This survey was conducted to investigate the present status of farm tractor utilization for obtaining a basic reference to the establishment of the government's agricultural mechanization strategies. Thirty two counties from the eight provinces except Jeju were covered in this study. From these selected areas, 433 sample farms having farm tractor were taken to obtain the general informations by the enquete, and 93 sample farms among them to investigate the status of daily tractor use in the year of 1980. The analyzed results are summarized as follows: 1. Farm tractors owned by the rice-oriented farms holds 71.5 percent of the total number of tractors the livestock-oriented farms 17.0 percent, and the orchard-oriented farms 7.0 percent. Among the farm tractors 64.3 percent was a large size (46ps) and 35.7 percent a small size(19~23ps). 2. Most of the tractors surveyed were equipped with the essential attachments such as plow and rotavator. About 18 percent of the tractor owners had no trailer, which seemed too high considering the large percentage of tractor use for transportation. The availability of other attachments was very low except a grader on the rice-oriented farms and a hay harvester and a front loader on the livestock-oriented farms. 3. The average size of farm was 3.9 hectare for the rice-oriented farms, 13.9 hectare for the livestock-oriented farms and 7.4 hectare for the orchard-oriented farms. It was obious that the average farm size of was too small compared to the theoretical machine capacity of the tractors. 4. About 70 percent of the tractor operators were in the age of twenties and thirties. About 90 percent of them had an educational level of middle school graduate or above even though their technical level was very low. 5. Any particular problem in tractor use was not found in this survey. From the farmer's preference for purchasing a new tractor, however, it is estimated the demand on a 20-30ps tractor will be more increased. 6. The average annual use of tractor was of about 100 days or 400 hours. It appeared that the rice-oriented farms used most with 412.4 hours per year, and followed by the livestock-oriented farms with 403.6 hours, the orchard oriented farms with 377.7 hours. 7. Among the total hours of tractor use, 47.3 percent was for transportation, and 41.6 percent was for plowing and rotary tillage. The largest portion of the annual tractor use was taken by transportation on the livestock-oriented farms, by land preperation on the rice-oriented farms, and by loading and chemical spraying on the orchard-oriented farms. 8. The hours of tractor use had a peak in May. The hours of use for own farm was remarkably different among the different farm oriented, but there was no considerable difference between the too different sizes of tractor. 9. The hours of tractor use decreased as the age of the operator or the educational level increased. The reason might be that the operators who had a high educational level or were older had a tendency of disliking custom works. 10. The average custom use of tractor was 171.3 hours per year, and the ratio of custom work was 63.7 percent on the rice-oriented farms, 31.7 percent on the livestock-oriented farms and 22.4 percent on the orchard-oriented farms. Among the custom works, the most popular one was the grader leveling. 11. The charge on custom work was about 40,000 Won per hectare for plowing and rotary tillage, and it was the most expensive in the southeastern region, and next followed by the southwestern region. 12. The average plowing capacity of the small tractor was 7.8 hours per hectare in the paddy field, and that of the large tractors was 4.3 hours per hectare. The average rotary-tilling capacities of the small and the large tractors were 6.5 and 4.3 hours per hectare, in the paddy field respectively.
When the marcher visited Korea in fall 1994, he was shocked to see high rise apartment buildings around the capitol region including Seoul and Suwon, resulting from rising demand of housing because of urban migration followed by second and third industrial development. After 6 years in March 2000, the researcher witnessed more apartment buildings and vinyl house complexes, one of the evidences of continued economic progress in Korea. Korea had to receive the rescue finance from International Monetary Fund (IMF) because of financial crisis in 1997. However, the sign of recovery was seen in a year, and the growth rate of Gross Domestic Products (GDP) in 1999 recorded as high as 10.7 percent. During this period, the Korean government has been working on restructuring of banks, enterprises, labour and public sectors. The major directions of government were; localization, reducing administrative manpower, limiting agricultural budgets, privatization of public enterprises, integration of agricultural organization, and easing of various regulations. Thus, the power of central government shifted to local government resulting in a power increase for city mayors and county chiefs. Agricultural extension services was one of targets of government restructuring, transferred to local governments from central government. At the same time, the number of extension offices was reduced by 64 percent, extension personnel reduced by 24 percent, and extension budgets reduced. During the process of restructuring, the basic direction of extension services was set by central Rural Development Administration Personnel management, technology development and supports were transferred to provincial Rural Development Administrations, and operational responsibilities transferred to city/county governments. Agricultural extension services at the local levels changed the name to Agricultural Technology Extension Center, established under jurisdiction of city mayor or county chief. The function of technology development works were added, at the same time reducing the number of educators for agriculture and rural life. As a result of observations of rural areas and agricultural extension services at various levels, functional responsibilities of extension were not well recognized throughout the central, provincial, and local levels. Central agricultural extension services should be more concerned about effective rural development by monitoring provincial and local level extension activities more throughly. At county level extension services, it may be desirable to add a research function to reflect local agricultural technological needs. Sometimes, adding administrative tasks for extension educators may be helpful far farmers. However, tasks such as inspection and investigation should be avoided, since it may hinder the effectiveness of extension educational activities. It appeared that major contents of the agricultural extension service in Korea were focused on saving agricultural materials, developing new agricultural technology, enhancing agricultural export, increasing production and establishing market oriented farming. However these kinds of efforts may lead to non-sustainable agriculture. It would be better to put more emphasis on sustainable agriculture in the future. Agricultural extension methods in Korea may be better classified into two approaches or functions; consultation function for advanced farmers and technology transfer or educational function for small farmers. Advanced farmers were more interested in technology and management information, while small farmers were more concerned about information for farm management directions and timely diffusion of agricultural technology information. Agricultural extension service should put more emphasis on small farmer groups and active participation of farmers in these groups. Providing information and moderate advice in selecting alternatives should be the major activities for consultation for advanced farmers, while problem solving processes may be the major educational function for small farmers. Systems such as internet and e-mail should be utilized for functions of information exchange. These activities may not be an easy task for decreased numbers of extension educators along with increased administrative tasks. It may be difficult to practice a one-to-one approach However group guidance may improve the task to a certain degree.
The success of the family planning program in Korea is reflected in the decrease in the growth rate from 3.0% in 1962 to 2.0% in 1971, and in the decrease in the fertility rate from 43/1,000 in 1960 to 29/1,000 in 1970. However, it would be erroneous to attribute these reductions entirely to the family planning program. Other socio-economic factors, such as the increasing age at marriage and the increasing use of induced abortions, definitely had an impact on the lowered growth and fertility rate. Despite the relative success of the program to data in meeting its goals, there is no room for complacency. Meeting the goal of a further reduction in the population growth rate to 1.3% by 1981 is a much more difficult task than any one faced in the past. Not only must fertility be lowered further, but the size of the target population itself will expand tremendously in the late seventies; due to the post-war baby boom of the 1950's reaching reproductive ages. Furthermore, it is doubtful that the age at marriage will continue to rise as in the past or that the incidence of induced abortion will continue to increase. Consequently, future reductions in fertility will be more dependent on the performance of the national family planning program, with less assistance from these non-program factors. This paper will describe various approaches to help to the solution of these current problems. 1. PRACTICE RATE IN FAMILY PLANNING In 1973, the attitude (approval) and knowledge rates were quite high; 94% and 98% respectively. But a large gap exists between that and the actual practice rate, which is only 3695. Two factors must be considered in attempting to close the KAP-gap. The first is to change social norms, which still favor a larger family, increasing the practice rate cannot be done very quickly. The second point to consider is that the family planning program has not yet reached all the eligible women. A 1973 study determineded that a large portion, 3096 in fact, of all eligible women do not want more children, but are not practicing family planning. Thus, future efforts to help close the KAP-gap must focus attention and services on this important large group of potential acceptors. 2. CONTINUATION RATES Dissatisfaction with the loop and pill has resulted in high discontinuation rates. For example, a 1973 survey revealed that within the first six months initial loop acceptance. nearly 50% were dropouts, and that within the first four months of inital pill acceptance. nearly 50% were dropouts. These discontinuation rates have risen over the past few years. The high rate of discontinuance obviously decreases the contraceptive effectiveness. and has resulted in many unwanted births which is directly related to the increase of induced abortions. In the future, the family planning program must emphasize the improved quality of initial and follow-up services. rather than more quantity, in order to insure higher continuation rates and thus more effective contraceptive protection. 3. INDUCED ABORTION As noted earlier. the use of induced abortions has been increase yearly. For example, in 1960, the average number of abortions was 0.6 abortions per women in the 15-44 age range. By 1970. that had increased to 2 abortions per women. In 1966. 13% of all women between 15-44 had experienced at least one abortion. By 1971, that figure jumped to 28%. In 1973 alone, the total number of abortions was 400,000. Besides the ever incre.sing number of induced abortions, another change has that those who use abortions have shifted since 1965 to include- not. only the middle class, but also rural and low-income women. In the future. in response to the demand for abortion services among rural and low-income w~men, the government must provide and support abortion services for these women as a part of the national family planning program. 4. TARGET SYSTIi:M Since 1962, the nationwide target system has been used to set a target for each method, and the target number of acceptors is then apportioned out to various sub-areas according to the number of eligible couples in each area. Because these targets are set without consideration for demographic factors, particular tastes, prejudices, and previous patterns of acceptance in the area, a high discontinuation rate for all methods and a high wastage rate for the oral pill and condom results. In the future. to alleviate these problems of the methodbased target system. an alternative. such as the weighted-credit system, should be adopted on a nation wide basis. In this system. each contraceptive method is. assigned a specific number of points based upon the couple-years of protection (CYP) provided by the method. and no specific targets for each method are given. 5. INCREASE OF STERILIZA.TION TARGET Two special projects. the hospital-based family planning program and the armed forces program, has greatly contributed to the increasing acceptance in female and male sterilization respectively. From January-September 1974, 28,773 sterilizations were performed. During the same time in 1975, 46,894 were performed; a 63% increase. If this trend continues, by the end of 1975. approximately 70,000 sterilizations will have been performed. Sterilization is a much better method than both the loop and pill, in terms of more effective contraceptive protection and the almost zero dropout rate. In the future, the. family planning program should continue to stress the special programs which make more sterilizations possible. In particular, it should seek to add the laparoscope techniques to facilitate female sterilization acceptance rates. 6. INCREASE NUMBER OF PRIVATE ACCEPTORS Among the current family planning users, approximately 1/3 are in the private sector and thus do not- require government subsidy. The number of private acceptors increases with increasing urbanization and economic growth. To speed this process, the government initiated the special hospital based family planning program which is utilized mostly by the private sector. However, in the future, to further hasten the increase of private acceptors, the government should encourage doctors in private practice to provide family planning services, and provide the contraceptive supplies. This way, those do utilize the private medical system will also be able to receive family planning services and pay for it. Another means of increasing the number of private acceptors, IS to greatly expand the commercial outlets for pills and condoms beyond the existing service points of drugstores, hospitals, and health centers. 7. IE&C PROGRAM The current preferred family size is nearly twice as high as needed to achieve a stable poplation. Also, a strong boy preference hinders a small family size as nearly all couples fuel they must have at least one or more sons. The IE&C program must, in the future, strive to emphasize the values of the small family and equality of the sexes. A second problem for the IE&C program to work. with in the: future is the large group of people who approves family planning, want no more children, but do not practice. The IE&C program must work to motivate these people to accept family planning And finally, for those who already practice, an IE&C program in the future must stress continuation of use. The IE&C campaign, to insure highest effectiveness, should be based on a detailed factor analysis of contraceptive discontinuance. In conclusion, Korea faces a serious unfavorable sociodemographic situation- in the future unless the population growth rate can be curtailed. And in the future, the decrease in fertility will depend solely on the family planning program, as the effect of other socio-economic factors has already been maximumally felt. A second serious factor to consider is the increasing number of eligible women due to the 1950's baby boom. Thus, to meet these challenges, the program target must be increased and the program must improve the effectiveness of its current activities and develop new programs.
Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.