• 한국화재소방학회논문지
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• 제17권1호
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• pp.40-45
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• 2003

본 논문에서는 현재 세계적으로 사용되고 있는 화재 PSA 방법론을 살펴보고 화재방호를 목적으로 위험도 정보를 이용할 시 요구되는 방법론의 개선 사항을 파악하였다. 화재 PSA의 결과 및 이를 통한 통찰(insight)은 의사 결정을 하는데 완전한 기술적인 근거라 하기보다는 위험도 정보를 활용한 의사 결정 과정의 일부로서 사용될 수 있으며, 화재 PSA 결과의 적용 분야와 적용 수준은 PSA에서 사용된 모델의 정확성과 타당성에 좌우된다고 할 수 있다. 따라서 화재 PSA의 유용성은 많은 분야의 연구와 개발을 통해 현재 기술 수준 증진에 따라 확대될 것이며, 그에 따라 더 일관성 있는 결과를 낳게 될 것으로 판단한다.

• 한국안전학회지
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• 제34권5호
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• pp.159-166
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• 2019

The seismic PSA is to probabilistically estimate the potential damage that a large earthquake will cause to a nuclear power plant. It integrates the probabilistic seismic hazard analysis, seismic fragility analysis, and system analysis and is utilized to identify seismic vulnerability and improve seismic capacity of nuclear power plants. Recently, the seismic risk of domestic multi-unit nuclear power plant sites has been evaluated after the Great East Japan Earthquake and Gyeongju Earthquake in Korea. However, while the currently available methods for system analysis can derive basic required results of seismic PSA, they do not provide the detailed results required for the efficient improvement of seismic capacity. Therefore, for in-depth seismic risk evaluation, improved system analysis method for seismic PSA has become necessary. This study develops a system analysis method that is not only suitable for multi-unit seismic PSA but also provides risk information for the seismic capacity improvements. It will also contribute to the enhancement of the safety of nuclear power plants by identifying the seismic vulnerability using the detailed results of seismic PSA. In addition, this system analysis method can be applied to other external event PSAs, such as fire PSA and tsunami PSA, which require similar analysis.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• 제41권2호
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• pp.117-121
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• 2016

Background: Definition and grouping of initiating events (IEs) are important basics for probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). An IE in a spent fuel reprocessing plant (SFRP) is an event that probably leads to the release of dangerous material to jeopardize workers, public and environment. The main difference between SFRPs and nuclear power plants (NPPs) is that hazard materials spread diffusely in a SFRP and radioactive material is just one kind of hazard material. Materials and Methods: Since the research on IEs for NPPs is in-depth around the world, there are several general methods to identify IEs: reference of lists in existence, review of experience feedback, qualitative analysis method, and deductive analysis method. While failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is an important qualitative analysis method, master logic diagram (MLD) method is the deductive analysis method. IE identification in SFRPs should be consulted with the experience of NPPs, however the differences between SFRPs and NPPs should be considered seriously. Results and Discussion: The plutonium uranium reduction extraction (Purex) process is adopted by the technics in a model reprocessing plant. The first extraction cycle (FEC) is the pivotal process in the Purex process. Whether the FEC can function safely and steadily would directly influence the production process of the whole plant-production quality. Important facilities of the FEC are installed in the equipment cells (ECs). In this work, IEs in the FEC process were identified and categorized by FMEA and MLD two methods, based on the fact that ECs are containments in the plant. Conclusion: The results show that only two ECs in the FEC do not need to be concerned particularly with safety problems, and criticality, fire and red oil explosion are IEs which should be emphatically analyzed. The results are accordant with the references.