• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.33-75
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• 2011

The ownership structure of a franchise system is determined by the franchisor's strategic choice. A close look at the extant theories and perspectives in economics and management such as resource scarcity theory, agency theory, transaction cost analysis, and mixed ownership theory reveals that firms choose their ownership structure for the sake of economic efficiency, profit potentials, the chance of survival, and other strategic concerns. The present study, on the basis of strategic choice perspective, reviews the divergent theories of a franchise system's ownership structure and its determinants, thus providing a theoretical framework for comparing the contradictory arguments along the several critical dimensions. We also developed and tested the conflicting hypotheses regarding key determinants of ownership structure including firm's age, size, transaction-specific investments, uncertainty, and risk-sharing propensity. Using a FDD (Franchise Disclosure Document) data set of 543 Korean franchisors, we found that the years in business, the total number of employees, days of training, the inverse of the years of franchising, and the requirement of royalty payment have positive relationships with the proportion of company-owned outlets to total number of outlets. On the other hand, the proportion of company-owned outlets was found to have negative relationships with the total number of outlets and the extent of geographic dispersion of outlets, but to have no significant relationships with the initial investment required and the inverse of contract length. Based on the findings, we provide several theoretical and managerial implications for studying ownership structure of franchise systems.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.29 no.3
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• pp.75-112
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• 2006

We found following evidences from our empirical analysis with the Workplace Panel Survey data of the Korea Labor Institute with reference to 'discord hypothesis' which insists that employee participatory high performance work practices would strengthen not only an enterprise focus in labor-management relations but also the enterprise unionism in the labor union system or collective bargaining structures, so they would probably come into conflict with the superenterprise-oriented industrial solidarity spirit in labor unionism. First, even though there are significant positive management performance effects of high performance work practices, especially in case of mining and manufacturing industries, the positive performance effects of employee participatory work practices such as job rotation ratio of workers and 6-sigma activities were much strengthened relatively in case of non-unionized establishments. Second, the superenterprise-oriented collective bargaining system is also found to give very strong and statistically significant negative performance effects to the introduction and implementation of work teams and performance-related payment systems such as profit sharing, group incentive pay system and so on. Although there are some careful reservations in interpreting the results of our analysis because of data insufficiency, they may have important implications that the industrial labor unionism or the superenterprise-oriented collective bargaining practices exercise the bargaining power to make individual firms be negative or feel it nearly impossible to introduce the employee participatory work practices which can be very favorable to improving those management performance.