• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.30 no.2
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• pp.225-270
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• 2008

We analyze macroeconomic consequences of pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) public pension system with a simple overlapping generations model. Contrary to large body of existing literatures offering quantitative results based on simulation study, we take another route by adopting a highly simplified framework in search of qualitatively tractable analytical results. The main contribution of our results lies in providing a sound theoretical foundation that can be utilized in interpreting various quantitative results offered by simulation studies of large scale general equilibrium models. We present a simple overlapping generations model with a defined benefit(DB) PAYGO public pension system as a benchmark case and derive an analytical equilibrium solution utilizing graphical illustration. We also discuss the modifications of the benchmark model required to encompass a defined contribution(DC) public pension system into the basic framework. Comparative statics analysis provides three important implications; First, introduction and expansion of the PAYGO public pension, DB or DC, result in lower level of capital accumulation and higher expected rate of return on the risky asset. Second, it is shown that the progress of population aging is accompanied by lower capital stock due to decrease in both demand and supply of risky asset. Moreover, risk premium for risky asset increases(decreases) as the speed of population aging accelerates(decelerates) so that the possibility of so-called "the great meltdown" of asset market cannot be excluded although the odds are not high. Third, it is most likely that the switch from DB PAYGO to DC PAYGO would result in lower capital stock and higher expected return on the risky asset mainly due to the fact that the young generation regards DC PAYGO pension as another risky asset competing against the risky asset traded in the market. This theoretical prediction coincides with one of the firmly established propositions in empirical literature that the currently dominant form of public pension system has the tendency to crowd out private capital accumulation.