• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.447-457
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• 2021

Graphite Isotope Ratio Method (GIRM) can be used to estimate plutonium production in a graphite-moderated reactor. This study presents verification results for the GIRM combined with a 3-D polynomial regression function to estimate cumulative plutonium production in a graphite-moderated reactor. Using the 3-D Monte-Carlo method, verification was done by comparing the cumulative plutonium production with the GIRM. The GIRM can estimate plutonium production for specific sampling points using a function that is based on an isotope ratio of impurity elements. In this study, the ¹⁰B/¹¹B isotope ratio was chosen and calculated for sampling points. Then, 3-D polynomial regression was used to derive a function that represents a whole core cumulative plutonium production map. To verify the accuracy of the GIRM with polynomial regression, the reference value of plutonium production was calculated using a Monte-Carlo code, MCS, up to 4250 days of depletion. Moreover, the amount of plutonium produced in certain axial layers and fuel pins at 1250, 2250, and 3250 days of depletion was obtained and used for additional verification. As a result, the difference in the total cumulative plutonium production based on the MCS and GIRM results was found below 3.1% with regard to the root mean square (RMS) error.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.83-90
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• 2020

The Graphite Isotope Ratio Method (GIRM) can verify non-proliferation of nuclear weapon by estimating the total plutonium production in a graphite-moderated reactor. Using the reactor, plutonium is generated and accumulated through the ²³⁸U neutron capture reaction, and impurities in the graphite are converted to nuclides due to the nuclear reaction. Therefore, the amount of plutonium production and concentration of the impurities are correlated. However, the plutonium production cannot be predicted using only the absolute concentration of the impurities. It can only be predicted when the initial concentration of the impurities is obtained because the concentration, at a certain time, depends on it. Nevertheless, the ratios of the isotopes in an element are known regardless of the impurity of an element in the graphite moderator. Thus, the correlation between the isotope ratio and amount of plutonium produced helps predict plutonium production in a graphite-moderated reactor. Boron, Lithium, Chlorine, Titanium, and Uranium are known as indicator elements in the GIRM. To assess whether the correlation between the indicator isotope and amount of plutonium produced is independent of the initial concentration of the impurities, four different impurity compositions of graphite were used. ¹⁰B/¹¹B, ³⁶Cl/³⁵Cl, ⁴⁸Ti/⁴⁹Ti, and ²³⁵U/²³⁸U had a consistent correlation with the cumulative plutonium production, regardless of the initial impurity concentration of the graphite, because these isotopes were not generated through the nuclear reaction of other elements. On the other hand, the correlation between ⁶Li/⁷Li and plutonium production depended on the initial concentration of the impurities in graphite. Although ⁷Li can be produced through the neutron capture reaction of ⁶Li, the (n, α) reaction of ¹⁰B was the major source of ⁷Li. Therefore, the initial concentration of ¹⁰B affected the production of ⁷Li, making Li unsuitable as an indicator element for the GIRM.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.52 no.3
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• pp.499-507
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• 2020

Research reactors for radioisotope production, fuel and material testing and research activities are designed, constructed and operated based on the society's needs. In this study, neutronic and thermal hydraulic design of a high neutron flux research reactor core for radioisotope production is presented. Main parameters including core excess reactivity, reactivity variations, power and flux distribution during the cycle, axial and radial power peaking factors (PPF), Pu₂₃₉ production and minimum DNBR are calculated by nuclear deterministic codes. Core calculations performed by deterministic codes are validated with Monte Carlo code. Comparison of the neutronic parameters obtained from deterministic and Monte Carlo codes indicates good agreement. Finally, subchannel analysis performed for the hot channel to evaluate the maximum fuel and clad temperatures. The results show that the average thermal neutron flux at the beginning of cycle (BOC) is 1.0811 × 10¹⁴ n/㎠-s and at the end of cycle (EOC) is 1.229 × 10¹⁴ n/㎠-s. Total Plutonium (Pu₂₃₉) production at the EOC evaluated to be 0.9487 Kg with 83.64% grade when LEU (UO₂ with 3.7% enrichment) used as fuel. This designed reactor which uses LEU fuel and has high neutron flux and low plutonium production could be used for peaceful nuclear activities based on nuclear non-proliferation treaty concepts.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.56 no.1
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• pp.147-159
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• 2024

Plutonium-238 has always been considered as the one of the promising radioisotopes for space nuclear power supply, which has long half-life, low radiation protection level, high power density, and stable fuel form at high temperatures. The industrial-scale production of ²³⁸Pu mainly depends on irradiating solid ²³⁷NpO₂ target in high flux reactors, however the production process faces problems such as large fission loss and high requirements for product quality control. In this paper, a conceptual design study of producing ²³⁸Pu in a multi-purpose high flux reactor was evaluated and analyzed, which includes a sensitivity analysis on ²³⁸Pu production and a further study on the irradiation scheme. It demonstrated that the target structure and its location in the reactor, as well as the operation scheme has an impact on ²³⁸Pu amount and product quality. Furthermore, the production efficiency could be improved by optimizing target material concentration, target locations in the core and reflector. This work provides technical support for irradiation production of ²³⁸Pu in high flux reactors.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.54 no.2
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• pp.637-643
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• 2022

Uranium and plutonium are required to be accounted in spent fuel head-end and major recovery area in pyro-process for safeguards purpose. The possibility of neutron resonance technique, as a nondestructive analysis, was simulated on isotopic fissile analysis for large scale process. Neutron resonance technique has advantage to distinguish uranium from plutonium directly in mixture. Simulation was performed on U235 and Pu239 assay in spent fuel and for scoping examination of assembly type. The resonance energies were determined for U235 and Pu239. The linearity in the neutron transmission was examined for the selected resonance energies. In addition, the limit for detection was examined by changing sample density, thickness and content for actual application. Several factors were proposed for neutron production and the moderated neutron source was simulated for effective and efficient transmission measurement. From the simulation results, neutron resonance technique is promising to analyze U235 and Pu239 for spent fuel assembly. An accurate fissile assay will contribute to an increased safeguards for the pyro-processing system and international credibility on the reuse of fissile materials in the fuel cycle.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.41 no.2
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• pp.117-121
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• 2016

Background: Definition and grouping of initiating events (IEs) are important basics for probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). An IE in a spent fuel reprocessing plant (SFRP) is an event that probably leads to the release of dangerous material to jeopardize workers, public and environment. The main difference between SFRPs and nuclear power plants (NPPs) is that hazard materials spread diffusely in a SFRP and radioactive material is just one kind of hazard material. Materials and Methods: Since the research on IEs for NPPs is in-depth around the world, there are several general methods to identify IEs: reference of lists in existence, review of experience feedback, qualitative analysis method, and deductive analysis method. While failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is an important qualitative analysis method, master logic diagram (MLD) method is the deductive analysis method. IE identification in SFRPs should be consulted with the experience of NPPs, however the differences between SFRPs and NPPs should be considered seriously. Results and Discussion: The plutonium uranium reduction extraction (Purex) process is adopted by the technics in a model reprocessing plant. The first extraction cycle (FEC) is the pivotal process in the Purex process. Whether the FEC can function safely and steadily would directly influence the production process of the whole plant-production quality. Important facilities of the FEC are installed in the equipment cells (ECs). In this work, IEs in the FEC process were identified and categorized by FMEA and MLD two methods, based on the fact that ECs are containments in the plant. Conclusion: The results show that only two ECs in the FEC do not need to be concerned particularly with safety problems, and criticality, fire and red oil explosion are IEs which should be emphatically analyzed. The results are accordant with the references.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.5
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• pp.19-40
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• 2002

For front, aspect of terror may have to prepare indeed even chemical terror or rocket and small size missile and radioactivity terror because is predicted to become various. Furthermore, when see motion of every countries about nuclear engineerses' bringing round and illicit sale of plutonium, our country may have to prepare in terrorism which is expected thus. So that can finish international event successfully because the United States of America supports great manpower and budget since New York's World Trade Center terror and when see that is considering terror prevention countermeasure, we operate temporarily bursting tube state complete charge team such as terror by each field specialist such as a concern interested including special CBR complete charge moving team among 2002 World Cups soccer game period ahead of international event, must consider safety countermeasure. Specially, biology weapon of chemical weapon and cholera etc. 13 kinds of 5000ton that North Korea plans CBR terror society confusion that North Korea that to terror support nation as well as nuclear weapons development suspicion is defending South Korea communization strategy as real condition that is amplified as well as is saving production brand gets imprinted uses CBR terror at normal times, when see that is planing powerlessness communization unity using CBR weapon at time of war, must operate until bias 2002 World Cups international event finishes cooperation safety countermeasure utensil safely under closer talk between the South Korea ${\cdot}$ Japan ${\cdot}$ North Korea. As for us which must serve 2002 World Cup successfully to accomplish perfectly preparedness of CBR terror firstly, all inhabitants knows well CBR protection trick, and secondly, CBR existing formation that solidify realignment CBR complete charge moving team which of course is consisted of CBR specialist compose and keeping immediate going out attitude operating, by third, that expand CBR individual protection equipment and CBR evacuation equipment and establish individual and group protection attitude naturally, supplement as there is main room that actualize CBR pollution patient's slogan countermeasure by fourth, and develop standard model for CBR terror provision by fifthBecause constructing infra of CBR safety establishing CBR preparedness that utilize it, must minimize damage and contribute inhabitants' life and property protection.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.