다. 본 연구를 통하여 실질적 경쟁 및 잠재적 경쟁과 기업의 R&D 투자의사결정의 관계 그리고 목표대비 성과 수준의 역할을 이해하는데 도움이 될 수 있을 것으로 기대된다.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• 제23권2호
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• pp.46-58
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• 2019

Purpose - This paper analyzes how Research and Development (R&D) cartelization and Research Joint Ventures (RJV) affect firms that engage in Cournot competition in their product market using a model in which the Home and Foreign firm produce differentiated products and export their total output to a third country's market. Design/Methodology - In a two-stage game, research expenditures incurred in the first stage improve product quality and are subject to various degrees of spillovers. We consider four different scenarios. Findings - In a symmetric equilibrium we observe the following: (i) an RJV that cooperates in R&D decision yields the highest R&D expenditure. However, the scenario which yields the lowest expenditure depends on the extent of differentiation between the goods and the degree of spillovers; (ii) RJV cartelization yields the highest product quality, output, and consumer surplus in the third country; however, the lowest is produced by R&D competition if spillovers are strong and by R&D cartelization if spillovers are weak; and (iii) each firm's profit is at its minimum in R&D competition and its maximum in RJV cartelization. Furthermore, if spillovers are strong, the profit of each firm in R&D cartelization is greater than that in RJV competition, and vice versa. Originality/value - By analyzing product innovation in international markets, we can find similarities and differences between process R&D and product R&D in international markets.

• 무역학회지
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• 제41권2호
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• pp.29-60
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• 2016

본 연구에서는 두 나라의 대표적인 두 기업이 R&D 경쟁과 쿠르노 경쟁을 하는 상황을 전제로 외국기업의 R&D 외부효과가 국내 주요 경제변수에 어떤 영향을 미치며 나아가 국내정부의 보호수준과 어떤 관계를 갖는지에 대한 무역정책의 문제를 규명한다. 국제적 과점의 2단계 모형을 통해 우리는 자유무역과 보호무역 정책에서 존재하는 유일한 해를 구하고, 나아가 시뮬레이션 분석을 통해 R&D 투자의 외부효과에 따른 주요 경제변수들의 변화 패턴과 일국의 최적관세 패턴을 추적한다. 이론적인 주요 예측으로 기업들이 R&D 경쟁을 하고 있는 상황에서 자유무역과 보호무역 두 경우에 모두 R&D 외부효과가 클수록 R&D 투자율과 수준이 감소하고, 사회후생은 유사한 패턴을 보이지만 그 수준은 보호무역에서 상대적으로 큰 것으로 드러난다. 또 이 연구의 가장 관심사항인 R&D 투자의 외부효과와 최적관세율 간의 관계에서는 두 변수 간에 부(-)의 관계가 나타난다. 이는 정책적으로 R&D 투자의 외부효과가 커짐에 따라 최적관세율을 낮출 필요가 있음을 시사한다.

• 기술혁신연구
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• 제4권1호
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• pp.165-183
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• 1996

In acquiring and transferring a superior knowledge assesing the intermediate result value of a competitive R&D project is very important for a firm engaging in R&D. Most existing literatures on R&D evaluation are concerned with project selection and resource allocation. In this paper the stage of an R&D project is classified into research, exploratory development, and development. And a model is suggested which evaluates the intermediate result value before completion of development stage under duopoly and oligopolistic competition. Assessed value of the intermediate result transferred to the next tier company can be used as a minimum acceptable price to the inventor when more advanced knowledge acquired through R&D is transferred to the next tier one. The model suggested is composed of structural variables including research cost, success rates, potential profits, discount rate degree of competition. By using exponential distribution for invertion process time in each stage, we derive a formula that can assess the value of the intermediate result, and we demonstrate how the model can be applied to a competitive R&D situation through an example.

• 기술경영경제학회:학술대회논문집
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• 기술경영경제학회 1997년도 제11회 하계학술발표회 논문집
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• pp.124-159
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• 1997

This paper examines a significant example of accumulation of technology in post war Japan - the development process of the videocasstte recorder (VCR) for home use, and the dynamic evolution process of the mass market. The purpose of analyzing the Japanese home VCR industry is to clarify how and why only the Japanese makers had succeeded in developing home VCR and dominated. the global mass market and to make clear the dynamic process of industrial evolution. This study found out the following facts; 1) Japanese inter-firm interactions in the VCR have been carried out by the structure of "the competition and cooperation among the engaged players" form the initial stage, to growing, and maturing stage. 2) The process of competition and cooperation produced the revolutionary innovation through a continuous systematic development process in the R&D phase. 3) The process of competition and cooperation accelerated the speed of technological progress and the rapid growth of the industry in the growing and maturing stage.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• 제24권2호
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• pp.53-67
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• 2020

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to study strategic trade policies under international process research and development (R&D) competition with or without market leaders for free trade and a subsidy regime and compare the effects of R&D subsidies and export subsidies on the equilibrium levels of firm profit and social welfare. Design/methodology - For the analysis, we use previous work by Haaland and Kind (2008) and construct a differentiated goods duopoly model, wherein two firms compete via quantity in a third-country market for free trade and the subsidy regime. We consider simultaneous-move quantity competition when the two firms choose their quantities simultaneously and sequential-move quantity competition when they choose their quantities sequentially. The results are compared to those of Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004), who studied export subsidies. Findings - The following are the findings. First, the results of firm preference orderings regarding firm position from Dowrick (1986) and Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004) may not hold in our model when the firms' strategies are strategic substitutes under free trade. Second, the preference rankings under Cournot competition for free trade and a subsidy regime are the same as those in the strategic trade policy of export subsidy. Third, except for the cases of too close substitutes and complements, the results of firm and government preferences regarding firm position are different from those of Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004) in that Stackelberg leadership in a subsidy regime is advantageous when the goods are substitutes but is disadvantageous when the goods are complements. Moreover, the equilibrium level of firm profit is the highest in the Cournot-Nash play when the goods are substitutes in a subsidy regime. Fourth, except for the cases of too close substitutes and complements, the results of firms' and their respective governments' trade regime preferences are similar to those of Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004) in that a Stackelberg leader firm and government prefer free trade if the goods are substitutes and prefer a subsidy regime if the goods are complements. Furthermore, a Stackelberg follower firm and government strongly prefer a subsidy regime to free trade. Originality/value - By analyzing the effects of R&D subsidies and export subsidies in international markets, we can find similarities and differences between them in international markets.

• 한국경영과학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한산업공학회/한국경영과학회 1995년도 춘계공동학술대회논문집; 전남대학교; 28-29 Apr. 1995
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• pp.363-374
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• 1995

A duopoly model of R&D competition is presented to investigate whether an equilibrium R&D level with flexible spillovers is insufficient (or excessive) from the viewpoint of social welfare. The model focus on flexible spillovers which include much portion of externality occurring in R&D activity. Flexible spillovers refer to the spillovers that vary with industry equilibrium level of R&D. Innovating firms have incentives to cooperate in R&D in the presence of large spillovers. For any symmetric R&D profile, socially desirable equilibrium output is larger than equilibrium output produced in duopoly. Cooperative equilibrium R&D investment is observed to be socially insufficient in terms of welfare criterion irrespective of the magnitude of spillovers. While noncooperative R&D yields socially excessive expenditure on research project for a certain range of spillovers.

• 에너지공학
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• 제24권2호
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• pp.22-33
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• 2015

본 논문은 한국 폐자원에너지기업을 대상으로 R&D 효율성을 평가하는 지표 중 하나로서 현재의 기술수준과 이에 영향을 미치는 요인에 대해 기술경제이론에 근거하여 분석하였다. 연구 방법으로는 한국 폐자원에너지기업을 대상으로 한 설문조사 데이터를 이용해 다항로지스틱회귀분석을 활용하였다. 분석의 결과, 국내 폐자원에너지기업의 기업규모, R&D투자 비중, R&D인력 비중은 기술수준에 긍정적인 영향을 미치지만, 국내시장 경쟁정도가 심할수록 기술수준에 부정적인 영향을 미치는 것으로 분석되었다. 반면, 규모의 경제는 기술수준에 유의미한 영향을 미치지 못하는 것으로 분석되었다. 이러한 분석결과에 따른 정책적 시사점은 시장경쟁 과열이 기업의 기술수준에 부정적인 영향을 미치지 않도록 이해관계자 간 상생할 수 있는 협력체계를 구축해야 하며, 또한 생산량 증대 및 생산비용 감소를 통해 기업이 규모의 경제효과를 거둘 수 있도록 하는 노력이 필요하다는 것이다.

• 기술경영경제학회:학술대회논문집
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• 기술경영경제학회 2002년도 제21회 하계학술발표회 논문집
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• pp.225-237
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• 2002

The term "Strategic Alliance" which is not exactly defined in legal sector can apply to a wide variety of collaborative activities between firms, In spite of the vague conception Strategic Alliance, it has many benefit in the market. Especially, cooperation in R&D may reduce duplicative and unnecessary costs, lead to significant exchange of ideas and experience and thus result in products and technologies being developed more rapidly than would otherwise be the case. As a general rule, R&D cooperation tends to increase overall R&D activities. However, R&D agreements may cause competition problems such as restrictives effects on prices, output, innovation and variety or quality of products, To prevent its problems, competition authorities set out guidelines. The antitrust analysis of strategic alliances including R&D cooperation will vary according the substance of the actual agreement.

• 기술혁신연구
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• 제2권1호
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• pp.256-276
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• 1994

This paper aims at identifying the desirable R'||'&'||'D life cycle related to government-industry cooperative R'||'&'||'D. It is based on a case study associated with the relationship between cooperation and cooperation in information in information communications sector. It presents three types of R'||'&'||'D life cycle to achieve a technological enhancement as high as possible with limited resources. The first case of R'||'&'||'D project is of "advanced type". In the generic technology phase, government takes a leading role jointly in R'||'&'||'D activities, but, in after the applied research phase, the domestic firms take the lead. This kind of cooperation can be made when competition between domestic firms is highly intense, and the technological knowledges of participating firms are at internationally competitive levels. The second type of "less-advanced type"; the firms of a country(more often a small country) lag behind in technology level, and the penetration of foreign firms in the market is limited. In this case, government takes full charge of R'||'&'||'D activities up to the applied research phase, due to the low technology level and insufficient financial resources of private firms. Lastly, this paper presents and R'||'&'||'D life cycle of "strategic" type. This applies to the case in which domestic firm with less financial resources make an attempt to increase their technological knowledges while the government, in turn, contributes to strengthen the international competitiveness of domestic industry.