• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.111-128
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• 2002

The Ministerial Declaration of the 4th WTO Ministerial Meeting at Doha in November 2001 announced the launch of the New Round and a completion date of January 1st, 2005. It agreed to eventually negotiate trade and environment linkage issues, such as the relationship between the WTO rules and Multilateral Environment Agreements and the reduction or elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and services. The Committee on Trade and Environment was instructed to pursue work on all items on its agenda within the current terms of reference and to give particular attention to the effects of environmental measures on market access, relevant provisions of the TRTPS Agreement, and labelling requirements for environmental purposes. This means that far the first time, the members of the WTO will discuss and negotiate trade and environment linkage in the framework of multilateral trade negotiation. Korea, from the standpoint of a smaller open economy heavily dependent on international trade, is obliged to overcome the challenges imposed by the environment agenda in the Doha declaration. This study examined the linkage among environment, economic growth and international trade in order to review the possible trade and environment policy implications in Korea. Mutual supportiveness of trade and environment depends much on the effectiveness of trade and environment policy coordination. In this regard, we conclude that the Korean government should provide an appropriate institutional framework to promote closer cooperation among policy makers engaged in negotiations. Trade and environment policy review and environmental impact assessment of trade negotiation should be considered as a work programme of this institutional policy coordination framework.

• Journal of International Area Studies (JIAS)
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.81-110
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• 2018

In this paper, we examined the regional economic integration, the trade negotiation strategy and bargaining power of the European Union through the logical structure of the three - dimensional game theory. In the three - dimensional game theory, the negotiator emphasized that the negotiation strategy of the triple side existed while simultaneously operating the game standing on the boundary of each side game, constrained from each direction or occasionally using the constraint as an opportunity. The study of three-dimensional game theory is aimed at organizing the process of coordinating opinions and meditating interests at the international level, regional level and member level by the regional union as a subject of negotiation. This study would compare and analyze the recently concluded EU-Japan EPA (Economic Partnership Agreement) negotiation process with the case of the EU FTA, and summarize the logic of the three-dimensional game theory applicable to the FTA of the regional economic partnership. Furthermore, the study would illustrate the strategies of the regional economic cooperatives to respond to negotiations. The area of trade policy at the EU level has already been completed by the exclusive power of the Union on areas where it is difficult to politicize with technical features. Moreover, the fact that the policy process at the Union level has not been revealed as a political issue, and that the public opinion process is a double-step approach. In conclusion, the EU's trade policy process constitutes a complicated and sophisticated process with the allocation of authority by various central organizations. The mechanism of negotiation is paradoxically simplified because of the common policy decision process and the structural characteristics of the trade zone, and the bargaining power at the community level is enhanced. As a result, the European Commission would function as a very strong negotiator in bilateral trade negotiations at the international level.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.13 no.5
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• pp.3-10
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• 2013

This study is trying to suggest the continuity and changes that would be made in inter-Korean military negotiations in the future under the Kim Jeong-eun regime by analyzing the recent inter-Korean Working-Level Talks for Gaeseong Industrial Complex based on 'anti-Japanese guerilla style negotiation model, the military negotiation model under Kim Jeong-il era. Especially, through analysis of the inter-Korean Working-Level Talks for Gaeseong Industrial Complex, it is verified that behavior similar to that in the military talks in the past is found even in the economic negotiations. Such analysis leads to an assumption that negotiations under the Kim Jeong-eun regime would be made within the category of the military negotiations under the Kim Jeong-il era. Fundamentally North Korea will change but try to achieve its objectives in the military talks within the existing frame of strategic culture rather than changing it. Such phenomenon will continue for some time. In the future inter-Korean military talks, however, North Korea will try to change its behavior to cope with its financial difficulties. Accordingly, the South Korea's government will have to have paradigm shift toward inter-Korean military negotiations. Especially, Kim Jeong-eun's studying abroad in the past will make him change in the negotiations. At this moment, the South Korean government must make continuous efforts to induce dialogue and negotiation. In order to induce the North Korea to change, the development of economic norm logic with the united front applied in the strategic culture of military negotiation and the formation of a value system in the North Korea's military negotiation policy makers will lead to the creation of a new military negotiation framework.

• Korean journal of communication and information
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• v.22
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• pp.77-106
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• 2003

As globalization of communication is going on and as the media have become increasingly central to the world economy, media policy matters have become the province of world economic organizations like the IMF and the WTO. The WTO service negotiation is focused primarily on the discriminatory and quantitative barriers associated with the trade of audiovisual services. Domestic measures such as subsidization, content regulation including quotas, and licensing requirements and restrictions on foreign ownership and control are at issues here. These measures have been successfully implemented by countries wishing to withstand competition from the American audiovisual industry. The debate about trade in audiovisual services is permeated by the unstated assumption that these programs are pure commodities whose production, distribution, exhibition and in turn, values are solely determined by the market forces. It is therefore presumed that liberalization of trade in audiovisual services will benefit all, serving cultural pluralism and diversity as well as economic efficiency. However, this assumption is not shared by developing countries, the recipients of U.S. television material. They argue audiovisual sector requires a social and cultural approach, since it plays a key role in the preservation of people's identity and social bonds. They claim that it is the each state's right to define its media policy and to implement it through the means it considers fit. These clashing views over the nature of the audiovisual material and the ways in which protect cultural pluralism and diversity do not confine to be the realm of theoretical debate. Each state's interest and motivation to protect its local industry and to have a competitive advantage in the international market is working in this battle. Consolidation with the countries like Australia, Canada, and EU nations, in favour of cultural exemption, seems to be the best policy for us. However, we are not entirely free from the WTO pressures, considering relation to the U. S. This study analyzes Korean Broadcasting Law compared with those of other OECD countries and tries to propose some strategical guidelines facing WTO service negotiation in the area of broadcasting.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.10 no.2
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• pp.3-19
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• 2011

Nagoya Protocol designed to establish criteria about material trade of biological genetic resources(ABS) was adopted in the 10th conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity. In the course of the negotiation for adoption of the protocol, there was conflict between developed and developing countries, resource-rich and poor countries, and multinational corporations and environmentalists. This study investigates conflict process, subjects, issues and major factors in the negotiation case, and analyzes the negotiation by using the Conflict Management Process. To develope conflict management strategies for various conflict cases, we examine previous studies and analyze the intersectional conflict factors of this case and general cases, such as Fundamental side, Resource-allocation side, and Communication/Information-sharing side. These analyses of conflict prevention/resolution of the ABS negotiation show the importance of building mutual trust among stakeholders, enhancing mediator training, and constructing appropriate legislative/policy systems for successful conflict management.

• The KIPS Transactions:PartC
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• v.15C no.6
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• pp.455-468
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• 2008

In this paper, we propose FAS model for establishing trust based on digital certificates in Grid security framework. The existing RBAC(Role Based Access Control) model is extended to provide permissions depending on the users‘ roles. The FAS model is designed for a system independent integrated Grid security by detailing and extending the fundamental architecture of user, role, and permission. FAS decides each user’s role, allocates access right, and publishes attribute certificate. FAS is composed of three modules: RDM, PCM, and CCM. The RDM decides roles of the user during trust negotiation process and improves the existing low level Grid security in which every single user maps a single shared local name. Both PCM and CCM confirm the capability of the user based on various policies that can restrict priority of the different user groups and roles. We have analyzed the FAS strategy with the complexity of the policy graph-based strategy. In particular, we focused on the algorithm for constructing the policy graph. As a result, the total running time was significantly reduced.

• Health Policy and Management
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.1-30
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• 2009

Korean medical fee contract system between the insurer and healthproviders was introduced in 2000. However, a continuous discord among contracting parties concerned and an irrational operation of an arbitration committee of Ministry for Health, Welfare and Family Affairs (MIHWAF) have made it difficult for them to reach to an agreement over last 8 years. The purpose of this study is to observe the current problems of contract system from the view of health insurance law and actual examples. Furthermore, I examined the of breakdown of negotiation by analyzing the eligibility of contracting parties, rationality of Resource Based Relative Value System (RBRVS) and contracting method and fairness of arbitration method in case of negotiation rupture. The results were as follows: First, since the introduction of medical fee contract system, there has been a problem in that both the president of National Health Insurance Corporation (NHIC) and health care provider association have not held strong negotiation power. Second, the frequent changes and notifications of Relative Value Units (RVUs) without any mutual consent between the insurer and provider association negatively have influenced the conversion factors and finally hindered the agreement of contract. Third, a current process that the conversion factors are mediated and determined at the arbitration committee of MIHWAF in the case of contract breakdown between contracting parties has some flaw in that the irrational composition of committee provoked the lack of fairness and objectivity of mediation. Fourth, we can not prospect a satisfactory outcome of arbitration committee because the mediation always has failed to proceed smoothly due to boycott of both committee members from insurer and providers over last 8 years. As a result, we have to make an every effort to resolve problems mentioned above and then dream of an advanced national health insurance system.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.45 no.1
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• pp.79-93
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• 2014

The Act on Distribution and Price Stabilization of Agricultural and Fisheries Product, which specifies rules and regulations on the trading system of fishery products wholesales markets, has been revised several times, mainly in order to improve the trading system. However, there is still a huge gap between the reality and law when it comes to the trading system of the fishery products wholesale market. This study aims to analyze the problems of the trading system of the fishery products wholesale market and to suggest ways to make improvement. The main problem facing the trading system of the fishery products wholesale market is sales on consignment by intermediate wholesalers, and this paper suggests two alternatives to solve the problem. First, intermediate wholesaler can be converted to market wholesalers, but it also entails other problems. The market wholesaler system has never been successfully adopted in the agricultural and fishery products wholesale market, and it is not clear which system is better between the wholesale market corporation and the market wholesaler system. Second, sales on consignment by intermediate wholesalers can be adopted with a positive view toward it. Negotiation transaction can be carried out for sales on consignment as a transaction method under the current Act on Distribution and Price Stabilization of Agricultural and Fisheries Products. However, since the act cannot provide a solution for listing, it is necessary to introduce Japan's negotiated transaction in advance system as a negotiation transaction method.

• Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society
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• v.3 no.3
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• pp.18-35
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• 2000

Universal service policy is the core of telecommunications policy and, therefore, in many countries, governments have been accomplished universal service as the critical goal of telecommunications policy. In the past when the market was under monopoly, the monopolist had the responsibility of supplying for universal service, whereas supply cost complemented through internal assistance. From 1998 when WTO basic telecommunications negotiation took effect, however, telecommunications markets fully opened, it was impossible to supply of universal service under the past system. Therefore, governments of major countries are trying to renew laws and institutions for policies compatible with competition environments. In this paper, I analyse and compare major countries' policies for the universal services and try to find out policy implication for Korea.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.44 no.1
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• pp.301-319
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• 2019

This study is to review the Joseon government's attempt to recover the tariff autonomy lost in the course of entering into the unequal treaty with then-Japan government, as well as the practical effort to realize such an attempt. Among other attempts, the Joseon government ① began imposing tariffs starting September 1878 by establishing Dumopo Customs Office in Busan, ② dispatched on April 1881 a group of investigators to the competent authorities to review and look back the Joseon's tariff system against Japan and ③ entered into a tariff negotiation with then-Japan government on September 1881 with the emissary (Susinsa) Byeong-ho Jo representing the Joseon government. A series of these attempts, in line with each other, represents the Joseon government's ceaseless, constant effort to recover the tariff autonomy, which is what this study intends to review from the modern-day perspectives. Authored by Byeong-ho Jo to capture an advantageous position in the 1881's tariff negotiation against then-Japan government, 「Joilseui」 successfully represented the Joseon government's position on matters of ① the Japanese tax-autonomous district in Korea, ② defining tariff rates, ③ use of Japanese Yen for payment of tariffs, ④ effective period of the treaty and ⑤ export restrictions on grains. Failure of the Joseon government's attempt to recover the Tariff autonomy was attributable not only to, as 「Joilseui」 defined, ① governments' non-cooperative attitudes on the negotiation table, ② lack of authorities that the entrusted bodies had, ③ import tariffs defined high and ④ export restrictions on grains and red ginseng, but also to loss of the tariff autonomy in 1876 and the 1881's negotiation broken down that were plotted by then-Japan government's invasive policy.