• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
• /
• v.4 no.1
• /
• pp.59-66
• /
• 2017

The purpose of this paper is to review the quality of corporate governance from the prior empirical literature. This study finds that most of the researchers developed the self structured corporate governance index and few researchers used the corporate governance index provided by rating agencies. This study also finds that there is no uniform basis to measure the corporate governance quality and observed the variation in terms of overall and individual attributes of corporate governance; sub-indices of corporate governance; scoring system; weighted and un-weighted method; statistical method; time period; financial and non financial companies; code of corporate governance; listing requirement; disclosure practices; legal environment; firms characteristics; and country perspective. This study also observed that overall corporate governance quality is very low in most of the studies and even quality of corporate governance varies in the firms within the same country. This study recommends that the boundary of corporate governance quality should be defined based on the agreed set of rules and regulation, code of governance and practices. This study also suggests that the regulator and policy makers should more emphasize on code of corporate governance and regulatory framework and monitoring to improve the quality of corporate governance.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
• /
• v.7 no.7
• /
• pp.149-158
• /
• 2020

The purpose of this study was to investigate the impact of corporate governance index on the cost of equity in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. This study collects data from 975 observations during the period 2012 to 2018 to test the hypotheses using multiple linear regression model for the panel data. In this research, the independent variable of corporate governance index comprises of 27 specific corporate governance attributes. The results of hypothesis testing showed that corporate governance has a negative and significant effect on the rate of capital cost. In other words, the quality of corporate governance can lower the rate of capital cost. This result suggests that, by using a powerful corporate governance system and by declining the information asymmetry (increasing transparency) and agency conflict, we would be able to enhance the quality of financial reports. It would strengthen the capital market, attract financial suppliers and investors, and absorb the required financial resources of the firm by a lower rate. The findings of the study suggest that companies are able to reduce the cost of equity by establishing strong corporate governance. This conclusion suggests the importance and effectiveness of corporate governance in the cost of equity.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
• /
• v.9 no.6
• /
• pp.127-137
• /
• 2022

This paper aims to investigate the impact of corporate governance on the quality of integrated reporting. Corporate governance includes internal (board size, board independence, and board diversity) and external (audit quality and enforcement) governance factors. This paper develops an index to capture the quality of integrated reporting by employing the completeness of information required by the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC). For an international sample, the paper manually collects 160 integrated reports along with internal and external governance factors and employs multivariate analyses to examine the association between these governance factors and the quality of integrated reporting. The empirical results suggest that firms with a larger board of directors, a larger proportion of female members on board, and located in countries with enforcement for integrated reporting requirements have a higher quality of integrated reporting. Our conclusions still hold after accounting for several conditions, including the industry-fixed and year-fixed effects. Together, these results suggest that both internal and external governance factors are important determinants for the quality of integrating reporting. These results have several theoretical and practical implications as they fulfill the absence of relevant studies on addressing the impact of internal and external corporate governance factors on the quality of integrated reporting.

• Journal of Distribution Science
• /
• v.11 no.6
• /
• pp.5-11
• /
• 2013

Purpose - The main question in this study is whether there is any relationship between corporate governance variables and earnings quality. The size of the board and audit committee, the number of stockholding managers and non-executive directors, and management quality are considered as independent corporate governance variables in the hypotheses. Research design, data, and methodology - Earnings quality is used as the dependent variable. Input from the abovementioned variables are drawn from 94 listed companies in the Tehran Stock Exchange for the period between 2006 and 2010. Results - This study examines corporate governance aspects such as the size of the board of directors, the number of shares held by the board, the board's independence, and the percentage of non-executive directors. The results show that establishing an audit committee has a significant role in ensuring higher quality reported earnings. Conclusions - The regression statistics output reveals a meaningful relationship between earnings quality and the size of the board of directors, the number of non-executive directors, and the size of the audit committee. This result indicates that improving earnings quality requires that the size of the board of directors be taken into account.

• Journal of Distribution Science
• /
• v.14 no.12
• /
• pp.129-139
• /
• 2016

Purpose - This paper examines the explanatory power of the agency theory in the determination of cash holdings for Korean retail firms. If the agency theory holds, a firm with strong corporate governance structure tends to have low cash holdings. A strong governance structure makes the CEO of this firm to behave in the interests of shareholders and thus the CEO has low incentive to stockpile cash holdings, which can be easily diverted for the CEO's own managerial purposes. We investigate this relationship between corporate governance structure and cash holdings, by using corporate governance scores as a proxy variable that captures the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanism. Research design, data, and methodology - We adopt the sample of publicly listed retail firms in KOSPI market from 2005 to 2013. Financial and accounting statements are gathered from the WISEfn database. We also use the corporate governance scores published by Korean Corporate Governance Service. The relationship between the corporate governance scores and cash holdings is cross-sectionally estimated based on the ordinary least square method. This estimation method is widely accepted in the existing literature. The sample of large conglomerates, Chebol, and the remainder firms are separately examined as well, to account for the distinctive internal financing environment in these large conglomerates. Results - We mainly contribute to the extant literature by providing empirical evidence against the agency theory of cash policy. Unlike the prediction of agency theory, we confirm statistically insignificant or even positive correlations between the set of corporate governance scores and cash-asset ratios. Almost all the major corporate governance attributes including total score, shareholder rights, board structure, and the quality of information disclosure do not show negative correlations with cash holdings, which poses a strong challenge to the validity of the agency theory in the determination of retail firms' cash holdings. Conclusions - This study presents interesting empirical results with respect to the cash policy in Korean retail firms. Consistent to prior studies, I verify that the agency theory only limitedly explains the level of cash holdings. Future studies may obtain more robust results by examining a longer sample period.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
• /
• v.9 no.1
• /
• pp.219-228
• /
• 2022

High-profile corporate crises have sparked a surge in interest in corporate governance (CG) and corporate reputation (CR). Company governance issues in many companies contribute to corporate failures and a bad reputation. Transparency is the glue that holds any group or organization together while also connecting it to a coalition of key stakeholders. This research focuses on how corporate governance factors (such as board independence, board size, board meetings, and board gender) and company characteristics affect the reputation of Malaysian public listed companies (PLCs). Many studies have looked into the characteristics of corporate governance in Malaysian businesses. However, none of the research has explored this issue using the new reputation measurement. A sample of the 100 largest companies listed on Bursa Malaysia based on their market capitalization for the year ended 2018 was selected. A new measurement, the disclosure index, was created and used to analyze reputation disclosure in the annual report of a corporation. The independent director, board size, and board meeting were statistically significant and associated with the level of reputation disclosure, according to the findings of this study. The results suggest that company directors prioritize good governance and management quality to boost their firm's reputation and acquire a competitive edge.

• Asian Journal of Business Environment
• /
• v.7 no.2
• /
• pp.5-16
• /
• 2017

Purpose - The purpose of this research study is to make a comparative analysis between corporate governance guidelines 2016 and 2012 and area of further improvement to ensure better governance, accountability and transparency. Research design, data and methodology - This research study is mainly based on the corporate governance guidelines 2016 and 2012 issued by the regulatory authority known as Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC). Results - This study finds that corporate governance guideline 2012 include some new issues such as criteria and qualification of independent director; some additional statements in the directors' report; mandatory requirement of separation of chairman and CEO; constitution of audit committee; chairman of audit committee; role of audit committee, duties of CEO and CFO on financial statements; and collection of compliance certificate from professional accountant or secretary in compare to corporate governance guidelines 2016. Conclusions - This study suggests that the regulatory authority should include more issues such as tax management and reporting, risk management and reporting; individual and overall performance analysis of the board and independent directors; separate nomination and compensation committee; assessment of true independence of the board and its supporting committees to ensure higher quality of corporate governance and transparency.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
• /
• v.7 no.4
• /
• pp.71-80
• /
• 2020

The paper examines the influence of corporate governance (CG) and earning quality (EQ) on corporate value (FV) of Vietnamese enterprises. The study uses GLS regression and linear structure model using data collected from companies listing on the stock market in Vietnam during 2008-2018, with a total of 2,937 observations. The research results indicate that EQ and CG represented by the Integrated Board of Directors and the Integrated Supervisory Board have a positive effect on FV directly and indirectly. The results show that the Integrated Board of Directors has a positive effect on EQ, whereas the Integrated Supervisory Board has a negative effect on EQ. Based on the research results, we suggest that companies need to strictly comply and implement GC, so to bring down the agency cost and consequently to increase performance. The companies also should establish the Board of Director of a proper size, with financial and accounting specialty, and including women board members. The government also needs to improve the management mechanism asking for firms to prepare and publish financial statements with reliable company information, which could be provided to users. These recommendations are a useful basis to help businesses improve FV via changes in the corporate governance factors in each enterprise.

• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
• /
• v.11 no.2
• /
• pp.207-214
• /
• 2020

The objective of this study is to analyze the effect of the quality of the Internal Accounting Control System(IACS) on Executive compensation, and to determine whether this relationship depends on the effectiveness of corporate governance. For the analysis, 6,343 firm-year data listed on the Korea Exchange from 2011 to 2016 were used. The results are as follows. First, Executive compensation was decreased in companies with low quality of IACS to provide a penalty for management. Second, the negative relationship between the weaknesses of IACS and Executive compensation was found to be strengthened when the corporate governance was effectively operated. These findings suggest that information about the quality of the IACS can be usefully used to reasonably identify the executive compensation policy, and that corporate governance needs to be operated more efficiently.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
• /
• v.7 no.12
• /
• pp.389-395
• /
• 2020

Earnings management is a matter of concern for organizations because it affects the interests of stakeholders. This reduces the quality of information on financial statements of the organizations when the organization performs earnings management behavior. The objective of the article is to examine the impact of corporate governance on earnings management of all Vietnamese listed banks from 2015 to 2019. The article uses time-series data and ordinary least square (OLS) with Eviews 10.0 software to test the regression model. The agency and asymmetry information theory is used to explain the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management. The study results show that two variables - the foreign members of the board of directors and audit committee - have an opposite effect on earnings management behavior of Vietnamese listed banks. Therefore, the managers of listed banks need to raise awareness to express responsibility for honest and reasonable information on the financial statements. This creates trust and credibility for stakeholders. Moreover, Central bank of Vietnam should monitor regularly and enforce strict sanctions to limit earnings management behavior of listed banks. This contributes to improving the quality of accounting information in the Vietnamese banking sector to meet the trend of international economic integration.