• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.49
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• pp.257-281
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• 2011

The duty of utmost good faith is found in sections 17-20 of MIA 1906. Critics of the current legal regime on the pre-contractual duty from the viewpoint of the assured, have been concentrated on two points in particular. First, the scope of the duty is so wide that it imposes too high burden on the assured. The second criticism is directed at the remedy, prescribed by the MIA 1906, s.17, against breach of the duty. This article intends to analyse the legal implications of proposals in CP 2007 for reforming pre-contractual duty of utmost good faith of business assured in English insurance contracts law and the problems of proposals. The Law Commissions are proposing four fundamental changes to meet the long-standing criticism and the results of analysis are as following. First, the Law Commissions are proposing a change in the test of constructive knowledge in relation to the duty of disclosure so that a business assured will be obliged to disclose facts which he knows or a reasonable ought to know in the circumstances. Secondly, deviating from the current legal position, the Law Commissions are proposing that if a business assured has made a misrepresentation, but the assured honestly and reasonably believe what it said to be true, the insurer should not have any remedy due to the misrepresentation. The proposal is designed to protect the reasonable expectations of business assured at the pre-contractual stage. Thirdly, the Law Commissions are proposing to change the test for materiality by replacing the "prudent insurer" test by a "reasonable assured" test. The proposed test would focus on the question of what a reasonable assured in the circumstances would think what is relevant to the judgment of the insurer. Finally, the Law Commissions are proposing flexible remedies in case of the breach of the duty. The Law Commissions are proposing no remedy when an assured is acting honestly and reasonably, while avoidance in case of dishonesty. On the other hand, The Law Commissions seem to have an intention to introduce a compensatory remedy in case of negligent breach of the duty.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.65
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• pp.21-49
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• 2015

This study primarily concerns the various franchisor's duties provided under the Draft Common Frame of Reference (here-in-after DCFR) in comparison with those under Korean law. It particularly focuses on the followings. First, it scrutinizes the rules on the scope of application in a comparative way, focusing on the following questions; what is the definition of a franchise contract and what are the essential elements of such contract. Second, it investigates in a comparative way the provisons as to the franchisor's contractual duties as follows; 1) a duty to collaborate actively and loyally and coordinate their respective efforts, 2) a duty to provide the franchisee with adequate and timely information before the contract is concluded, 3) a duty to grant the franchisee a right to use the intellectual property rights, 4) a duty to provide the franchisee with the know-how, 5) a duty to render the franchisee with assistance, 6) a duty to ensure the products ordered by the franchisee are supplied, 7) a duty to provide information during the performance, 8) a duty to warn the franchisee decreased supply capacity, 9) a duty to make reasonable efforts to promote and maintain the reputation of the franchise network. Its emphasis is particularly put on the rationals, the contents and the nature of such duties. Third, this study provides legal and practical advice to the contracting parties when they intend to insert either the DCFR or Korean law in their contract as a governing law.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.37-57
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• 1987

This article discussed the characteristics of several Pareto-optimal incentive contracts between owner and labor, more specifically, four situations: reporting output jointly observable by labor ana owner; reporting both output and effort; incorporating other endogenous elements (like capital) that affect the production process and Pareto-optimal fee schedules; and ascertaining the effects of private pre-decision information private- decision information, and per-contact informational asymmetries. Also presented were several extensions of the basic contractual model, and the different components of agency costs associated with labor-owner contractual relations. In a single-period model, the agency problem exists because the uncertainty prevents the owner from using the cash flow to determine unambiguously the labor's action. Holmstrom(1979) suggests that "when the same situation repeats itself over time, the effects of uncertainty tend to be reduced and dystunctional behavior is more accurately revealed, thus alleviating the problem of moral hazard. " Under these conditions, if the labor selects the first-best level of effect in each period, the cash flow will be independent and identically distributed over time. As the number of periods increases, the variance of the labows average output, if he selects the first-best level of effort in each period, gets smaller. Note that for this diversification effect to occur, it is necessary that the owner evaluate the labor's effort over the entire history of his employment, rather than evaluate each period's performance separately. Radner(1980) and Rubinstein and Yaari(1980) consider the extreme case in which there are an infinite number of observations. They show that the owner can eventually detect and systematic shirking on the part of the labor by comparing the labor's average output with what would be expected if the labor had been selecting the first-best level of effort in each period. In a dynamic model with incentive problems we have demonstrated that the labor's second-period compensation will depend on his first-period performance. This allows the owner to diversify away some of the uncertainty surrounding the labor's actions. In addition, this allows the owner to smooth the labor's income over time by spreading the risk of the first-period outcome over both periods. At least some unexplored avenves in this area invite future accounting research: situations where owner has different incompatible objectives and negotiates a contract with labor; circumstances in which owner deals with multiple objectives and negotiates contracts with several labors simultaneously; the value of costly accounting information systems and communication in establishing, Pareto-optimal incentive contracts, and the value and effects of inside information, Thorough theoretical or empirical research on each of these topics not only would increase our knowledge about the role and significance of accounting information but could also provide explanations of the inherent differences among various organizations and in their economic behavior. behavior.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.14
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• pp.103-152
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• 2000

English contract law has traditionally taken the view that it is not the duty of the parties to a contract to give information voluntarily to each other. In English law, one of the principal distinctions between insurance contract law and general contract law is the existence of the doctrine of utmost good faith in insurance law. The doctrine gives rise to a variety of duties, some of which apply before formation of the contract while others apply post-formation. This article is, therefore, designed to analyse the overall structure and problems of the doctrine of utmost good faith in English marine insurance law. The results of analysis are as following : First, the requirement of utmost good faith in marine insurance law arises from the fact that many of the relevant circumstances are within the exclusive knowledge of the assured and it is impossible for the insurer to obtain the facts to make a appropriate calculation of the risk that he is asked to assume without this information. Secondly, the duty of utmost good faith provided in MIA 1906, s. 17 has the nature as a bilateral or reciprocal, overriding and absolute duty. Thirdly, the Court of Appeal in Skandia held that breach of the pre-formation duty of utmost good faith did not sound in damages since the duty did not arise out of an implied contractual term and the breach did not constitute a tort. Instead, the Court of Appeal held that the duty was an extra-contractual duty imposed by law in the form of a contingent condition precedent to the enforceability of the contract. Fourthly, the scope of the duty of utmost good faith is closely related to the test of materiality and the assured is required to disclose only material circumstances subject to MIA 1906, s. 18(1) and 20(1). The test of materiality, which had caused a great deal of debate in English courts over 30 years, was finally settled by the House of Lords in Pan Atlantic and the House of Lords rejected the 'decisive influence' test and the 'increased risk' test, and the decision of the House of Lords is thought to accept the 'mere influence' test in subsequent case by the Court of Appeal. Fifthly, the insurer is, in order to avoid contract, required to provide proof that he is induced to enter into the contract by reason of the non-disclosure or misrepresentation of the assured. Sixthly, the duty of utmost good faith is, in principle, terminated before contract is concluded, but it is undoubtful that the provision under MIA 1906, s. 17 is wide enough to include the post-formation duty. The post-formation duty is, however, based upon the terms of marine insurance contract, and the duty lies entirely outside s. 17. Finally, MIA 1906, s. 17 provides expressly for the remedy of avoidance of the contract for breach of the duty. This means rescission or retrospective avoidance of the entire contract, and the remedy is based upon a fairly crude 'all-or-nothing' approach. What is needed in English marine insurance law is to introduce a more sophiscated or proportionate remedy.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.71
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• pp.171-194
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• 2016

In the UK, the legal principle for the duty of disclosure established in Carter v Boehm case was codified in the Marine Insurance Act 1906("MIA"). The duty of disclosure under the MIA is the pre-contractual duty by the insured and therefore, the insured should disclose the every material circumstance that would influence a prudent insurer's judgement. If the insured violates the duty of disclosure, the insurer is entitled to avoid the insurance contract, regardless of whether there was the deliberate or reckless breach, which is unfavorable to the insured. The Law Commission reviewed the duty of disclosure under the MIA in detail and provided the Insurance Act 2015 for the purpose of enhancing the interests of the insured. The Insurance Act 2015("Act"),while the basic legal structure of the duty of disclosure under the MIA still remains, amends it in respect of non-consumer insurance and furthermore, integrate the duty of disclosure and the duty not to misrepresent into the duty of fair presentation of risk. And according to the Act, the insurer is required to more actively communicate with the insured before entering the contract with the result that, if the insured fails to disclose the material circumstance but provides the sufficient information to put the insurer on notice, the insurer should further inquire for the purpose of the insured's revealing the material circumstance. In addition, the Act details the insured's constructive knowledge of material circumstance by reviewing the current case law and introduces a new system for the insurer's proportionate remedy against the insured's breach of the duty of fair presentation of risk.