• Journal for History of Mathematics
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.97-106
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• 2006

The lattice originated from logic, not mathematics. Around 1880, Peirce thought that all the lattices were distributives, however $Schr{\"{o}}der$ corrected the error around 1890. In 1993, Birkhoff used the term lattice for the first time that had a different meaning from today's lattice. This paper introduces Peirce, and studies correlation among atomic lattices, atomistic lattices, J-lattices, strong lattices and distributive lattices.

• Proceedings of the Korean Fiber Society Conference
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• 2000.04a
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• pp.173-176
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• 2000

• Archives of design research
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• v.18 no.1 s.59
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• pp.5-16
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• 2005

As for the public, it is hard to understand semiotics because of the scope of an enormous semiotics education. This study is making semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce the subject. I thought that utilization can hold his semiotics study in a visual design field. First of all, this study considered design related papers related to the existing semiotics again and study found an error of the existing semiotics study and understanding did category concept with re-definition about semiotics of Peirce. Explained a symbol mark through understanding of semiotics of Peirce. This study was able to get the following conclusion through these results. 1) A symbol mark means one product, sonics, company oneself with a custom. Therefore, it is a rule symbol in the Representation side. 2) A symbol mark symbolizes an object with one symbol, so a symbol mark is a symbol in an object. 3) Because a symbol mark exists through a social rule, in semiotics definition of Peirce, this must become understanding with a Argument symbol. 4) A symbol mark is what a company or an organization field used from the past, and the public are recognizing this how. Therefore, it works as fact a company attaches a symbol mark to own product, and to show the public a symbol mark. A symbol mark is Dicent Sign in Interpretant. A rule and understanding about a lot of types which have various mutual relation, Peirce classification and understanding of a symbol mark tells to demand is holding that understanding a type of semiotics with the concept that is not an image to us.

• Journal of The Korean Association For Science Education
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• v.26 no.6
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• pp.703-722
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• 2006

The purpose of this study is to investigate the characteristics of abduction suggested by C. S. Peirce, and to discuss its implications in science education. Peirce's abduction is the logic of generating hypothesis. Abduction is a kind of logical inference, which colligates general rule and the observed result, and then it makes us judge the observed result as a case of the general rule on the basis of their resemblance. The process of abduction is also the logic of inquiry. In a Peirce's view, inquiry is a struggle for escaping from the condition of 'doubt' and to 'belief the nature of which is the establishment of habits. Because what habit an object has is its whole meaning, in his views, the fixation of belief is the way of attaining the truth related to it. The beliefs of individuals, however, are always fallible. So, to attain a truth, we need the terminal opinion of community of inquiry that could conduct infinite inquiry. These characteristics of Peirce's abduction give suggestions in science education as follows; firstly, hypothesis generating which transforms the condition of 'doubt' into the 'belief by considering practical effects should be highlighted, secondly, logical inference which makes us judge the observed result as a case of the general rule on the basis of resemblance should be highlighted, and thirdly, communities of inquiry which stand on the view of modest realism should be intended toward. These results could be expected in playing a role in critical discussion on science education relating to abduction.

• Journal of English Language & Literature
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• v.55 no.1
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• pp.199-213
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• 2009

From the perspective of pragmatics, language is a mode of act that works in the order of motive and performs human purpose. The function of language is then primarily performative rather than informational or significative. Pragmatics, however, encounters a tough question: what is the relation of the linguistic act to meaning? Many language theories including pragmatic theories admit the autonomy of meaning while defining language as act. But in Deleuze and Peirce we find examples of maximalist pragmatics that denies the autonomy of meaning. However, Deleuze and Peirce are different in their view on the function of meaning. For Deleuze, language is the transmission of act, what he calls 'order-word.' He rejects meaning except as the minimal condition for the transmission. But his theory turns out to be contradictory in that meaning as the minimal condition is actually the function of constants that he denies for order-words that are always variables. On the contrary, Peirce's pragmatism as a radical pragmatics does not exclude meaning. For him, language is interpretative act serving the purpose of understanding reality, which is performed through the function of meaning and 'habit.' This shows that meaning is indispensable to language even in maximalist pragmatics.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.152
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• pp.59-79
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• 2019

The main purpose of this paper is to critically examine the intractable problems of Peirce's notion of 'symbol' as a higher and perfect mode of sign, and present a more appropriate account of the higher status of symbol from an experientialist perspective. Peirce distinguished between icon, index, and symbol, and suggested symbol to be a higher mode of sign, in that it additionally requires "interpretation." Within Peirce's picture, the matter of interpretation is to be explained in terms of "interpretant," while icon or index are not. However, Peirce's conception of "interpretant" itself remains fraught with intractable opacities, thereby leaving the nature of symbol in a misty conundrum. Drawing largely on the experientialist account of the nature and structure of symbolic experience, I try to explicate the complexity of symbol in terms of "the symbolic mapping." According to experientialism, our experience consists of two levels, i.e., physical and symbolic. Physical experience can be extended to symbolic level largely by means of "symbolic mapping," and yet is strongly constrained by physical experience. Symbolic mapping is the way in which we map part of certain physical experience onto some other area, thereby understanding the other area in terms of the mapped part of the physical experience. According to this account, all the signs, icon, index, and symbol a la Peirce, are constructed by way of symbolic mapping. While icon and index are constructed by mapping physical level experience onto some signifier(i.e. Peirce's "representamen"), symbol is constructed by mapping abstract level experience onto some signifier. Considering the experientialist account that abstract level of experience is constructed by way of symbolic mapping of physical level of experience, the symbolic mapping of abstract level of experience onto some other area is a secondary one. Thus, symbol, being constructed by way of secondary or more times mapping, becomes a higher level sign. This analysis is based on the idea that explaining the nature of sign is a matter of explaining that symbolic experience, leaving behind Peirce's realist conception of sign as a matter of an event or state of affairs out there. In conclusion, I suggest that this analysis will open up new possibilities for a more appropriate account of the nature of signs, beyond Peirce's complicated riddles.

• Koreanishche Zeitschrift fur Deutsche Sprachwissenschaft
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• v.3
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• pp.35-55
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• 2001

In der Semiotik ist es sehr wichtig, den Rahmenbereich des Zeichens festzustellen, weil der Bereich des Zeichens je nach Wissenschaftler unterschiedlich ist. Dementsprechend muss jedes Forschungsergebnis in der Semiotik hinterfragt werden, um sichergehen zu $k\"{o}nnen$, ob es zur Semiotik $geh\"{o}rt$ oder nicht. Daher besteht $zun\"{a}chst$ die Notwendigkeit, zu bestimmen, was ein Zeichen ist. In diesem Zusammenhang versuchten wir in diesem Aufsatz, damit wir den Begriff 'Zeichen' besser erfassen $k\"{o}nnen$. das Zeichen von C. S. Peirce mit dem van W. v. Humboldt zu vergleichen. Zu Beginn dieses Aufsatzes stellten wir dar, was ein Zeichen ist. Dieser Vorgang ist notwendig, damit mit Hilfe des allgemeinen Begriffes des Zeichens ein Vergleich zwischen Peirce und Humboldt angestellt werden kann. Danach stellten wir die Zeichentheorie von Peirce vor. Nach Peirce ist die Sprache eine Untergattung von drei Zeichensorten, die Ikon, Index und Symbol genannt werden. Nach ihm gehbrt das Symbol zur Sprache. $F\"{u}r$ ihn ist der Interpretant im Zeichenbegriff am wichtigsten, weil ein Zeichen immer eines Interpretantes bedarf, der das Zeichen interpretiert. Aber der Interpretant ist kein Individuum, sondern ein interpretierendes $Bewu{\ss}tsein$, also eine traditionelle Gesellschaft, die ein Muster zum Interpretieren bietet. $Anschlie{\ss}end\;besch\"{a}ftigten$ wir uns mit der Theorie von Humboldt. Er benutzt verschiedene Zeichenbegriffe wie z.B. Schriftzeichen, Lautzeichen, Sprachzeichen, grammatische Zeichen, $h\"{o}rbare$ Zeichen, zeitliche Zeichen und $r\"{a}umliche$ Zeichen. Bei ihm ist die Unterscheidung zwischen Wort und Zeichen besonders wichtig, weil das Wort nicht zum Zeichen $geh\"{o}rt$, wie wir es normalerweise annehmen. Er behauptet, dass das Wort beim Produzieren motiviert ist. Daher ist nach ihm das Wort transsemiotisch. $Dar\"{u}ber$ hinaus muss das Zeichen und das Wort im Zusammenhang zwischen Sprache und Denken betrachtet werden. Wenn man das Wort als Zeichen betrachtet, ist das Wort ein Zwischending zwischen dem Sprechenden und dem Ding. Damit $k\"{o}nnen$ wir schlussfolgern; 1) Bei Humboldt ist das Zeichen em Mittel zum Denken, das sich vom transsemiotischen Wort unterscheidet. 2) Nach Peirce besteht ein Zeichen aus Ikon, Index und Symbol. Im Zeichen, das aus Reprasentamen, Interpretant und Objekt besteht, ist der Interpretant am wichtigsten, denn ein Zeichen, dass keinen Interpretant hat, ist kein Zeichen mehr, das interpretierbar ist.

• 기호학연구
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• no.54
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• pp.7-36
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• 2018

Michael Polanyi's idea of tacit knowledge came from the realization that scientific objectivity and critical philosophy had become too restrictive for philosophy, especially in the realm of meaning, which is beyond positivistic proof and contains more non-critical elements than critical ones. In social life, people still share certain kinds of knowledge and beliefs which they obtain without making or learning those explicitly. Contemplating the role and significance of tacit knowledge, he called for a post-critical philosophy that integrates the realm of meaning and thereby appreciates the intertwined nature of tacit and explicit knowledge. Polanyi's position towards skepticism and doubt shows similarities with Charles S. Peirce's thinking about the relationship between belief and doubt. Although Peirce's semeiotics stands firmly in the tradition of critical philosophy, he affirms that doubt cannot be a constant state of mind and only belief can form a basis for a specific way of life. Polanyi's approach differs from Peirce's by focusing on the impossibility of scientific knowledge based solely on principles and precision, and his emphasis on the crucial role of the community of scientists. Nevertheless, the deeper implications of Peirce's contemplations on belief and doubt have myriad ramifications on the philosophy of science as well as the sociology of science.

• Proceedings of the Korean Fiber Society Conference
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• 2003.04a
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• pp.396-397
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• 2003

직물의 구조적 특성을 고찰하기 위하여 지금까지 많은 연구가 진행되어 왔으며 그 결과 여러 가지직물의 기하학적 모델들이 제시되었다. 본 논문은 Peirce의 모델을 이용하여 직물내에서 직물의 이완 상태에 따라 실의 구조적인 특성을 고찰하고자 한다. Peirce의 모델로부터 실의 구조적 특성을 알기 위해사는 실의 직경을 구해야하는데 실의 직경은 실제 측정하기가 어려워 대개의 경우 다음 식과 같이 실의 번수로부터 구하게 된다. (중략)

• Journal of the Korean Data and Information Science Society
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• v.26 no.4
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• pp.857-864
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• 2015

By Wikipedia, data mining is the computational process of discovering patterns in huge data sets involving methods at the intersection of association rule, decision tree, clustering, artificial intelligence, machine learning. Clustering or cluster analysis is the task of grouping a set of objects in such a way that objects in the same group are more similar to each other than to those in other groups. The similarity measures being used in the clustering may be classified into various types depending on the characteristics of data. In this paper, we computed bounds for similarity measures based on the probabilistic interestingness measure with partially marginal probability such as Peirce I, Peirce II, Cole I, Cole II, Loevinger, Park I, and Park II measure. We confirmed the absolute value of Loevinger measure wasthe upper limit of the absolute value of any other existing measures. Ordering of other measures is determined by the size of concurrence proportion, non-simultaneous occurrence proportion, and mismatch proportion.